Kitap 8
And Tissaphernes was more inclined to this course, so far as it was possible to conjecture from what he was doing. For he consequently gave his support and confidence to Alcibiades, as though he thought his advice in the matter good, and not only furnished wretched maintenance to the Peloponnesians, but also would not allow them to fight at sea; instead, he kept telling them that the Phoenician ships would come and that they would then contend with superabundant strength; and thus he injured their cause and diminished the vigour of their fleet, which had been very strong; and in general it was too evident to escape notice that he was not zealously co-operating in the war.
This advice Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the King while he was under their protection, not only because he believed it to be best, but also because he was at the same time working for his own restoration to his fatherland, knowing that, if he did not ruin that prospect, it would some day be possible for him to gain the consent of his countrymen and be restored. And the means by which he thought he could best persuade them was this—to make it appear that Tissaphernes was on intimate terms with him;
and that, in fact, is what happened. For the Athenian soldiers at Samos perceived that he had great influence with Tissaphernes, partly because Alcibiades sent word to the most influential men among them to make mention of him to the best people and say that he wished to come home on condition of there being an oligarchy and not the villainous mob-rule that had banished him, and after securing the friendship of Tissaphernes to be a fellow-citizen with them; but of still greater moment was the fact that even on their own initiative the Athenian trierarchs at Samos and the most influential men were bent upon overthrowing the democracy.
This movement began first in the camp and from there spread to the city of Athens. Then certain men crossed over from Samos and had a conference with Alcibiades, and when he held out to them that he would first make Tissaphernes a friend and then the King also, if there were not a democracy —for so the King would have more confidence in them—the influential citizens, who are apt to bear the heaviest burdens, had great hopes for themselves personally that they would get the government into their own hands and prevail over the enemy as well.
So they went to Samos and set about combining in a conspiracy such men as were suitable, at the same time saying openly to the people that the King would be a friend to them and would furnish money if Alcibiades were restored and they were not ruled by a democracy. The multitude, even if at the moment it was somewhat dissatisfied with the scheme, none the less kept quiet because the prospect of pay from the King seemed easy of attainment;
while those who were trying to establish the oligarchy, as soon as they had made their designs known to the people, once more took up the proposals of Alcibiades for consideration among themselves and the majority of the members of the political clubs. And to most of these the proposals appeared practicable and trustworthy;
Phrynichus, however, who was still general, did not find them at all satisfactory, but was of opinion that Alcibiades had really no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and had no other object in view than in some manner, by bringing about in the state a change from its present order, to secure his own return at the invitation of his party associates. The Athenians, however, in the opinion of Phrynichus, must make it their chief concern to avoid being rent with factions. Neither was it in the interest of the King, he said, now that the Peloponnesians were at home on the sea quite as much as the Athenians and held possession of cities in his empire which were not the smallest, to attach himself to the Athenians, whom he did not trust, and thus involve himself in trouble, when it was possible to make friends of the Peloponnesians, from whom he had suffered no harm.
As for the allied cities, to which forsooth they would promise an oligarchical form of government for the reason that they themselves would not be under a democracy, he said that he knew well that neither those which had revolted from the Athenians would be any more likely to come back into the alliance nor would those which still remained allies be more staunch; for they would not want to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy in preference to being free with whichever form they might perchance have such freedom.
And as to those who were called “the good and true” men,ie. the aristocrats. he said that the allies believed that they would bring them no less trouble than the popular party, being as they were providersThe πορισταὶ at Athens were a board appointed in times of financial difficulty to devise and propose (ἐσηγεῖσθαι) new sources of revenue. and proposers to the people of evil projects from which they themselves got the most benefit. Indeed, so far as it rested with these men, they, the allies, would be put to death not only without trial but by methods even more violent, whereas the people were a refuge to themselves and a check upon the oligarchs.
This understanding of the matter, he asserted, the allied cities had gained from the facts themselves, and he was quite sure that this was their opinion. Therefore, to himself at least not one of the schemes that were being advocated by Alcibiades at the present time was satisfactory.
But the members of the conspiracy who had assembled went on as they had originally determined and accepted the present proposals, and prepared to send Peisander and others as envoys to Athens, that they might negotiate both about the return of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy in that city and might make Tissaphernes a friend to the Athenians.
But Phrynichus, knowing that there would be a proposal for the recall of Alcibiades and that the Athenians would accept it, and also fearing, in view of the opposition he had shown in his own speech, that if Alcibiades came back he would do him injury as one who had been in his way, now had recourse to the following device.
