Kitap 7
In the mean time, Gylippus and Sicanus had come to Syracuse; and though Sicanus had failed in winning Acragas, (for while he was still at Gela, the party Literally, the party for the Syracusans, for friendship with them, as Arnold renders it. See his note. friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out;) yet Gylippus came with fresh troops raised from the rest of Sicily, and with the heavy-armed which had been sent out from the Peloponnese in the spring, on board the merchantmen, and had arrived at Selinus from Libya.
For when they had been carried by a tempest to Libya, and the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes, and pilots for their voyage, during their passage along shore they entered into alliance with the Euesperitae, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and defeated the latter people; and after coasting along thence to Neapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from which the distance is shortest to Sicily, namely, a voyage of two days and a night, they crossed over there from that place, and arrived at Selinus.
Immediately on their arrival, the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again on both sides, by sea and by land. When the Athenian generals, on the other hand, saw that a fresh force had joined them, and that their own circumstances at the same time were not improving, but were daily becoming worse, and most especially were depressed through the sickness of the men, they repented of not having removed before. And as even Nicias did not now oppose them in the same degree, except by begging them not openly to vote on the question, they gave orders, as secretly as they could, for all to sail out of their station, and to be ready when the signal should be given.
And when, after all was in readiness, they were on the point of sailing away, the moon was eclipsed; for it happened to be at the full. The greater part therefore of the Athenians urged the generals to stop, regarding the matter with religious scruple; and Nicias (for he was somewhat over addicted to superstition, and such feelings,) declared that he would not now so much as consider the matter, with a view to moving, until, as the soothsayers directed, he had waited thrice nine days. And so the Athenians, having been stopped on this account, remained in the country.
When the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athenians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were no longer their superiors, either by sea or by land, (for they would not else have meditated sailing away;) and at the same time, because they did not wish them to go and settle in any other part of Sicily, and so to be more difficult to make war upon;
but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, as quickly as possible, in a position that was advantageous to themselves. They manned their ships therefore, and practised as many days as they thought sufficient. And when a favourable opportunity presented itself, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian lines; and a small division of their heavy-armed and horse having sallied forth against them through certain gateways, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routed and pursued them back; and as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed.
On that day, then, the army of the Syracusans drew off; but on the next they both sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their troops against the walls. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closed and fought with them.
Now when Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, and wished to surround the ships of the enemy, had sailed out from the line too much towards the shore; the Syracusans and their allies, after first defeating the centre of the Athenians, intercepted him also in the bottom and furthest recess of the harbour, and both killed him, and destroyed the ships that were following him. After which the Syracusans closely pursued all the ships of the Athenians, and drove them ashore.
When Gylippus saw the enemy's ships defeated, and carried beyond the stockades and their own station, wishing to cut off the men that were landing from them, and that the Syracusans might more easily tow off the vessels, through the land being in possession of their friends, he ran down to meet them at the break-water with some part of his army.
The Tyrrhenians (for it was they who were keeping guard at this point) seeing them coming on in disorder, advanced towards them, and fell upon and routed their van, and drove them into what was called the marsh of Lysimelea.
Afterwards, when the force of the Syracusans and their allies had now come up in greater numbers, the Athenians also advanced against them, being afraid for their ships, and entered into action with them, and defeated and pursued them to some distance, killing a few heavy-armed. They saved also the greater part of their own ships, and brought them together alongside their station; eighteen of them, however, the Syracusans and their allies captured, and put all the men to the sword.
Wishing also to burn the rest of them, they filled an old merchantman with faggots and pine-wood, and having thrown fire into it, and the wind blowing right on the Athenians, they let the vessel drift towards them. The Athenians, alarmed for their ships, contrived, on the other hand, means for checking and extinguishing it; and having stopped the flames and the near approach of the merchantman, they thus escaped the danger.
After this, the Syracusans erected a trophy, both for their sea-fight, and for the interception of the heavy-armed above, at the wall, where they als took the horses; while the Athenians did the same for the rout of those of the infantry whom the Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and for that which they themselves effected with the rest of their army.
