Kitap 8
Tissaphernes adopted these views in the main, so far at least as might be conjectured from his actions. For having on this account placed himself in the confidence of Alcibiades, as of one who had given him good advice on the subject, he both scantily supplied the Peloponnesians with money, and would not allow them to fight by sea; but by telling them that the Phoenician fleet should come to them, and that so they should contend with superabundant strength, he greatly injured their cause, and took off the vigour of their navy, which had been very great; and in all other respects, too evidently to escape observation, he wanted hearty zeal in cooperating with them.
Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the king, whilst he was with them, both because he thought it best for them, and, at the same time, because he was further providing for his own restoration to his country; knowing that if he did not bring it to ruin, he would some time or other have means of persuading his countrymen, and returning to it. But the way in which he thought he should persuade them most easily was this, namely, by Tissaphernes' appearing to be in his interest.
And so it turned out; for when the Athenian soldiers at Samos found that he had great influence with him, [the plan was adopted,] to a certain extent, in consequence of Alcibiades having sent word to the most powerful individuals amongst them, to let it be mentioned to the most respectable people, that he wished to return home on condition of there being an oligarchy, and not that unprincipled democracy which had banished him; and after making Tissaphernes their friend, to enjoy his privileges as a citizen with them: but, at the same time, the trierarchs and the most influential Athenians at Samos were of themselves still more eager for abolishing the democracy.
This design therefore was first mooted in the camp, and thence spread to the city. Accordingly, certain individuals went over from Samos, and had an interview with Alcibiades; and when he held out that he would first make Tissaphernes their friend, and then the king, in case they were not under a democratical government, (for so the king would place greater reliance on them,) the aristocratical party amongst the citizens, who also suffered most at present, entertained many hopes of getting the government into their own hands, as well as of gaining the victory over the enemy.
Accordingly they went to Samos, and united in a club such men as favoured their views, openly representing to the people at large that the king would be their friend, and supply them with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and they were not governed by a democracy.
The multitude, though annoyed to a certain extent by these negotiations, remained quiet because of their abundant hopes of pay from the king; while those who were for establishing the oligarchy, after they had communicated their designs to the mass of the people, again considered the proposals of Alcibiades καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς κ. τ. λ.] Dobree, Göller, Poppo, and Arnold, agree in thinking that ἐν must be inserted before σθίσιν, without which the passage seems to them not fairly intelligible. But may not this be regarded as a dativus instrumenti ? which is certainly used sometimes with reference to persons, though less commonly than to things. One instance of it is given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 608, Obs. 3, from Soph. El. 226, ti/ni gar pot' a)\n, w(= fili/a gene/qla, pro/sforon a)kou/saim' e)/pos; and perhaps a second might have been added from the same play, v. 441, ei)/ soi prosqilw=s au)th=| dokei=Ge/ra ta/d' ou(n ta/foisi decasqai ne/kus. Matthiae, § 396, brings forward another undoubted instance from Eur. Heracl. 392, ἄνδρα γὰρ χρεὼν——οὐκ ἀγγέλοισι τοὺς ἐναντίους ὁρᾶν and another less certain one from Xen. Cyrop. One instance may also, I think, be quoted from Thucydides himself, though I am not aware that it ever has, viz. VIII. 82. 3, ξυνέβαινε δὲ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ μὲν τισσαφέρνει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φοβεῖν, ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸν τισσαφέρνην. There seems therefore to be no sufficient reason why the same construction should not have been used here. If this be admitted, I would apply the same principle to two other passages of our author, of which I have before taken a different view, viz. I. 25, οὔτε κορινθίῳ ἀνδρι προκαταρχόμενοι, and V. 38. 4, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν. With regard to the former, when I wrote the note on it, I had not seen the quotation with which Poppo corroborates Bloomfield's interpretation, and which puts it beyond a doubt, I think, that Arrian, at any rate, took the same view of it. amongst themselves and the greater part of their associates. To the rest, then, they appeared advantageous and worthy of their confidence;
but Phrynichus, who was still general, was not at all pleased with them, but thought that Alcibiades (as was really the case) had no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, or considered any thing else but how, by bringing the state to change its present constitution, he might obtain his recall by the invitation of his associates. What they themselves, however, should most especially look to, was, he said, to avoid being rent by factions. That it was not for the king's advantage, when the Peloponnesians were now on an equality at sea, and held none of the least cities in his dominion, to incur trouble by siding with the Athenians, whom he did not trust, when he might have made the Peloponnesians his friends, by whom he had never yet been injured.
As for the allied states, again, to whom, forsooth, they had promised an oligarchy, because they themselves also would cease to be under a democracy, he well knew that neither those which had revolted would any the more on that account come over to them, nor those that were left be more staunch to them; for they would not wish to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy, rather than to be free, under whichever of those two forms of govern ment they might obtain their liberty.
And with regard to the respectable classes, as they were called, they considered that the oligarchs would not cause them less trouble than the popular government, being as they were the authors and introducers of projects which were evil for the people, and from which they themselves derived most benefit. Indeed as far as depended on them, they would be put to death without trial, and even by measures of violence; whereas the commons were their refuge, and the moderators of the other party.
