Kitap 7
And the armies on the shore on both sides, so long as the fighting at sea was evenly balanced, underwent a mighty conflict and tension of mind, the men of Sicily being ambitious to enhance the glory they had already won, while the invaders were afraid that they might fare even worse than at present.
For the Athenians their all was staked upon their fleet, and their fear for the outcome like unto none they had ever felt before; and on account of the different positions which they occupied on the shore they necessarily had different views of the fighting.Classen's emendation of the incomprehensible Vulgate seems to have the support of the Schol. διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς χώρας ἄλλοι ἂλλως ἐθεώρουν τὴν ϝαυμαχίαν. Bekker's emendation, δῐ αὐτὸ ἀνώμαλον. . . for διὰ τὸ. . ., is confirmed by one MS. (a2) and makes good sense if we take αὐτὸ to refer either to the idea that their fear was unparalleled or that the stake was so great: “For since the Athenians had their all staked upon the ships, there was fear for the outcome like to none they had ever felt, and on this account they necessarily had different views of the sea-fight”
For since the spectacle they were witnessing was near at hand and not all were looking at the same point at the same time, if one group saw the Athenians prevailing anywhere, they would take heart and fall to invoking the gods not to rob them of their safe return; while those whose eyes fell upon a portion that was being defeated uttered shrieks of lamentation, and by the mere sight of what was going on were more cowed in spirit than the men who were actually fighting. Others, again, whose gaze was fixed on some part of the field where the battle was evenly balanced, on account of the long-drawn uncertainty of the conflict were in a continual state of most distressing suspense, their very bodies swaying, in the extremity of their fear, in accord with their opinion of the battle; for always they were within a hair's breadth of escaping or of perishing.
And in the same Athenian army one might hear, so long as the combatants were fighting on equal terms, every kind of cry at the same time—wailing, shouting, “We are winning,” “We are beaten,” and all the divers kinds of cries that a great army in great danger would be constrained to utter.
The men also on board the Athenian ships were affected in a similar way, until at last the Syracusans and their allies, after the fighting had been maintained a long time, routed the Athenians and pressing on triumphantly, with loud cries and exhortations, pursued them to the land. Thereupon as regards the naval force such ships as had not been captured in the deep water were driven to shore, some to one place, some to another, and the men tumbled out of the ships and rushed for the camp;
as for the army on land, their emotions were no longer at variance, but with one impulse all broke forth into wailing and groaning, being scarcely able to bear what was happening, and ran along the shore, some to the ships, in order to help their comrades, some to what remained of their wall, in order to guard it; while still others, and these the greater number, were now concerned only about themselves and how they might be saved.
And at the moment there reigned a consternation greater than any fear felt before. These men had now suffered a fate not unlike that which they had themselves inflicted upon the Lacedaemonians at Pylos; for when their fleet had been destroyed there, the men who had crossed over to the island were also as good as lost to them.cf. iv. 14. And so at the present time the Athenians could have no hope of getting safely away by land unless something quite extraordinary should happen.
The battle having been thus stubbornly fought and many men and ships lost on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies were victorious and gathered up their wrecks and their dead and after that sailed home and set up a trophy.
The Athenians, however, were so affected by the magnitude of their present ills that they did not even give a thought to wrecks or dead, or ask leave to take them up, but were planning an immediate retreat during the night.
But Demosthenes went to Nicias and proposed that they should man once more what remained of their fleet and force their way out, if they could, at daybreak, saying that a larger number of seaworthy ships still were left to them than to the enemy; for there yet remained to the Athenians about sixty, but to their opponents less than fifty. Nicias agreed to this proposal, and the generals desired to man the ships at once;
but the sailors refused to embark, because they were utterly dejected by their defeat and felt that it was no longer possible for them to win. So they were now unanimously of the opinion that they must make their retreat by land.
But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their intention and thinking that it would be a serious matter if so large an army, retreating overland, should settle somewhere in Sicily and be disposed to renew the war upon Syracuse, went to those in authority and explained that they ought not to permit the Athenians to withdraw during the night—giving the reason which led him to this opinion—but that the Syracusans and their allies should immediately march out in full force and build barricades across the roads and forestall the enemy by guarding the narrow passes.
Now the officials were as firmly of this opinion as Hermocrates and thought that these steps should be taken, but since the soldiers had as yet hardly had the rest they so eagerly desired after the great battle and, besides, there was a festival—for the Syracusans happened on this day to be offering a sacrifice to Heracles—they believed it would be no easy matter to induce the men to answer the summons; for in their great joy over the victory most of them had taken to drinking at the festival; and “We expect,” they said, “that they would obey any orders from us rather than to take up arms and march out.” So when it was clear to the officials, considering all these things, that the plan was impracticable, and Hermocrates was no longer making any impression upon them, he himself thereupon devised the following plan:
fearing that the Athenians might leave quietly during the night and get through the most difficult places before they could prevent this, he sent certain of his own friends with some horsemen to the Athenian camp when it was growing dark. These rode up close enough to be heard and called upon certain persons by name, as though they were friends of the Athenians—for there were some who regularly reported to Nicias all that went on in Syracusecf. 7.48.2.—and bade them tell Nicias not to lead his army away that night, since the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to withdraw at his leisure, in the daytime, after having made full preparations.