When the victory had now been so decisive on the side of the Syracusans, even at sea, (for before this they were afraid of the ships newly come with Demosthenes,) the Athenians were in a state of utter despondency; and great was their disappointment, but far greater still their regret, for having made the expedition. For these were the only states they had hitherto attacked with institutions similar to their own, and living under a democracy like themselves;
possessing, too, ships, and horses, and greatness: and as they were not able either to introduce any change, as regarded their government, to create dissension among them, by which they might have been brought over, nor to effect that by means of their forces, (though κρείσσους.] I have taken this as a nominative case, with Arnold and others, rather than as an accusative, as Poppo is inclined to do in his larger edition; because the superiority of the Athenian forces at the beginning of their operations is quite evident from many other passages, even besides those referred to in Arnold's note; and the use of the participle ἐπελθόντεςat the beginning of the section is more suitable to the commencement of the siege, than to the later period of it, when the Syracusans could with truth be said to be superior to their assailants. Besides, ὄντες is found after κρείσσους in three of the MSS. With regard to the construction of ἐκ παρασκευῆς, it seems to depend upon προσάγεσθαι understood from the preceding προσήγοντο, as Bloomfield observes in the note to his translation. they were far superior,) but had failed in most of their attempts, they were even before this event in perplexity; and after they were defeated even at sea, which they could never have expected, they were far more so still.
The Syracusans, on the other hand, immediately began to sail without fear along the harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, that the Athenians might not in future sail out, even if they wished it, unobserved by them.
For they were no longer attending to their own preservation merely, but also to the prevention of the enemy's escape; thinking (as was the fact) that with their present resources their own cause was decidedly the stronger; and that if they could conquer the Athenians and their allies both by land and sea, the victory would appear a glorious one for them in the eyes of the Greeks. For of the rest of the Greeks some in that case were straight way liberated, and others released from fear, (as the remaining power of the Athenians would no longer be able to bear the war that would afterwards be waged against them;) while they themselves also, being regarded as the authors of this, would be greatly admired, both by the rest of the world, and by posterity.
And the contest was indeed worth encountering, both on these grounds, and because they were winning the victory, not only over the Athenians, but over the other numerous allies also; and, again, not winning it by themselves, but also in company with those who had joined in assisting them; having taken the lead, too, with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, and given their own city to stand the first brunt of the danger, and paved the way, in great measure, for their naval success.
For the greatest number of nations met together at this single city, excepting the whole sum of the confederates assembled, during the war, at the city of Athens or of Lacedaemon.
For the following were the states on each side that repaired to Syracuse for the war, coming against Sicily, or in its behalf, to assist the one side in winning, and the other in keeping possession of the country; taking their stand with one another, not so much on the ground of right, or of kindred, but as they were each circumstanced with respect either to expediency or to necessity.
The Athenians themselves went willingly, as Ionians against the Dorians of Syracuse; and with them went, as their colonists, having the same language and institutions as themselves, the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Aeginetans, who Implying that the present were not the original inhabitants of it. then occupied Aegina; as also the Hestiaeans, who inhabited Hestiaea, in Boeotia. Of the rest, some were serving with them as subjects;
others in consequence of their alliance, although independent; and others as mercenaries. Amongst their subjects and tributaries were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians, of Euboea.
From the islands were the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians: from Ionia, the Milesians, Samnians, and Chians. Of these, the Chians joined as independent allies, not being subject to tribute, but supplying ships. All these were chiefly Ionians, and descended from the Athenians, except the Carystians, who were Dryopes; and though subject, and going from necessity, ῎ἴωνές γε ἐπὶ δωριέας.] That is, it was not unnatural or irksome to them to serve against their natural enemies, although it was not in a quarrel of their own. —Arnold. still they followed at any rate as Ionians against Dorians. Besides these, there were of Aeolic race, the Methymnaeans, subject to supplying ships but not tribute; and the Tenedians and Aenians, who were tributaries. These, although Aeolians, were by compulsion fighting against Aeolians, namely, the Boeotians, their founders, who were on the Syracusan side.
But the Plataeans alone fought as Boeotians καταντικρύ.] Such is perhaps the force of the word, in the absence of any instance in which Thucydides uses it for ἄντικρυς. Otherwise the meaning of absolute or downright Boeotians, would suit the passage much better, as distinguishing between the Plataeans who actually lived in the country, and those before mentioned who were only colonies from it. right in the face of Boeotians, as might have been expected, for the hatred they bore them. Of Rhodians and Cytherians, again, both of Doric race, the Cytherians, though colonists of the Lacedaemonians, were fighting in concert with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians with Gylippus;
while the Rhodians, who were Argives by race, were compelled to wage war against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and the Geloans, who were even their own colonists, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders around the Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians followed, indeed, as independent allies, but still, on account of their insular position, rather by constraint, because the Athenians commanded the sea.
The Corcyraeans, though not only Dorians but even Corinthians, followed openly against the Corinthians and Syracusans, though colonists of the one and kinsmen of the other; by compulsion, according to their specious profession, but rather with good will, for the hatred they bore the Corinthians. The Messenians, too, as they are now called, at Naupactus, and also from Pylus, which was then held by the Athenians, were taken to the war. Moreover, some few Megarean exiles, owing to their misfortune, were fighting against the Selinuntines, who were Megareans.
