Thesauros Edebiyat Felsefe Θεαίτητος

Θεαίτητος

Θεαίτητος Plato

171

Socrates
SOC. Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.
Theodorus
THEO. Certainly.
Socrates
SOC. Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true? 5
Theodorus
THEO. Necessarily.
Socrates
SOC. But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?
Theodorus
THEO. No, they do not.
Socrates
SOC. And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.
Theodorus
THEO. Evidently. 10
Socrates
SOC. Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?
Theodorus
THEO. Yes.
Socrates
SOC. Then since the truth of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.
Theodorus
THEO. I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

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