And as the states had learnt these things from positive facts, he well knew that such was their opinion on the subject. For himself, then, he was pleased with none of the schemes carried on by Alcibiades at present, as before.
But those members of the association who had assembled acceded to the present proposals, as they had at first determined, and prepared to send Pisander and some others on an embassy to Athens, to treat for the return of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in that city, and so to gain the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians.
But when Phrynichus saw that there would be a proposal for the recall of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would accede to it, being afraid, on considering the opposite tendency of what had been maintained by himself, that if he were restored he would do him some mischief, as one who had impeded his plans, he had recourse to the following device.
He sent to Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, with secret instructions that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by bringing Tissaphernes into friendship with the Athenians; expressly mentioning all the other matters also, and pleading that it was pardonable in him to devise evil against a man who was an enemy, even though it were to the detriment of the state.
Now Astyochus did not so much as think of punishing Alcibiades—especially as he no longer put himself in his power as he used to do—but having gone up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, at once told them the contents of the letter from Samos, acting as an informer to them, and for his own private gain devoting himself, as was said, to the interest of Tissaphernes both on these and on all other matters:
for which reason also he was the more gentle in remonstrating with him respecting the pay not being given in full.
Alcibiades immediately sent a letter to Samos giving information against Phrynichus to the authorities there, telling them what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus, being confounded and in the most extreme danger, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching him because his former information had not been duly kept secret, and telling him now that he was prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at Samos; describing the particulars of the way in which he could do it, as Samos was unfortified; and pleading that it was not now culpable in him, being, as he was, in danger of his life through them, to do this, or any thing else, rather than be destroyed by his bitterest enemies. Astyochus gave information of this also to Alcibiades.
Now when Phrynichus had discovered beforehand that he was doing him injury, and that a letter from Alcibiades on the subject was on the point of arriving, he himself anticipated it by announcing to the army, that as Samos was unfortified, and all the ships were not stationed within the harbour, the enemy intended to attack the camp: that he had certain intelligence of this, and that they ought as quickly as possible to fortify Samos and put every thing else in a state of defence. Now he was himself general, and so had full authority to carry out these measures. Accordingly they prepared for the work of fortification;
and owing to this Samos was the more quickly walled, though it would have been so under any circumstances. Not long after came the letters from Alcibiades, saying that the army was going to be betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy were on the point of attacking them.
As, however, Alcibiades was not thought to be worthy of credit, but to have had a previous acquaintance with the plans of the enemy, and through personal dislike to have attributed them to Phrynichus, as though he were privy to them, he did him no harm, but rather bore witness to his statement by sending this intelligence.
After this, Alcibiades tried to bring over and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians; and he, though afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they were there with more ships than the Athenians, was still disposed to be convinced by him, if by any means he could; especially since he had observed the dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians which had been expressed at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes, (for as at this time they ἤδη γὰρ ... ἐγεγένητο.] That is to say, the quarrel had taken place at Cnidus, (ch. 43. 2–4,) and from Cnidus the Peloponnesians had moved to Rhodes, (ch. 44. 1,) therefore as the Peloponnesians were arrived at Rhodes when Alcibiades made his application to Tissaphernes, it was perfectly possible for Tissaphernes to be influenced in his reception of the proposals by his feeling of resentment towards the Peloponnesians, as that, having occurred while they were at Cnidus, must have been prior to his interview with Alcibiades. —Arnold. were at Rhodes, it had already occurred,) in the course of which Lichas had verified the observation which had before been made by Alcibiades about the Lacedaemonians liberating all the states, when he said that it was an intolerable agreement that the king should be master of the cities over which, at any earlier period, either himself or his fathers had had dominion. Alcibiades then, inasmuch as he was struggling for a great object, was earnestly courting and soliciting Tissaphernes.
The Athenian ambassadors, on the other hand, who had been sent from Samos with Pisander, on their arrival at Athens, delivered an address before the people, giving a summary of many arguments, but most especially urging, that by recalling Alcibiades, and not being under a democratical government in the same manner as hitherto, they might both have the king for an ally, and gain the victory over the Peloponnesians.
When many others opposed them on the subject of the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades at the same time exclaimed, that it was a shameful thing if he were to return by doing violence to the laws; and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces adjured them with regard to the mysteries, for which he had been banished, and appealed to the gods against their restoring him; Pisander came forward in the face of much opposition and indignant protesting, and taking aside each one of his opponents, asked him whether he had any hope of preservation for the state, since the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than themselves opposed to them on the sea, and more cities in alliance with them, while the king and Tissaphernes supplied them with money; whereas they themselves had no longer any, unless some one should persuade the king to come over to their side.
When, on being thus questioned, they allowed that they had not, he then said to them plainly, This advantage, then, cannot be attained by us, if we do not adopt a more temperate policy, and put the offices into the hands of a smaller number, that the king may place confidence in us— (and that we may not consult so much at present about a form of government as about the preservation of the state; for we shall have power to alter hereafter whatever may not please us)—and, moreover, if we do not restore Alcibiades, who is the only man at present that can effect this.
