Kitap 7
In the meantime Gylippus and Sicanus returned unto Syracuse. Sicanus without his purpose at Agrigentum, for whilst he was yet in Gela, the sedition which had been raised in the behalf of the Syracusians was turned into friendship; but Gylippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides the men of arms, which having set forth from Peloponnesus in ships the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of Afric.
For having been driven into Afric, and the Cyrenaeans having given them two galleys with pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the Euesperitae besieged by the Africans; and having overcome the Africans, they went over to Neapolis, a town of traffic belonging to the Carthagenians, where the passage into Sicily is shortest, and but two days and a night's sail over; and from thence they crossed the sea to Selinus.
As soon as they were come, the Syracusians again presently prepared to set upon the Athenians, both by sea and land. The Athenian generals, seeing them have another army, and their own not bettering but every day growing worse than other, but especially as being pressed to it by the sickness of the soldiers, repented now that they removed not before; and Nicias, being now no longer against it as he was but desirous only that it might not be concluded openly, gave order unto all as secretly as was possible to put forth of the harbour and to be ready when the sign should be given.
But when they were about it and everything was ready, the moon happened to be eclipsed; for it was full moon. And not only the greatest part of the Athenians called upon the generals to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition and observations of that kind somewhat too much) said that it should come no more into debate whether they should go or not till the three times nine days were past which the soothsayers appoint in that behalf. And the Athenians, though upon going, stayed still for this reason.
The Syracusians, also having intelligence of this, were encouraged unto the pressing of the Athenians much the more, for that they confessed themselves already too weak for them, both by sea and land; for else they would never have sought to have run away. Besides, they would not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on; but had rather thereright, and in a place most for their own advantage, compel them to fight by sea.
To which end they manned their galleys; and after they had rested as long as was sufficient, when they saw their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp. And some small number of men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates; and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat them back into the camp. But the entrance being strait, there were seventy of the horsemen lost, and men of arms some, but not many.
The next day they came out with their galleys, seventy-six in number, and the Athenians set forth against them with eightysix; and being come together, they fought.
Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians, and desiring to encompass the galleys of the enemies, drew forth his own galleys in length more towards the shore, and was cut off by the Syracusians, that had first overcome the middle battle of the Athenians, from the rest, in the bottom and inmost part of the haven, and both slain himself, and the galleys that were with him lost. And that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased and driven ashore.
Gylippus, when he saw the navy of the enemy vanquished and carried past the piles and their own harbour, came with a part of his army to the pier to kill such as landed and to cause that the Syracusians might the easier pull the enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof themselves were masters.
But the Tuscans, who kept guard in that part for the Athenians, seeing them coming that way in disorder, made head, and charging these first, forced them into the marsh called Lysimeleia.
But when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and their confederates came to help them, then also the Athenians, to help the Tuscans and for fear to lose their galleys, fought with them; and having overcome them, pursued them, and not only slew many of their men of arms, but also saved the most of their galleys and brought them back into the harbour. Nevertheless the Syracusians took eighteen and slew the men taken in them.
And amongst the rest they let drive before the wind (which blew right upon the Athenians) an old ship full of faggots and brands set on fire to burn them. The Athenians on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy, devised remedies for the fire, and having quenched the flame and kept the ship from coming near, escaped that danger.
After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the battle by sea, and for the men of arms which they intercepted above before the camp, where also they took the horses. And the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight of those footmen which the Tuscans drave into the marsh and for those which they themselves put to flight with the rest of the army.
When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their fleet (for they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes), the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of heart. And as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of the voyage.
For having come against these cities, the only ones that were for institution like unto their own and governed by the people as well as themselves, and which had a navy and horses and greatness, seeing they could create no dissension amongst them about change of government to win them that way, nor could subdue it with the greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs, they were then at their wits' end; but now, when they were also vanquished by sea (which they would never have thought), they were much more dejected than ever.
The Syracusians went presently about the haven without fear and meditated how to shut up the same that the Athenians might not steal away without their knowledge, though they would.
For now they studied not only how to save themselves, but how to hinder the safety of the Athenians. For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, that their own strength was at this present the greater, and that if they could vanquish the Athenians and their confederates both by sea and land, it would be a mastery of great honour to them amongst the rest of the Grecians. For all the rest of Greece should be one part freed by it, and the other part out of fear of subjection hereafter; for it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remainder of their strength, to sustain the war that would be made upon them afterwards. And they, being reputed the authors of it, should be had in admiration, not only with all men now living, but also with posterity.
And to say truth, it was a worthy mastery, both for the causes shewn and also for that they became victors not of the Athenians only but many others, their confederates; nor again they themselves alone but their confederates also, having been in joint command with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, and both exposed their city to the first hazard, and of the business by sea performed the greatest part themselves.
The greatest number of nations, except the general roll of those which in this war adhered to Athens and Lacedaemon, were together at this one city.
And this number on both sides, against Sicily and for it, some to help win and some to help save it, came to the war at Syracuse, not on any pretence of right nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as profit or necessity severally chanced to induce them. The Athenians, being Ionic, went against the Syracusians, that be Doric, voluntarily.
