Kitap 8
It was in this manner that the Boeotians took and occupied Oenoe, and that the oligarchy and sedition at Athens came to an end.
About the same period of this summer the Peloponnesians at Miletus also executed the following measures. When none of those who were intrusted with the business by Tissaphernes, at the time that he went to Aspendus, afforded them supplies, and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes made their appearance hitherto, but Philippus who had been sent with him, as well as another Spartan named Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus the admiral, that the ships would not join them, and that they were being wronged by Tissaphernes in every respect; and when again Pharnabazus was calling them to his aid, and was desirous to get the ships in his turn, like Tissaphernes, and cause the remaining cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby; under these circumstances, I say, Mindarus, with great regularity, and with orders suddenly given, to escape the observation of those at Samos, weighed anchor from Miletus with three and seventy ships, and sailed for the Hellespont. (Sixteen ships had at an earlier period of this same summer entered that sea, and overrun some parts of the Chersonese.) But being caught in a storm, and compelled to do so, he put in at Icarus, and after remaining there through stress of weather five or six days, arrived subsequently at Chios.
When Thrasylus heard of his having put out from Miletus, he himself also set sail straightway from Samos with five and fifty ships, hurrying on to prevent his sailing into the Hellespont before him.
But on finding that he was at Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts both in Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, that in case of the ships stirring in any direction they might not do so unobserved; while he himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders for preparing meal and other necessaries, with a view of advancing from Lesbos to attack them at Chios, if any length of time should be spent there. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against and take it, if he could.
For some exiles of the Methymnaeans, and those the most influential, having carried over from Cuma about fifty heavy-armed men who had been associated with them, and hired others from the continent, with three hundred in all, of whom Alexander, a Theban, took the command on the strength of his connexion with them, made an attack on Methymna first; and when beaten off from the attempt by means of the Athenian garrison troops which had advanced from Mytilene, and again repulsed in an engagement outside of the town, made their way over the mountain, and procured the revolt of Eresus.
Thrasylus therefore sailed against it with all his ships, intending to assault it. Thrasybulus, too, had arrived there before him with five ships from Samos, on receiving tidings of the exiles thus crossing over; but being too late, he went to Eresus, and lay at anchor before it.
They were also joined by two vessels on their return home from the Hellespont, and by those of the Methymnaeans; and so there were present, in all, seven and sixty ships, with the troops of which they made their preparations for taking Eresus by storm, if they could, with the aid of engines, or in any way whatever.
In the mean time Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, after being victualled for two days, and receiving from the Chians three Chian tessaracostes a man, on the third day put out with all speed from the island, not into the open sea, to avoid falling in with the fleet at Eresus, but sailing to the continent with Lesbos on their left hand.
After touching at the port of Carteria, in the Phocaean territory, and dining, they proceeded along the coast of Cuma, and supped at Argennusa on the mainland, over against Mytilene.
Thence they still coasted on, though it was late in the night, and arrived at Harmatus on the continent, just opposite Methymna, and after dinner passing quickly by Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the towns in those parts, came somewhat before midnight to Rhoeteum, and so were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum, and other places in that neighbourhood.
Now the Athenians were at Sestos with eighteen ships; and when their friends gave them notice by fire signals, while they also observed the fires on the hostile shore suddenly appear numerous, they were aware that the Peloponnesians were entering the Hellespont. Accordingly that same night, sailing as quickly as they could, and keeping close under the shore of the Chersonese, they coasted along towards Elaeus, wishing to escape from the enemy's fleet into the open sea.
And they eluded the observation of the sixteen ships at Abydus, although orders for keeping guard had been before given by their friends who went to them, that they might be on the alert against the Athenians in case they should sail out. But descrying those with Mindarus in the morning, and being immediately chased by them, they had not all time to escape, but the greater part of them did, to Imbros and Lemnus; while four of the ships, which were sailing last, were overtaken off Elaeus.
One of these, which was stranded opposite the temple of Protesilaus, they took together with its crew, and two others without their crews; while the remaining one they burnt, after it had been deserted, close to Imbros.
After this, with the vessels which had joined them from Abydus and the rest, amounting in all to eighty-six, they besieged Elaeus that day, and when it did not surrender, sailed back to Abydus.
As for the Athenians, they had been deceived by their scouts, and did not imagine that the passage of the enemy's fleet could ever escape their vigilance, but were leisurely assaulting the walls of Eresus. When, how ever, they were aware of it, they immediately left Eresus, and proceeded with all haste to the defence of the Hellespont.
And they took two of the Peloponnesian ships, which having on that occasion put out into the open sea more boldly than the rest, fell in with them. The next day they arrived and cast anchor at Elaeus, and bringing in from Imbros such ships as had taken refuge there, they were five days making preparations for the battle.
After this they fought in the following manner. The Athenians, drawn up in column, were sailing close along shore towards Sestos; while the Peloponnesians, observing this from Abydus, put out on their side also to meet them.
When they found that they were on the eve of an engagement, they extended their flank, the Athenians along the Chersonese, from Idacus to Arrhiana, with seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, from Abydus to Dardanus, with eighty-six.
