Kitap 8
When these forces had been thus disposed, the Four Hundred, each carrying a concealed dagger and accompanied by the one hundred and twenty young men whom they made use of wherever there was any need of their handiwork, broke in upon the regular senators who were in the senate-chamber, and told them to get their payA drachma each day; see Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Ath., i. 327. For that day they took their pay from the regular official; For the rest of the month the 400 paid it to them. and go out; and they themselves brought them their pay for all the remainder of their term, and as they went out gave it to them.
When in this manner the senate had quietly withdrawn without making any opposition, and the citizens at large raised no disturbance but kept quiet, the Four Hundred entered the senate-chamber and for the present chose by lot prytanesThey were proceeding in the constitutional way. In the regular βουλὴ, the ten tribes took in turn the πρυτανεία or executive control of public affairs for one-tenth of the year (about thirty-five days). The prytanes would have been now forty in number instead of fifty as usual, as the new council consisted of forty from each tribe (Aristot. Ἀθ. Πολ., ch. xxxi.). from their own number, and with respect to the gods observed all the usual rites of prayers and sacrifices as they assumed office. Afterwards, however, they departed widely from the democratic manner of administration —except that they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades—and in general governed the city in a high-handed way.
A certain number of men, though not many, they put to death, for they thought it convenient to have them out of their way, while others they imprisoned, and also removed others from the city. Moreover, they made overtures to Agis, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was at Deceleia, saying that they wished to make peace and that it was only reasonable that he should be more ready to come to terms with them, having no longer to deal with the faithless democracy.
But Agis, thinking that the people would not in this way immediately surrender their ancient liberties, and that if they saw a large army of Lacedaemonians they would not remain quiet, and also not being quite sure at present that the Athenians were no longer in a state of disturbance, did not make a conciliatory response to those who had come as envoys from the Four Hundred. He sent instead for a large additional force from the Peloponnesus, and not long afterwards himself took the garrison at Deceleia together with the new arrivals and came down to the very walls of Athens, hoping either that the Athenians, being now in confusion, would more readily submit on terms pleasing to the Lacedaemonians, or else that, in consequence of the turmoil that would in all probability prevail both inside and outside the city, he would not fail at the first assault to capture the long walls at any rate owing to the absence of troops to defend them.
But when he came close and the Athenians made no move whatever from within the walls, but sending out the cavalry and a portion of the hoplites, light-armed troops and bowmen, shot down some of his men in consequence of their approaching too near and got possession of a number of arms and dead bodies, he at length recognized his mistake and led back his army.
He himself, then, and his own troops remained at their post in Deceleia, but the reinforcements that had come he sent back home after they had remained a few days in Attica. After this the Four Hundred, notwithstanding their earlier experience, kept sending envoys to Agis, and as he now received them more readily and advised them to do so, they sent envoys also to Lacedaemon to negotiate an agreement, since they were now desirous of making peace.
They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army there and to explain that the oligarchy had been set up, not for the injury of the city or the citizens, but for the salvation of the whole Athenian cause; and also to explain that there were five thousand, not four hundred only, who were participating in the government, although, because of their military expeditions and their activities abroad, the Athenians had never yet come to consult upon any matter so important that five thousand had assembled.
So after giving them these and other instructions as to the proper explanations to offer, they sent them off immediately after their own assumption of office, fearing lest— as actually happened—a crowd of sailors might of itself not be willing to abide by the oligarchical form of government, and so, the mischief having once begun at Samos, bring about their own overthrow.
For in Samos a reaction had already set in against the oligarchical movement, and the following events took place at about the very time when the Four Hundred were organizing.
Those of the Samians who at the earlier timecf. ch. xxi. rose up against the aristocrats and were of the popular party changed sides again, being persuaded both by Peisander, on his arrival,cf. 8.63.3. and by his Athenian accomplices at Samos, and became conspirators; they were fully three hundred in number, and were intending to attack the others, as being of the democratic party.
And Hyperbolus, one of the Athenians, a depraved fellow who had been ostracized,Probably in 418 B.C. He was the constant butt of the jokes of Aristophanes. See also Plutarch, Nicias 11; Aristides 7; Alcibiades 13. not through any fear of his power and consequence, but because he was a villain and a disgrace to the city, they put to death, herein acting in concert with Charminus,cf. 8.30.1; 8.41.3; 8.42.2. one of the generals, and a group of the Athenians at Samos, thus giving them a pledge of good faith. And in other like deeds they co-operated with them and were eager to attack the populace.
