Kitap 8
In this manner Oenoe was taken and occupied by the Boeotians, and thus the oligarchy at Athens and the struggle between the factions came to an end.
During this summer, about the same time as these events, the situation of the Peloponnesians in Miletus was as follows:The general purport; there is no verb in the text for the subject οἱ τῇ μιλήτῳ πελοπονήσιοι. After the long parenthesis the subject is resumed in οὕτω δὴ ὁ μίνδαρος, “In these circumstances, then, Mindarus.” None of the officers appointed by Tissaphernes at the time when he went to Aspendus would give them maintenance, and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had yet come; Philippus, who had been sent with him,cf. 8.87.6. and also another person, a Spartan named Hippocrates who was at Phaselis, had written letters to Mindarus, the admiral, saving that the ships would never come and that they were being wronged in all things by Tissaphernes; moreover, Pharnabazus was inviting them to come and was eager, when he should have got the assistance of the Peloponnesian fleet, to do just what Tissaphernes was to have done and to cause the rest of the cities within his province to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby. In these circumstances, then, Mindarus put off from Miletus, in good order and, giving his fleet the command without previous notice that his move might not become known to the Athenians at Samos, he sailed for the Hellespont with seventy-three ships; for earlier in this same summer sixteen ships had sailed thither and had overrun a portion of the Chersonesus. Mindarus, however, was caught by a storm and forced to make harbour at Icarus; there he remained five or six days by reason of bad weather and then went on to Chios.
When Thrasyllus heard that Mindarus had put to sea from Miletus, he also sailed at once from Samos with fifty-five ships, making all haste that the enemy might not enter the Hellespont before him.
But learning that Mindarus was at Chios and believing that he could keep him there, he posted scouts both at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, in order that, if the enemy's ships should make a move in any direction, he should have knowledge of it; as for himself, he sailed along the coast to Methymna, and gave orders to prepare barley-meal and general provisions, with the idea that, if a considerable time elapsed, he would use Lesbos as a base for attacks upon Chios. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against it and take it if possible.
For some exiles who had been driven out of Methymna, and those the most influential citizens, had brought over from Cyme about fifty hoplites that had been taken into their clubs, had hired still others from the mainland, and now with these troops, about three hundred in all, commanded by Anaxarchus a Theban on the strength of kinship,cf. 8.5.2, where the Boeotians support the Lesbians in their application to Agis for assistance; also iii. 2, where the Boeotians are said to be kinsmen of the Mytilenaeans. had made an attack upon Methymna first; and when they had been foiled in this attempt by the timely arrival of the Athenian garrison in Mytilene, and had been again repulsed in a battle fought outside the walls, they had made their way over the mountain and had brought about the revolt of Eresus.
Thrasyllus therefore now sailed thither with all his fleet, intending to assault the town. Thrasybulus also had already arrived there from Samos with five ships, after word had been brought to him of the crossing of the exiles; but being too late to save Eresus, he had merely anchored there on his arrival.
The Athenian fleet was likewise reinforced by two vessels that were returning home from the Hellespont and by fiveOr, reading αἱ μηθυμναῖαι, with B, “(all) the Methymnaean ships.” Methymnaean ships, so that there were present in all sixty-five ships. It was with the troops from these ships that they were preparing to take Eresus by assault, with the aid of engines or in any way they could.
Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, having spent only two days in provisioning and having received from the Chians three Chian tessaracostsLiterally “fortieths” of some local coin, possibly the golden stater; about 4d.; 8 cents. for each man, on the third day set sail in all haste from Chios, avoiding the open sea that they might not fall in with the Athenian fleet at Eresus, but keeping Lesbos on their left, and making for the mainland.
They first touched at the harbour of Cartereia in the territory of Phocaea, where they dined, and then, sailing along the Cymaean coast, supped at ArginussaeIf τῆς ἠπείρου is genuine, there must have been a town Arginussae on the mainland opposite the islands of that Name. The Schol. on Ar. Frags. 33 mentions a town Arginusa. Deleting τῆς ἠπείρου, as Krüger suggests, we should have, “at the Arginussae, opposite Mytilene.” With Hude's text (adding καὶ) the meaning would be that they supped, some at the islands, others on the mainland. on the mainland opposite Mytilene.