With these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians and Imbrians, and the Aeginetae that dwelt in Aegina then, all of the same language and institutions with themselves; also the Hestiaeans of Euboea. Of the rest, some went with them as their subjects and some as their free confederates and some also hired.
Subjects and tributaries: as the Eretrians, Chalcideans, Styrians, and Carystians, from Euboea; Ceians, Andrians, Tenians, from out of the islands; Milesians, Samians, and Chians, from Ionia.
Of these the Chians followed them as free, not as tributaries of money, but of galleys. And these were almost all of them Ionians, descended from the Athenians, except only the Carystians, that are of the nation of the Dryopes. And though they were subjects and went upon constraint, yet they were Ionians against Dorians. Besides these there went with them Aeolians, namely, the Methymnaeans, subjects to Athens, not tributaries of money but of galleys; and the Tenedians and Aenians, tributaries. Now here, Aeolians were constrained to fight against Aeolians, namely, against their founders the Boeotians, that took part with the Syracusians.
But the Plataeans, and only they, being Boeotians, fought against Boeotians upon just quarrel. The Rhodians and Cythereans, Doric both, by constraint bore arms; one of them, namely the Cythereans, a colony of the Lacedaemonians, with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians that were with Gylippus;
and the other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but against their own colony, the Geloans, which took part with the Syracusians. Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, not but that they were free states, but because they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athenians, who were masters of the sea.
And the Corcyraeans, being not only Doric but Corinthians, fought openly against both Corinthians and Syracusians, though a colony of the one and of kin to the other, which they did necessarily (to make the best of it), but indeed no less willingly, in respect of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Messenians, now so called, in Naupactus, were taken along to this war, and the Messenians at Pylus, then holden by the Athenians.
Moreover the Megarean outlaws, though not many, by advantage taken of their misery, were fain to fight against the Selinuntians that were Megareans likewise. But now the rest of their army was rather voluntary.
The Argives not so much for the league as for their enmity against the Lacedaemonians and their present particular spleen, followed the Athenians to the war, though Ionic, against Dorians. And the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries went with them as men accustomer ever to invade the enemy shewed them; and now for gain had for enemies, as much as any, those other Arcadians which went thither with the Corinthians. The Cretans and Aetolians were all mercenary; and it fell out that the Cretans, who together with the Rhodians were founders of Gela, not only took not part with their colony, but fought against it willingly for their hire. And some Acarnanians also went with them for gain;
but most of them went as confederates, in love to Demosthenes and for good will to the state of Athens. And thus many within the bound of the Ionian gulf.
Then of Italians, fallen into the same necessity of seditious times, there went with them to this war the Thurians and Metapontians; of Greek Sicilians, the Naxians and Catanaeans. Of barbarian, the Egestaeans, who also drew with them the most of those Greek Sicilians. Without Sicily, there went with them some Tuscans, upon quarrels between them and the Syracusians, and some Iapygian mercenaries. These were the nations that followed the army of the Athenians.
On the other side, there opposed them on the part of the Syracusians, the Camarinaeans their borderers; and beyond them again the Geloans;
and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond them again the same way, the Selinuntians. These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Afric. Then the Himeraeans, on the side that lieth on the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and only aided them.
These were their confederates of the Greek nation within Sicily, all Dorians and free states. Then of the barbarians there, they had the Siculi, all but what revolted to the Athenians. For Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedaemonians sent them a Spartan commander, with some Helotes and the rest freedmen. Then aided them both with galleys and with land men the Corinthians only; and for kindred's sake, the Leucadians and Ambraciotes; out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians; and Sicyonians on constraint; and from without Peloponnesus, the Boeotians.
To the foreign aids the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added more in every kind than as much again; for they got together men of arms, galleys, and horses, great store, and other number in abundance. And to all these again the Syracusians themselves added, as I may say, about as much more, in respect of the greatness both of their city and of their danger.
These were the succours assembled on either part, and which were then all there; and after them came no more, neither to the one side nor the other.
No marvel then if the Syracusians thought it a noble mastery if to the victory by sea already gotten they could add the taking of the whole Athenian army, so great as it was, and hinder their escape both by sea and land.
Presently therefore they fall in hand with stopping up the mouth of the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide, with galleys laid cross and lighters and boats upon their anchors; and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary in case the Athenians would hazard another battle, meditating on no small matters in anything.
The Athenians, seeing the shutting up of the haven and the rest of the enemy's designs, thought good to go to council upon it.
And the generals and commanders of regiments having met and considered their present want, both otherwise and in this, that they neither had provision for the present (for upon their resolution to be gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the sending in of any more), nor were likely to have for the future unless their navy got the upper hand, they resolved to abandon their camp above and to take in some place, no greater than needs they must, near unto their galleys, with a wall, and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the army, and to man every galley they had, serviceable and less serviceable; and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if they gat the victory, to go to Catana; if not, to make their retreat in order of battle by land (having first set fire on their navy) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach unto before the enemy.
As they had concluded, so they did. For they both came down to the shore from their camp above and also manned every galley they had and compelled to go aboard every man of age of any ability whatsoever.