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Then Tiro says that later in that same speech Cato used arguments that were disingenuous and excessively audacious, not suited to the character which Cato showed at other times, but cunning and deceitful, resembling the subtleties of the Greek sophists. For although, says he, he charged the Rhodians with having wished to make war on the Roman people, he declared that they did not deserve punishment, because they had not made war in spite of their strong desire to do so. He says that Cato introduced what the logicians call an e)pagwgh/, Defined by Cicero, Topica, 42 f., as inductio, or an inductive argument, with examples; see also §§ 45–47, below. a most treacherous and sophistical device. designed not so much for the truth as for cavil, since by deceptive examples he tried to establish and prove that no one who wished to do wrong deserved to be punished, unless he actually accomplished his desire. Now Cato's words in that speech are as follows: v. 4, Jordan. He who uses the strongest language against them says that they wished to be our enemies. Pray is there any one of you who, so far as he is concerned, would think it fair to suffer punishment because he is accused of having wished to do wrong? No one, I think; for so far as I am concerned, I should not. Then a little farther on he says: v. 5, Jordan. What? Is there any law so severe as to provide that if anyone wish to do so and so, he be fined a thousand sesterces, provided that be less than half his property; The law provided that a man should not be fined in a sum greater than half his property. if anyone shall desire to have more than five hundred acres, This was forbidden by a Licinian Law, passed in 367 B.C.; the iuger was really about two-thirds of an acre. Another Licinian Law provided that no one should pasture more than 100 head of cattle, or 500 of smaller animals, on the public lands. The number, and the amount of the fine, are here expressed indefinitely. let the fine be so much; if anyone shall wish to have a greater number of cattle, let the fine be thus and so. In fact, we all wish to have more, and we do so with impunity. Later he continues: v. 6, Jordan. But if it is not right for honour to be conferred because anyone says that he wished to do well, but yet did not do so, shall the Rhodians suffer, not because they did wrong, but because they are said to have wished to do wrong? With such arguments Tullius Tiro says that Marcus Cato strove to show that the Rhodians also ought not to be punished, because although they had wished to be enemies of the Roman people, they had actually not been such. Furthermore, he says that it cannot be denied that to wish to have more than five hundred acres, which was forbidden by Stolo's That is, the Licinian Law of C. Licinius Stolo. bill, is not exactly the same thing as to wish to make an unjust and unrighteous war upon the Roman people; also that it could not be denied that rewards and punishments belong to different categories. For services, he says, that are promised should be awaited, and not rewarded until they are performed; but in the case of threatening injuries, it is fair to guard against them rather than wait for them. For it is an admission of the greatest folly, he declares, not to go to meet wickedness that is planned, but to await and expect it, and then, when it has been committed and accomplished, at last to inflict punishment, when what is done cannot be undone.