Thence they proceeded long before dawn along the coast until they came to Harmatus, on the mainland opposite Methymna; there they breakfasted in haste and then sailed along the coast past Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus and the other places in that region, arriving at Rhoeteum before midnight. Some of the ships even made harbour at Sigeium and other places in that neighbourhood.
But the Athenians who were at Sestus with eighteen ships, when their signallers gave them notice and they observed the sudden blaze of numerous fires on the hostile shore, realized that the Peloponnesians were entering the straits. So that same night, making what speed they could and keeping close to the shore of the Chersonesus, they sailed toward Elaeus, wishing to get by the enemy's ships and out into the open water.
And they did elude the sixteen ships at Abydos,cf. ch. xcix. (end). although these had been cautioned by a friendly boat that sailedThe passage was so understood by the Scholiast (τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ φιλίου ἐπίπλου, τουτέστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ στόλου τοῦ μετὰ μινδάρου.) But commentators find the construction harsh and unexampled in Thucydides with προειρῆσθαι. Tucker explains: “They escaped the notice of the ships at Abydos, who had given warning to their approaching friends (Mindarus) to keep a watch for them in case of their trying to sail out.” So also Goodhart. up to be on the alert in case the Athenians should try to leave the straits; but the ships commanded by Mindarus, which they descried at dawn—and these immediately gave chase—they could not outstrip with their entire fleet, but though most of their ships made good their escape to Imbros and Lemnos, four of them that brought up the rear were overtaken near Elaeus.
One of these, which was stranded at the sanctuary of Protesilaus, was captured with all on board, and two others without their crews; the fourth, which had been deserted by its crew, the enemy burned close to Imbros.
After this Mindarus took all his ships, including those which had been at Abydus and were now united with his fleet, eighty-six vessels in all, and for that day invested Elaeus;
but when it would not yield they all sailed back to Abydus. The Athenians at Eresus, on the other hand, misled by their scouts and never imagining that the enemy could sail past them unobserved, were assaulting the walls at their leisure; but when they learned the truth they abandoned Eresus at once and hastened with all speed to the defence of the Hellespont.
And they captured two of the Peloponnesian ships, which fell in with them at that moment, having put out into the open sea too boldly in their pursuit. A day later they reached Elaeus and cast anchor; then they brought thither the ships at Imbros that had taken refuge there and spent the next five days preparing for the battle.
When that time had elapsed they began the battle in the following manner. The Athenians, arrayed in single column, were sailing close in to sore in the direction of Sestus, when the Peloponnesians, observing their movements from Abydus, went out to meet them.
When they both realised that a battle was imminent, the Athenians, with seventy-six ships, extended their line parallel with the shore of the Chersonesus, from Idacus to Arrhiana, while the Peloponnesians, with eighty-six ships, extended theirs from Abydus to Dardanus.
The right wing of the Peloponnesians was held by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself, who had there his fastest ships; on the Athenian side, Thrasyllus had the left wing and Thrasybulus the right, the other generals being stationed at intervals throughout the line.
The Peloponnesians were eager to strike the first blow, and by outflanking the Athenian right with their own left wing to cut them off from the exit to the straits, if possible, meanwhile in the centre driving them to the shore, which was not far distant. The Athenians perceived their intention, and at the point where their opponents wished to bar their way they proceeded to extend their line to prevent it, and were succeeding in this manoeuvre; indeed, their left had already passed the headland called Cynossema.
But in the centre, as the result of this movement, their line of ships became weak and straggling; and especially since the number of their ships was smaller and the turn of the coast at Cynossema is sharp and angular, so that what was happening on the other side of it was not visible.
Accordingly the Peloponnesians, falling upon their centre, drove the Athenian ships ashore and landed to follow up their victory, having had a decided advantage in the action.
To assist their centre was in the power neither of Thrasybulus and his men on the right, by reason of the multitude of the ships that were pressing hard upon them, nor of the followers of Thrasyllus on the left; for that part of the field was concealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and at the same time the Syracusans and the rest who were arrayed against him, being not inferior in number, hemmed him in. But finally the Peloponnesians, pursuing fearlessly in the flush of victory, some chasing one vessel, some another, began to fall into disorder in a part of their own line.