He sent to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was at this time still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, secret information by letter that Alcibiades was ruining the Lacedaemonian cause by making Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians, and also wrote an explicit account of his other doings; he added that it was pardonable in himself to devise evil for an enemy, even though this involved detriment to his state.cf. 6.92.2 for similar excuse.
But Astyochus did not even think of punishing Alcibiades, especially as he no longer came within his reach as formerly, but going up to Magnesia to visit him and Tissaphernes he not only told them the contents of the letter he had received from Samos, himself becoming an informer, but also attached himself, as it was said, to Tissaphernes for his own private gain, both in this and in other matters; and it was for this reason that in dealing with the question of the pay, which was not being paid in full, his insistence was rather feeble.
Alcibiades immediately wrote a letter against Phrynichus to the authorities at Samos, telling them what he had done and urging that he be put to death.
Phrynichus was exceedingly disturbed, since he was in the very greatest danger on account of the information he had given; he accordingly wrote again to Astyochus, reproaching him because his former information had not been concealed, as in honour it should have been, and adding that now he was ready to furnish the Lacedaemonians the opportunity to destroy the whole Athenian army at Samos, stating in detail how he could do this, since Samos was without walls; it was not culpable in himself, he concluded, now that he was in danger of his life through their actions, to do this or anything else rather than perish himself at the hands of his bitterest enemies. But Astyochus gave information of this also to Alcibiades.
And when Phrynichus learned betimes that Astyochus was working to injure him and that a letter from Alcibiades about these matters had all but come, he anticipated it by himself informing the army that the enemy intended, seeing that Samos had no walls and that not all the ships were anchored inside the harbour, to attack the camp; he said that he had certain information of this, and that they ought to fortify Samos as quickly as possible and keep a watch upon everything. Now he was general, and was within his powers in acting thus on his own authority.
So they set about preparing the fortifications, and in consequence of this Samos, which in any case would soon have been ready, was more quickly fortified. Not long afterward came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus and that the enemy would soon attack.
But since Alcibiades was not regarded as a trustworthy man, but was believed, as he knew beforehand the plans of the enemy, to be actuated by personal enmity in attributing to Phrynichus a guilty knowledge of them, the accusation did Phrynichus no harm, but rather confirmed his statement by giving the same information.
After this Alcibiades continued to work on Tissaphernes and to urge him to be a friend to the Athenians. Now though Tissaphernes was afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they were there with a larger fleet than the Athenians, nevertheless he wanted to follow this advice if in any way he could do so, especially now that he had become aware of the disagreement that had arisen at Cnidos among the Peloponnesianscf. 8.43.3. about the treaty of Therimenes—for by this time the Peloponnesians were at Rhodes, so that the dispute had already taken place —in the course of which disagreement Lichas had verified the statement made before by Alcibiades, that it was the Lacedaemonian policy to liberate all the cities, declaring that it was intolerable to agree that the King should be master of all the cities over which he himself or his fathers had ever before held sway. Alcibiades, then, as one that contended for a great prize, was assiduously paying court to Tissaphernes.
Meanwhile the envoys that had been sent from Samos with Peisander arrived at Athens and made a statement before a meeting of the people, offering a summary of many arguments but urging with special emphasis that it was possible for them, by recalling Alcibiades and adopting a different form of democratic government, both to have the King as their ally and to prevail over the Peloponnesians.
But as to the democracy, many others spoke against the scheme, and at the same time the enemies of Alcibiades loudly protested that it would be an outrage if, after defying the laws, he should be restored; the EumolpidaeThe priestly clan which provided the hierophants of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the interpreters of laws touching Impiety. also and the CerycesThe other great priestly house, who actually slew the victims; they are generally mentioned in association with the Eumolpidae. bore witness against him on the score of the mysteries, for whose violation he had been banished, and protested in the name of the gods against bringing him back. Whereupon Peisander came forward and in the face of much protest and abuse took each one of the objectors aside and asked him what hope he had of the salvation of the state, now that the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than they confronting them at sea and a larger number of allied cities, with the King and Tissaphernes furnishing the enemy with money, while they themselves no longer had money, unless someone should persuade the King to change over to the Athenian side.
And when, in answer to this question, they all admitted there was no other hope, he thereupon told them plainly: “Well, this cannot be attained by us unless we form a wiser government and put the offices to a greater extent into the hands of a few, in order that the King may trust us, and unless in our deliberations we take less heed at present about the form of our government than about our salvation (for afterwards it will be possible for us to make a change if there is anything we do not like), and recall Alcibiades, who is the only man in the world to-day who is able to bring this result to pass.”