But the people, becoming aware of their design, disclosed it to Leon and Diomedon, two of the generals—for these submitted to the oligarchy unwillingly, because they held their office by the choice of the popular party—and also to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former of whom was a trierarch and the latter a hoplite, as well as to others who were reputed to be always foremost in opposition to the conspirators; and they begged these not to look on and see them destroyed and Samos alienated from the Athenians, the island to which alone it was due that the empire had held together up to this point.
These men, on hearing their plea, went to the soldiers one by one and besought them not to permit this thing, and especially to the men of the Paralus,For this state ship, see note at 3.33.1. those who sailed on the Paralus being Athenians and free men one and all and always opposed to an oligarchy even before it came; and Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed to any other place, used to leave the Samians some ships as a guard.
Consequently, when the three hundred attacked them, all these, and especially the crew of the Paralus, joined in the defence, so that the popular party in Samos prevailed. And they put to death of the three hundred some thirty who were chiefly responsible for the plot, and three they punished with banishment; as for the rest, they declared an amnesty, and enjoying a democratic government lived together henceforth as fellow-citizens.
The ship Paralus, having on board Chaereas son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had zealously worked for the change in government, was sent by the Samians and the Athenian soldiers with all speed to Athens to announce what had been done; for they did not yet know that the Four Hundred were in power.
As soon as they came to port the Four Hundred at once threw some two or three of the crew into prison, and depriving the rest of their ship and transferring them to another vessel, a troop-ship, they assigned them to guard duty in the neighbourhood of Euboea.
But Chaereas, on seeing the present state of affairs, immediately managed in some way to get off unobserved and returned to Samos, where he gave the soldiers an account of the situation in Athens, going beyond the facts in making them worse than they were. He said that they were scourging everybody by way of punishment, that it was not permitted to say a word against those who controlled the government, that the wives and children of citizens were being insulted, and that the oligarchy intended to seize and keep in confinement the relatives of all the men serving in the army at Samos who were not of their way of thinking, in order that, if they did not submit to their authority, these might be put to death; and he added many other false statements.
On hearing these things the soldiers at first rushed upon those who had been the chief promoters of the oligarchy, and such of the others as had had a hand in it, to stone them; afterwards, however, when restrained by those who took a neutral position and admonished by them not to ruin their cause when the enemy's ships were lying so near in hostile array, they desisted.
After this, Thrasybulus son of Lycus and Thrasyllus, who had been the chief leaders in the revolution, being now openly in favour of changing the government at Samos to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by the most solemn oaths, and particularly those who were of the oligarchical faction, that they would in very truth maintain a democracy and live in harmony, would zealously prosecute the war with the Peloponnesians, and would be foes to the Four Hundred and would make to them no overtures for peace.
The same oath was also taken by all the Samians who were of military age, and in all they did and in whatever might result from the risks they ran the soldiers made common cause with the Samians, being convinced that neither for these nor for themselves was there any haven of safety, but that, should either the Four Hundred prevail or the enemy stationed at Miletus, they were doomed to utter destruction.
So during this period they had come to a state of bitter contention in Samos, the one party attempting to compel the city to accept a democracy, the other to impose an oligarchy upon the army.
But the soldiers immediately held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals and such of the trierarchs as they suspected, and chose others in their stead, among whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus.
Moreover, they rose in their places and made various recommendations for their own guidance, in particular urging that there was no need to be discouraged because the cityie. Athens. had revolted from them; for it was the minority who had abandoned them, who were the majority, and also were in every way better provided with resources.
For since they themselves possessed the entire fleet, they would compel the other cities under Athenian sway to make their regular contributions precisely as if their headquarters were at Athens. And they had, in Samos, a state that was not weak; on the contrary, it had come within a very little of wresting from Athens the control of the sea when it waged war with her;In 440 B.C. (1.115.). and as for the enemy, they would defend themselves against them from the same strong base as before. Furthermore, they were better able, since they possessed the fleet, to provide themselves with supplies than were the people of Athens. Indeed it was because they themselves had been stationed at Samos as an advanced guard that the Athenians at home had even before this commanded the entrance to the Peiraeus;
and now, they added, the others would be brought to such a strait, in case they should not consent to give them back their constitution, that they themselves would actually be better able to exclude them from the sea than the others to exclude them.
