Θεαίτητος

Bölümler

142 142–143 143 144 144–145 145 145–146 146 146–147 147 147 147–148 148 149 149–150 150 150 151 151–152 152 152–153 153 153 154 154 154–155 155 155–156 156 156 157 157 157–158 158 158–159 159 159–160 160 160 161 161 161 162 162–163 163 163–164 164 164–165 165 165 166 167 168 168–169 169 169–170 170 170–171 171 171 172 172 172 173 173 174 174 175 175 176 176 176–177 177 177–178 178 178–179 179 179 180 180 180 181 181 181–182 182 182–183 183 184 184 184–185 185 185–186 186 186–187 187 187–188 188 188–189 189 189–190 190 190–191 191 191 192 192–193 193 193 193–194 194 194–195 195 196 196 197 197–198 198 198–199 199 199–200 200 200–201 201 201 202 202 203 203–204 204 204–205 205 205–206 206 206–207 207 207–208 208 208–209 209 209–210 210 210

İngilizce Yunanca

165

Socrates

SOC. And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance, to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions, such as a nimble fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses, and would have argued persistently and unceasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you he would at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?

Theaetetus

THEAET. By all means.