Of the rest the service was now more of a voluntary nature. For it was not so much on account of their alliance, as out of hatred for the Lacedaemonians, and for their own individual advantage at the moment, that the Argives followed in company of the Ionian Athenians to fight as Dorians against Dorians.
While the Mantineans, and other mercenaries from Arcadia, went as being accustomed to go against the enemies who at any time were pointed out to them; and thought, for the sake of gain, that the Arcadians, who at that time came with the Corinthians, were no less than others their foes. The Cretans and Aetolians also came for consideration of pay; and it happened in the case of the Cretans, that although they had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, they now came, not with their colonists, but against them—not by choice, but for pay. There were also some Acarnanians who served as auxiliaries, partly from motives of interest, but mainly as being allies, through their friendship with Demosthenes, and their good-will towards the Athenians.
These, then, τῷ Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ ὁριζόμενοι,] i. e. who were separated by that sea from the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. Compare VI. 13, τοὺς μὲν σικελιώτας, οἷσπερ νῦν ὅροις, χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπω, κ. τ. λ. were within the boundary of the Ionian gulf.
Of the Italiots, on the other hand, the Thurians and Metapontines, as they had been overtaken by such necessities at that time, owing to those seasons of faction, joined in the expedition; and of the Siceliots, the Naxians and Catanians. Of barbarians, there were the Segestans, who indeed invited then to their aid, with the greater part of the Sicels; and of those out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrhenians, on account of a quarrel with the Syracusans, and some lapygian mercenaries. Such and so many were the nations that were serving with the Athenians.
To the aid of the Syracusans, on the other hand, came the Camarinaeans, who lived on their borders; the Geloans, who lived next to them;
and then (for the Acragantines were neutral) the Selinuntines, who were situated on the farther side of the island. These occupied the part of Sicily opposite to Libya, but the Himeraeans the side towards the Tyrrhenian sea, in which they are the only Greek inhabitants, and from which they were the only auxiliaries of the Syracusans.
Such then were the Grecian communities in Sicily that joined in the war, being all Dorians and independent. Of the barbarians,. there were the Sicels alone, such of them as had not gone over to the Athenians. Of the Greeks beyond the limits of Sicily, there were the Lacedaemonians, who supplied a Spartan leader, while the rest of the troops were Neodamodes and Helots; (the term Neodamode being now equivalent to free;) the Corinthians, who alone of all the allies joined with both sea and land forces; the Leucadians, also, and Ambraciots, for the sake of their connexion with them; while mercenaries were sent from Arcadia by the Corinthians, and some Sicyonians, who were pressed into the service. From beyond the Peloponnese, some Boeotians joined them.
Compared, however, with these who came as auxiliaries, the Siceliots themselves supplied larger numbers in every branch of the service, inasmuch as they were powerful states; for numerous heavy-armed, ships, and horses, and an abundant ὅμιλος,] i. e. of light-armed irregulars. crowd besides, were collected by them. And compared, again, with all the rest pot together, as one may say, the Syracusans by themselves furnished more numerous levies, both from the greatness of their city, and because they were in the greatest peril.
Such were the auxiliaries collected on either side, which, by this time, had all joined both parties, and there were no subsequent additions to either.
The Syracusans and their allies, then, reasonably conceived that it would be a glorious prize for them, after their recent victory in the sea-fight, to capture the whole armament of the Athenians, great as it was, and not to let them escape either way, neither by sea nor
land. They began therefore immediately to close up the great harbour, the mouth of which was about eight stades across, with triremes ranged broadside, and merchant-vessels, and boats, mooring them with anchors; while they prepared every thing else, in case the Athenians should still have courage for a sea-fight, and entertained no small designs with regard to any thing.
The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour, and having received intelligence of their other plans, thought it necessary to hold a council.
Accordingly the generals and the Taxiarchs assembled to deliberate on their difficulties, arising both from other causes, and especially because they had neither any more provisions for their immediate use, (for, thinking that they were going to sail away, they had sent before to Catana, and commanded them to bring them no longer,) nor were likely to have them in future, unless they should gain the command of the sea. They determined therefore to evacuate the upper part of their lines, and having enclosed with a cross wall just by the ships the least space that could be sufficient to hold their stores and their sick, to garrison that, while with the rest of their troops, making every one go on board, they manned all their ships, both such as were sound and such as were less fit for service; and after a naval engagement, if they were victorious, to proceed to Catana; but if not, to burn their ships, throw themselves into him. and retreat by land, in whatever direction they would soonest reach some friendly town, whether barbarian or Grecian.
They, then, having resolved on these things, acted accordingly; for they gradually descended from their upper lines, and manned all their ships, having compelled to go on board whoever, even in any degree, seemed of age for rendering service.