Θεαίτητος

Bölümler

142 142–143 143 144 144–145 145 145–146 146 146–147 147 147 147–148 148 149 149–150 150 150 151 151–152 152 152–153 153 153 154 154 154–155 155 155–156 156 156 157 157 157–158 158 158–159 159 159–160 160 160 161 161 161 162 162–163 163 163–164 164 164–165 165 165 166 167 168 168–169 169 169–170 170 170–171 171 171 172 172 172 173 173 174 174 175 175 176 176 176–177 177 177–178 178 178–179 179 179 180 180 180 181 181 181–182 182 182–183 183 184 184 184–185 185 185–186 186 186–187 187 187–188 188 188–189 189 189–190 190 190–191 191 191 192 192–193 193 193 193–194 194 194–195 195 196 196 197 197–198 198 198–199 199 199–200 200 200–201 201 201 202 202 203 203–204 204 204–205 205 205–206 206 206–207 207 207–208 208 208–209 209 209–210 210 210

İngilizce Yunanca

154

Socrates

SOC. Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or white or any other color whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call color will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each color appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?

Theaetetus

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I wouldn’t.

Socrates

SOC. Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you? Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?

Theaetetus

THEAET. Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.