158
Theaetetus
THEAET. Really, Socrates, I don’t see what proof can be given; for there is an exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and antistrophe of a choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had: there is nothing to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we are carrying on this conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.
Socrates
SOC. So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to dispute whether we are awake or in a dream. Now since the time during which we are asleep is equal to that during which we are awake, in each state our spirit contends that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we maintain each with equal confidence.
Theaetetus
THEAET. Certainly.
Socrates
SOC. And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases, except that the time is not equal?
10
Socrates
SOC. Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?
Theaetetus
THEAET. That would be absurd in many ways.
Socrates
SOC. But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of opinions is true?
Theaetetus
THEAET. I do not think I can.
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