After saying this these men departed, and those who had heard reported it to the Athenian generals.
So the Athenians, in view of the announcement, in which they saw no trickery, stayed on for that night. And since, even as things were,ie., though an immediate departure seemed forced on them by the circumstances. they had not set out immediately, it seemed to them best to wait during the following day also, in order that the soldiers might pack up what was most useful, as well as they could in the circumstances, and then be off, leaving everything else behind and taking along only such of the supplies on hand as would serve for the sustenance of the body.
But the Syracusans and Gylippus went out ahead of them with their infantry and blocked up the roads in the country by which it was likely that the Athenians would travel, set guards at the fords across the streams and rivers, and posted themselves, at such points as seemed favourable, for the reception of the Athenian army, with the intention of opposing its progress. They also sailed up with their ships and began to haul down the Athenian ships from the beach and tow them away; the Athenians themselves had already, it is true, burned some few of their ships, as had been their purpose with the whole fleet,cf. 7.60.2. but all the rest the Syracusans, at their leisure and without opposition, taking them one at a time according as they happened to have run aground, lashed to their own ships and brought to the city.
After this, when it seemed to Nicias and Demosthenes that adequate preparations had been made, the departure of the army at last took place —on the third day following the sea-fight.
And it was terrible, not in one aspect only of their fortunes, in that they were going away after losing all their ships, and, in place of high hopes, with danger threatening both themselves and their State, but also in that, on the abandonment of their camp, it fell to the lot of each man to see things that were painful both to sight and mind.
The corpses were still unburied, and whenever a man saw one of his own friends lying dead, he was plunged into grief commingled with fear; and the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, far more than the dead seemed piteous to the living, and were more wretched than those that had perished.
For turning to entreaty and lamentation, they drove the men to distraction; begging to be taken along and calling aloud upon each one if they saw anywhere a comrade or a kinsman, clinging to their tent-mates now going away and following after them as long as they were able, and then, when the bodily strength of one or another failed, falling behind, though not without faint“Faint” is Classen's interpretation of ὸλίγων, as used of the weak, scarcely audible voice of the dying, in their last complaints and appeals to the gods. Cf. Od. xiv. 492, φθεγξάμενος ὀλίγῃ ὸπί, speaking with faint voice. On the other hand, μέγας is often used of a loud shout. But most editors object to ὀλίγων. Arnold thinks that the negative must be repeated, as if we had οὐκ ἄνευ οὐκ ὀλίγων and Valla translates, non sine multis obtestationibus ac ploratibus. Various conjectures have been offered as substitutes, e.g. λυγρῶν (Heilmann), συχνῶν (Poppo), οἰκτρῶν (van Herwerden), ἀλόγων (Madvig). Stahl deletes ὀλίγων as arising from a gloss, ὀλολυγῶν appeals to the gods and lamentations; so that the whole army, being filled with grief and in such perplexity, found it hard to depart, even out of a country that was hostile, and though they had endured already sufferings too great for tears and feared for the future what they might still have to suffer.
There was also a general feeling of dejection and much self-condemnation. For indeed they looked like nothing else than a city in secret flight after a siege, and that no small city; for in the entire throng no fewer than four myriads were on the march together. And of these, the rest all bore whatever each could that was useful, while the hoplites and the horsemen, contrary to their wont, carried their own food, some for want of attendants, others through distrust of them; for there had been desertions all along and in greatest numbers immediately on their defeat. But even so they did not carry enough, for there was no longer food in the camp.
Furthermore, the rest of their misery and the equal sharing of their ills—although there was in this very sharing with many some alleviation—did not even so seem easy at the moment, especially when one considered from what splendour and boastfulness at first to what a humiliating end they had now come. For this was indeed the very greatest reversal that had ever happened to an Hellenic armament;
for it so fell out that in place of having come to enslave others, they were now going away in fear lest they might rather themselves suffer this, and instead of prayers and paeans, with which they had sailed forth, were now departing for home with imprecations quite the reverse of these; going too as foot-soldiers instead of seamen, and relying upon hoplites rather than a fleet. And yet, by reason of the magnitude of the danger still impending, all these things seemed to them tolerable.