The Athenians under Thrasybulus, realizing this, now ceased extending their flank, and immediately facing about began to fight the ships that were bearing down upon them, and put them to rout; then intercepting the ships in the victorious part of the Peloponnesian line that had strayed out of line, they smote them and drove most of them into headlong flight without resistance. It so chanced that the Syracusans on their part had already given ground to Thrasyllus and his division, and they took to flight still more when they saw the rest fleeing.
After the rout was thus effected, the Peloponnesians fled for refuge for the most part to the river Pydius at first, but afterwards to Abydus. The Athenians took only a few ships—for the Hellespont is narrow and afforded their opponents places of refuge near at hand—yet the victory which they won in this battle was indeed most opportune.
Hitherto they had been afraid of the Peloponnesian feet, on account not only of the gradual lossescf. 8.42.4; 8.95.7; 8.102.2. they had suffered, but especially of their disaster in Sicily; but now they ceased either to reproach themselves or to consider their enemy any longer of any account in naval matters.
However, they did capture of the enemy's fleet eight Chian ships, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one each belonging to the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians; and they lost fifteen themselves.
So they set up a trophy on the headland where the Cynossema stands, brought in the wreckage, restored to the enemy their dead under a truce, and sent a trireme to Athens to announce their victory.
When the ship arrived and the Athenians heard the news of the good fortune that was beyond their hopes, coming as it did on the heels of the disasters that had recently befallen them in Euboea and in the course of their factional dissensions, they were greatly encouraged, and believed that their cause might still prevail if they should zealously lay their hands to the work.
On the fourth day after the battle, after they had hastily refitted their ships, the Athenians at Sestos sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted; and descrying the eight ships from Byzantiumcf. 8.80.4. lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus, they sailed against them, defeated in battle the forces which on shore aided them, and captured the ships. Then going on to Cyzicus, they brought it back into the Athenian alliance, since it had no walls, and levied upon it a fine of money.
Meanwhile the Peloponnesians on their part left Abydus and sailed to Slaeus, where they recovered such of their captured ships as were sound—the Elaeusians had burned the rest—and sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to fetch the ships that were there.
At about this same time Alcibiades sailed back to Samos with the thirteen shipscf. 8.88.1. from Caunus and Phaselis, reporting that he had prevented the coming of the Phoenician ships to join the Peloponnesians and that he had made Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. He then manned nine ships in addition to those he had, and exacted much money of the Halicarnassians, and also fortified Cos.
Having done these things and appointed a governor at Cos, when it was already nearing autumn he returned to Samos. As for Tissaphernes, on hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke up his camp at Aspendus and set out for Ionia.
For while the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had brought some hoplites from Abydus overland by way of Mount Ida and introduced them into their city, since they were being unjustly treated by Arsaces the Persian, lieutenant of Tissaphernes.
Now this was the man who, when the Delians settled at Atramytteium,cf. v. 1. at the time when they were removed from Delos by the Athenians for the purpose of purifying that island, professing a quarrel which he did not openly declare and proffering opportunity of military service to their leading men, had led them out on an expedition on a pretence of friendship and alliance, and then, waiting until they were at their midday meal, had surrounded them with his own troops and shot them down.
The Antandrians, therefore, fearing that on account of this act of his he might some day commit some outrage upon them also, and because, furthermore, he was imposing upon them burdens which they were not able to bear, had driven his garrison out of their acropolis.
When Tissaphernes heard of this further act on the part of the Peloponnesians, in addition to what they had done at Miletuscf. 8.84.4. and Cnidos,cf. 8.35.1.—for there also his garrisons had been expelled-thinking that he had got into exceeding disrepute with them and fearing that they might do him some further mischief still, and at the same time because he was vexed that Pharnabazus should accept their services, and in less time and at less expense than himself be more successful in coping with the Athenians—for all these reasons he determined to go to the Hellespont and see the Peloponnesians, that he might complain of what had been done at Antandros and might also defend himself as plausibly as he could against the slanderous charges they made against him in connection with the Phoenician ships and other matters.
And so he came first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to Artemis.