The assembly was at first displeased when they heard the proposal concerning an oligarchy; but when they had been plainly shown by Peisander that there was no other salvation, through fear and at the same time because they expected to make a change later, they yielded.
So they voted that Peisander and ten others should sail and conduct the negotiations with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades in whatever way might seem best to them.
At the same time, when Peisander brought a false accusation against Phrynichus, they deposed him and his colleague Scironides from command and sent in their stead Diomedon and Leon to take charge of the fleet. For Peisander alleged that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, and slandered him, because he did not believe him to be friendly to the negotiations with Alcibiades.
And Peisander also visited all the clubs which chanced previously to exist in the city for the control of courts and officials and exhorted them to unite, and by taking common counsel to overthrow the democracy. Then, after he had made whatever other arrangements the circumstances demanded, so that there might be no further delay, he himself and the ten other men made their voyage to Tissaphernes.
In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by now reached the Athenian fleet, made an advance upon Rhodes. They found the ships of the Peloponnesians hauled up on the shore, and having effected a landing and having defeated in battle the Rhodians who rallied to the defence, they retired to Chalce and continued to carry on the war from there rather than from Cos;
for it was easier for them to keep watch there in case the Peloponnesian fleet should put to sea in any direction. Meanwhile Xenophantidas, a Laconian, had come to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, bringing word that the Athenian fortificationcf. 8.38.2; 8.40.3. was now completed and that, unless they came to their aid with all their ships, the Peloponnesian cause at Chios would be lost. And they intended to go to their aid;
but meanwhile Pedaritus himself, together with the mercenaries under his commandcf. 8.28.5; 8.38.3. and the Chians in full force, attacked that part of the Athenian fortification which protected the ships, capturing a portion of it and getting possession of some ships that had been hauled up on shore. But when the Athenians had come out to the rescue and turned the Chians to flight at the outset, the mercenary force that was with Pedaritus was also defeated, and he himself and many of the Chians were killed and arms were captured in great quantity.
After this the Chians were besieged by both land and sea more closely than ever and there was a great famine in the place. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys led by Peisander had reached Tissaphernes and were holding conferences regarding the agreement.
But Alcibiades (for his relations with Tissaphernes were not altogether firm, he being now more afraid of the Peloponnesians and still wishing to follow the policy inculcated by Alcibiades and wear out both parties) now had recourse to this device—that Tissaphernes should make as great demands as possible upon the Athenians and in this way come to no agreement with them. And Tissaphernes also, as it seems to me, wished the same thing, fear being the motive in his case;
but Alcibiades, as soon as he saw that even on his own terms he did not want to reach an agreement, wished it to appear to the Athenians, not that he was unable to persuade him but that the Athenians, after Tissaphernes had been persuaded and in spite of his wishing to come to terms, were not conceding enough.
For Alcibiades made such excessive demands, speaking himself on behalf of Tissaphernes and in his presence, that although for a long time the Athenians yielded whatever he demanded, the blame for the failure must nevertheless fall upon them; for he insisted that all Ionia should be given up, after that the adjacent islands, and so on. When the Athenians did not oppose these demands, finally, at the third conference, fearing that his utter lack of influence would be openly exposed, he insisted that the King be permitted to build ships and sail along the Athenian coasts wherever he wished and with as many ships as he pleased. At that point the Athenians yielded no further, but believing that there was no way out of the matter and that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, departed in anger and made their way back to Samos.
Immediately after this, in the course of the same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after concluding with them such other agreements as he found practicable, to supply them with maintenance, and not be in a state of complete hostility; for he was afraid that, if they should be in difficulty about the maintenance of a large fleet, they might either be forced to fight the Athenians and suffer defeat, or that, their ships being emptied of men by desertion, the Athenians might get what they wanted without his help; and he was afraid, furthermore and chiefly, that in searching for supplies they might ravage the mainland.
Taking all these possibilities into consideration, therefore, and as a precaution against them, and acting consistently with his policy to reduce the Hellenes to an equality with each other, he sent for the Peloponnesians and gave them supplies, and concluded with them a a third treaty to the following effect:
"In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, an agreement was made in the plain of the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces respecting the King's affairs and those of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. 1.
"The King's country, as much of it as is in Asia, shall be the King's; and concerning his own country the King shall determine as he pleases. 2.
"The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the country of the King to do any harm, nor the King against that of the Lacedaemonians or their allies to do any harm.
If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies shall go with harmful intent against the country of the King, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it; and if any from the King's country shall go with harmful intent against the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall prevent it. 3.