But Nicias, seeing the despondency of the army and the great change it had undergone, passed along the ranks and endeavoured to encourage and cheer the soldiers as well as the circumstances permitted, shouting still louder in his zeal as he came to each contingent, and being desirous, by making his voice heard as far as possible, to do some good:
“Even in your present condition, Athenians and allies, you should still have hope—in the past men have been saved from even worse straits than these—and not blame yourselves too much either for your reverses or for your present unmerited miseries.
I myself, who have the advantage of none of you in strength of body—nay, you see how I am afflicted by my disease—and who was once thought, perhaps, to be inferior to no one in good fortune as regards both my private life and my career in general, am now involved in the same danger as the meanest among you. And yet my life has been spent in the performance of many a religious duty toward the gods and many a just and blameless action towards men.
Wherefore, in spite of all, my hope for the future is still confident, and our calamities do not frighten me as much as they might well have done. Perhaps they may even abate; for our enemies have had good fortune enough, and if we have roused the jealousy of any of the gods by our expedition we have already been punished sufficiently.
Others have ere now, we know, gone against their neighbours, and after acting as men will act, have suffered what men can bear. It is therefore reasonable that we also should now hope that the divine dispensations will be more kindly towards us—for we are now more deserving of the gods' pity than of their jealousy—and, furthermore you should, when you look upon yourselves and see what fine hoplites you are and what a multitude you are when marching in battle array, not be too greatly dismayed; nay, remember that wherever you establish yourselves you are at once a city, and that in all Sicily there is no other city which could either sustain an attack from you or drive you out if you once made a settlement anywhere.
And as to the march, you yourselves must see to it that it is safe and orderly, and each one of you must have no other thought than this—that the place, wherever it may be, in which you will be forced to fight, will be, if you conquer, both your country and your fortress.
And we must make haste upon our journey both night and day alike, for such supplies as we have are scanty; and if we reach some friendly place in the country of the Sicels—and we can still depend upon them because of their fear of the Syracusans—then only you may consider that you are in security. Directions have been sent ahead to the Sicels that they are to meet us and bring provisions with them.
Know the whole truth, fellow-soldiers: you must of necessity be brave men, since there is no place near at hand which you can reach in safety if you are cowards; and if you escape your enemies now, the rest of you will win all that you surely long to see once more, and those who are Athenians will raise up again, however fallen, the great power of their State; for it is men that make a State, not walls nor ships devoid of men.”For the sentiment, cf. Alcaeus, frg. 22 ἄνδρες πόληος πύργος ἀρεύιοι; Soph. O.T. 56; Aesch. Pers. 349; Eur. frg. 825; Plut. Lycurg. 19; Dem. xviii. 299; Dio C. LVI. V. 3; Cic. ad. Att. vii. 11.
Such were the words of exhortation which Nicias uttered as he passed along the ranks; and if he saw any part of the army straggling or not marching in line, he brought them together and into order; and Demosthenes did likewise, speaking in much the same terms to the soldiers under him.
And now the army began the march, arrayed in a hollow square, first the division of Nicias leading the way, then that of Demosthenes following.
The baggage-carriers and most of the miscellaneous throng were enclosed inside the ranks of the hoplites. When they reached the crossing of the river Anapus, they found some of the Syracusans and their allies drawn up there, and after routing these and securing the passage they went forward; but the Syracusan cavalry rode alongside and kept attacking them, while their light-armed troops showered javelins upon them.
On this day the Athenians advanced about forty stadia and bivouacked at a hill; but on the next daySecond day of the retreat. they began the march early and after proceeding about twenty stadia-descended into a level place, where they encamped; for they wished to get something to eat from the houses, the place being inhabited, and to get there a supply of water to take with them, since for many stadia ahead in the direction in which they were to go water was not plentiful.
Meanwhile the Syracusans had gone ahead and were engaged in making a wall across the pass in front; and this was over a steep hill, with a precipitous ravine on either side, called the Acraean Bald.“Bald” is a term applied to several bare (unwooded) summits in the Appalachian range in the United States.
On the next dayThird day of the retreat. the Athenians went forward, and the cavalry and javelin-men of the Syracusans and their allies, being in considerable force, sought to impede their march on either side by hurling javelins and riding alongside. For a long time the Athenians kept up the fight, but at length returned to the camp of the day preceding. And they no longer had provisions as before, for by reason of the enemy's cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main body.
Early the next morningFourth day of the retreat. they set out again upon their march, and forced their way through to the hill where a wall had been built across the pass; there they found in front of them the enemy's infantry drawn up behind the wall, not a few shields deep, for the place was narrow.
The Athenians attacked and tried to storm the wall; but when they found themselves targets for the missiles of large numbers of the enemy on the hill, which was steep—and of course the men up above them could reach them more easily—and were unable to force their way through, they drew back and rested.