Trifling and indeed insignificant was the help which the city was able to give them in overcoming the enemy, and they had lost nothing, seeing that the people at home were able neither to send them money any longer— the soldiers now providing it for themselves—nor to give them good counsel, which is the object for which a state exercises control over armies in the field. Nay, even in this respectie. in giving them good counsel (ἐν τῷ βούλευμα χρηστὸν παρέχειν.) the other party had erred in abolishing the laws of their fathers, whereas they themselves were trying to preserve them and would endeavour to compel the oligarchs also to do so. Thus the men in the army who could give good counsel were at least as good as those in the city.
Alcibiades, furthermore, if they would merely secure for him immunity from punishment and restoration from exile, would gladly procure for them the alliance of the King. Finally, and most important of all, if they should wholly fail to attain their ends, so long as they possessed so large a fleet there were many places of refuge where they could find both cities and territory.
Having thus deliberated together in public assembly and encouraged one another, they went on with their preparations for war no less than before. And the envoys who had been sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, learning how matters stood after they had already reached Delos, remained there inactive.
About this time the Peloponnesian soldiers in the fleet at Miletus were clamouring among themselves, saying that their cause was being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes; by the former because he was unwilling to fight, either before this while they themselves were still the stronger and the Athenian fleet was small, or now when the enemy were said to be rent with factions and their ships had not yet been brought together; nay, they kept waiting for the Phoenician ships which Tissaphernes was to furnish—a mere pretence and not a fact—and thus ran the risk of being worn out by delay; as for Tissaphernes, on the other hand, he was not only not producing these ships, but he was even doing harm to the fleet by not giving it maintenance regularly or in full. Therefore, they said, they ought to wait no longer but should fight to an issue. In all this it was the Syracusans who were most insistent.
Astyochus and the allies were aware of their murmuring, and it was determined after a council to fight a decisive battle; so when the disturbance at Samos was also reported to them, they put to sea with their entire fleet, one hundred and twelve in all, and bidding the Milesians proceed by land towards Mycale they sailed in the direction of Mycale themselves.
But the Athenians, with the eighty-two ships whose base was at Samos and which happened then to be lying at Glauce on the promontory of Mycale—where Samos is only a short distance from the mainland, in the direction of Mycale—when they saw the Peloponnesian ships sailing against them, retreated to Samos, not thinking themselves strong enough in point of numbers to hazard their all on a battle.
Besides, they had learned beforehand from Miletus that the enemy desired to fight, and they were expecting Strombichides to come to their aid from the Hellespont with the ships from Chios that had gone to Abydus;cf. 8.62.2. for a messenger had previously been sent to him. So they retired to Samos;
but the Peloponnesians sailed on to Mycale and encamped there, together with the Milesians and the troops of the neighbouring peoples that constituted the army on land.
The next day, when they were about to advance against Samos, word was brought to them that Strombichides had arrived with the ships from the Hellespont; so they sailed back at once to Miletus.
The Athenians, on the other hand, on receiving these reinforcements, themselves made an advance upon Miletus with one hundred and eight ships, wishing to come to a decisive battle; but when nobody came out against them they sailed back again to Samos.
During the same summer, immediately after this, when the Peloponnesians, though their whole fleet had come together, failed to come out to meet the enemy, thinking themselves unequal to the contest, they were perplexed, not knowing from what source they should get money to maintain so many ships, especially since Tissaphernes provided it wretchedly; so they sent Clearchus son of Rhamphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, according to the orders with which he had originally set out from the Peloponnesus.cf. 8.8.2; 8.39.2.
For Pharnabazus was inviting them to come to him and was ready to furnish maintenance;
moreover at the same time overtures were made to them for the revolt of Byzantium. So these forty Peloponnesian ships put out into the open sea, in order that they might escape detection by the Athenians as they made the voyage. Meeting with a storm, the greater number, under Clearchus, took refuge at Delos and afterwards came back to MiletusThe finite verb is omitted; either there is anacoluthon or the text is corrupt.(though Clearchus afterwards went by land to the Hellespont and assumed command); the rest, to the number of ten, got safely into the Hellespont with their commander, Helixus of Megara, and effected the revolt of Byzantium.
Afterwards, when the Athenians at Samos heard of this, they sent some ships to the Hellespont as a reinforcement and guard, and an insignificant sea-fight occurred off Byzantium, eight ships opposing eight.
Now among those who held control at Samos,Those elected leaders in ch. lxxvi. Thrasybulus, after he had effected the revolution, always held very strongly to the same opinion, that they should recall Alcibiades, and finally in a meeting of the assembly he won the majority of the soldiers to his view. And when these had passed a resolution recalling Alcibiades and granting him immunity, he sailed across to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back to Samos, thinking that their only salvation was to convert Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesian side to their own.