On the side of the Peloponnesians, the right wing was held by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself and the fastest sailing vessels; on that of the Athenians, the left was held by Thrasylus, the right by Thrasybulus; while the other commanders took their position as might severally happen.
It being the object of the Peloponnesians to strike the first blow, and by outflanking the Athenians' right with their own left to exclude them, if they could, from sailing out of the straits, as well as to drive their centre on to the shore, which was at no great distance; the Athenians, aware of this, extended their own wing also where the enemy wished to hem them in, and had the advantage over them in sailing;
while their left had by this time passed the headland called Cynossema. But in consequence of this, they had to form their centre with weak and scattered ships, especially as they had the smaller number at their command, and the coast about Cynossema formed a sharp and angular projection, so that what was doing on the other side of it was not visible.
The Peloponnesians therefore, falling on their centre, drove the Athenian ships ashore, and landed to follow up their attack, having had a decided advantage in the action.
To assist their centre was neither in the power of Thrasybulu on the right, owing to the superior number of ships that were pressing on him, nor of Thrasylus on the left; for it was con cealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and, moreover. the Syracusans and the rest who were opposed to him with no inferior numbers prevented his doing it: until the Peloponnesians, from pursuing, in the security of victory, different vessels in different directions, began to fall into greater disorder in one part of their force.
Thrasybulus therefore, observing this, ceased now from extending the flank, and facing about immediately attacked and routed the ships opposed to him; and then proceeding to those on the victorious part of the enemy's line, handled them roughly in their scattered condition, and threw most of them into a panic without striking a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time yielded the victory to Thrasylus, and taken to flight more decidedly, when they saw the rest doing so likewise.
The rout having thus been effected, and the Peloponnesians having most of them taken refuge at the mouth of the river Midius in the first instance, and then at Abydus, though the Athenians took but few ships, (for the narrow breadth of the Hellespont gave their opponents places of refuge at a little distance,) yet the victory which they gained in this sea-fight was most opportune for them.
For whereas they had before been afraid of the Peloponnesian fleet, in consequence of losses in detail, as well as of the disaster in Sicily, they now ceased to think disparagingly of themselves, and to consider their enemies as good for any thing at sea.
However, they took from their opponents eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one Leucadian, Lacedaemonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, respectively; while they themselves lost fifteen.
After erecting a trophy on the headland of Cynossema, securing the wrecks, and restoring the enemy their slain under a truce, they then despatched a trireme to Athens with the news of their victory.
On the arrival of the vessel, and on hearing of their unexpected good fortune, after the disasters which had recently befallen them in Euboea, and through their own sedition, they were much encouraged, and thought that their cause might still possibly prevail, if they supported it with vigour.
On the fourth day after the engagement, the Athenians at Sestos having hastily refitted their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. And descrying ὀκτὼ ναῦς.] See ch. 80. 4. the eight ships from Byzantium lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus, they attacked them, and took the vessels, after defeating in a battle those who came to help them on shore. On their arrival also at Cyzicus, which was unfortified, they got possession of it again, and levied a contribution from it.
In the mean time the Peloponnesians also sailed front Abydus to Elaeus, and recovered such of their ships as were in sound condition, (the rest having been burnt by the inhabitants,) and then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea, to fetch the squadron that was there.
About this same time, too, Alcibiades returned to Samos with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis, bringing word that he had prevented the Phoenician ships from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made Tissaphernes a more decided friend to the Athenians than before. Having then manned nine ships in addition to those he had already, he levied large sums of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos.
After executing these measures, and placing a governor in Cos, it being now towards autumn, he sailed back to Samos. As for Tissaphernes, when he heard that the Peloponnesian squadron had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he set out again from Aspendus, and proceeded to Ionia.
Now while the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (of Aeolian extraction,) conveyed by land over Mount Ida some heavy-armed troops from Abydus, and introduced them into their city, in consequence of being ill-treated by Arsaces the Persian, Tissaphernes' lieutenant.
This same man, pretending to have a quarrel which he had not yet avowed, and offering service to the chief men amongst them, had induced the Delians, who had settled at Atramyttium, when driven from their homes by the Athenians for the purpose of purifying Delos, to go out as though on terms of friendship and alliance with him; and then, having watched when they were at dinner, had surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them down.
Since therefore they were afraid, on account of this deed, that he might some time or other commit some outrage on themselves too, and since he also imposed upon them burdens which they could not bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.
When Tissaphernes heard of this act also on the part of the Peloponnesians, as well as that at Miletus and that at Cnidus, (for there too his garrisons had been driven out,) considering that he must have incurred their violent displeasure, and fearing that they might do him still further mischief, and, moreover, being vexed to think that Pharnabazus, by receiving them, might in less time and at less expense be more successful in his measures against the Athenians, he determined to go to them at the Hellespont, that he might both complain of what had been done at Antandrus, and defend himself as plausibly as he could against their charges respecting the Phoenician fleet, and all other matters. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus, and offered sacrifice to Diana.
[When the winter following this summer shall have terminated, the twenty-first year will be completed.]