Θεαίτητος

Bölümler

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İngilizce Yunanca

152

Socrates

SOC. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold or shall we accept Protagoras’s saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

Theaetetus

THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that.

Socrates

SOC. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

Theaetetus

THEAET. Yes. 10

Socrates

SOC. But seems denotes perceiving?

Theaetetus

THEAET. It does.

Socrates

SOC. Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.

Theaetetus

THEAET. Apparently.

Socrates

SOC. Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false. 15

Theaetetus

THEAET. So it seems.

Socrates

SOC. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth An allusion to the title of Protagoras’s book, Truth. in secret to his pupils.

Theaetetus

THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?