The people were at first very indignant on hearing mention made of the oligarchy; but when plainly informed by Pisander that there were no other means of preservation, being afraid, and at the same time having ἐλπίζων.] Ἐπελπίζων is the reading which Bekker adopts from nine of the MSS. in the sense of building their hope on this. But as this use the word appears to belong to later writers only, it would perhaps be better (supposing the compound verb to be the genuine reading) to give the preposition its very common force of addition, having, besides their conviction of present helplessness, the hope of changing hereafter what they did not like. Compare the use of ἐπιθεραπεύων, ch. 47. 1. Or, again, it might imply the idea of a hope in reserve—an after-hope, as in ἐπίνοια and some other words e. g. Soph. Antig. 385, ψεύδει γαρ ἡ ’πίνοια τὴν γνώμην. hopes of changing it again, they gave way.
Accordingly they resolved that Pisander and ten commissioners with him should sail and conclude, as they might think would be best, the negotiations both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.
At the same time, on Pisander's falsely accusing Phrynichus, the people deposed him from his command with his colleague Scironides, and sent Diomedon and Leon to the fleet as generals in their stead. For Pisander calumniated Phrynichus by saying that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, only because he did not think him favourable to the negotiations carried on with Alcibiades.
Pisander likewise visited all the clubs which had previously existed in the city for mutual support in law-suits and elections to offices, and exhorted them to unite together and by common counsels abolish the democracy; and after making all his other preparations to suit the present state of affairs, so that there might be no more delay, he himself with the ten commissioners proceeded on his voyage to Tissaphernes.
In the course of this winter Leon and Diomedon, having by this time reached the Athenian fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they found hauled up; and having made a descent on the territory, and defeated in an engagement those of the Rhodians who went out against them, they withdrew to Chalce, and carried on the war from that place, rather than from Cos; for it was more convenient for their observing whether the fleet of the Peloponnesians put out in any direction.
Xenophantidas the Lacedaemonian also came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, telling them that the wall of the Athenians was now completed, and unless they succoured them with all their ships, their cause would be ruined at Chios. Accordingly they determined to relieve them.
In the mean time Pedaritus, with his mercenaries and the Chians, made a general assault on the fortification round the Athenian ships, and took a part of it, and got possession of some vessels that had been drawn up on shore: but when the Athenians had come out to the rescue, and had routed the Chians first, the rest of the force, more immediately around Pedaritus, was defeated, he himself killed, with many of the Chians, and a great number of arms taken.
After these things the Chians were besieged still more closely than before, both by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. In the mean time, the Athenian ambassadors with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and conferred with him respecting the convention.
But as Alcibiades could not depend on the views of Tissaphernes, who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians, and wished still (as he had been instructed by him) to wear both parties out, he had recourse to the following plan, in order that Tissaphernes, by demanding the greatest possible concessions from the Athenians, might avoid coming to terms with them. Tissaphernes also, in my opinion, wished the same result, being himself led to do so by fear:
but Alcibiades, when he saw that the satrap was not, under any circumstances, desirous of making an agreement, wished the Athenians to think that he was not incapable of persuading him, but that when Tissaphernes had been persuaded, and was willing to join them, the Athenians did not concede enough to him.
For Alcibiades, speaking in person in behalf of Tissaphernes, who was also present, made such excessive demands, that the refusal of the Athenians, although for a long time they conceded whatever he asked, was still the apparent cause of their failure. For they required the whole of Ionia to be given up, and then again the adjacent islands, with other things; and when the Athenians did not object to these demands, at last, in their third interview, being afraid that he would certainly be convicted of inability to keep his word, he demanded that they should permit the king to build ships, and sail along his own coast, wherever and with how many soever he might please. Upon that the Athenians complied no longer, but considering that the business was impracticable, and that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, they departed in a rage, and went to Samos.
Immediately after these things, in the very same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after making still another convention with them, to give them pay, and not have them driven to absolute hostilities with him; being afraid that if they were without supplies for many of their ships, they might either be compelled to engage the Athenians and be defeated, or through their vessels being unmanned the Athenians might without his assistance attain the object of their wishes. And again, he was most of all afraid that they might ravage the continent in search of supplies.
From calculating and forecasting all these things, in accordance with his wish to reduce the Greeks to a footing of equality with one another, he consequently sent for the Lacedaemonians, and gave them supplies, and concluded a third treaty with them, to the following effect:
In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention was concluded on the plain of the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies, with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, respecting the interests of the king, the Lacedaemonians, and their allies.—That the king's country, so far as it lies in Asia, shall belong to the king still;
and that respecting his own territory, the king shall adopt such measures as he pleases.—
That the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not invade the king's territory, nor the king that of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, to do it any harm.— That if any of the Lacedaemonians invade the king's territory to do it harm, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it;
and that if any one from the king's country proceed against the Lacedaemonians or their allies to do them harm, the king shall prevent it.——