429–430
Socrates
Socrates. Nor utter it or use it as a form of address? For instance, if some one should meet you in hospitable fashion, should grasp your hand and say, Well met, my friend from Athens, son of Smicrion, Hermogenes, would he be saying or speaking or uttering or addressing these words not to you, but to Hermogenes—or to nobody?
Cratylus
Cratylus. I think, Socrates, the man would be producing sounds without sense.
Socrates
Socrates. Even that reply is welcome; for I can ask whether the words he produced would be true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Even that would suffice.
Cratylus
Cratylus. I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.
Socrates
Socrates. Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another?
Cratylus
Cratylus. Yes, I should.
Socrates
Socrates. And you agree that the name is an imitation of the thing named?
5
Cratylus
Cratylus. Most assuredly.
Socrates
Socrates. And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things?
Socrates
Socrates. Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not?
Cratylus
Cratylus. They can.
10
Socrates
Socrates. First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth?
