Kitap 7
At the present time, then, we have discontinued our work of circumvallation on account of the superior numbers of the enemy and are keeping quiet; for we cannot use our whole army because the guarding of the walls has absorbed a part of our heavy-armed force. The enemy meanwhile have built a single wall past ours, so that it is no longer possible to invest them, unless one should assault this counter-wall with a large force and take it.
So it has turned out that we, who are supposed to be besieging others, are rather ourselves under siege, at least by land; for we cannot even go far into the country because of their cavalry.
"And they have also sent envoys to the Peloponnesus for another army, and Gylippus has gone to the cities of Sicily, to persuade such of them as are now neutral to join them in the war, and to bring from other cities, if he can, still further reinforcements for his army and navy.
For they plan, as I hear, to make an attempt upon our walls with their land-force and at the same time to try their luck at sea also with their fleet.
And let it not seem incredible to any of you that they will try also by sea. For our fleet, as the enemy also have learned, though at first it was in prime condition as regards both the soundnessLit. “dryness,” as opposed to a water-logged condition (διάβροχοι). of the ships and the unimpaired condition of the crews, is not so now; the ships are water-logged, from having been at sea for so long a time already, and the crews have wasted away.
For it is not possible to draw the ships up on shore and dry them out, because the fleet of the enemy, which is quite a match for us and in number is even superior, keeps us in continual expectation that it will sail against us.
They keep practising in plain view; the initiative to make attack lies with them; and they have a better opportunity to dry their ships than we, for they are not blockading others.
"We, on the contrary, could hardly enjoy this advantage even if we had a great superiority in the number of our ships, and were not compelled, as now, to use them all for guard-duty. For if we relax our vigilance ever so little, we shall not have our supplies, which are even now with difficulty brought past their city and into our camp.
And our crews have been and are still being wasted, for the reason that our sailors, forced to go out to a distance for wood and forage and water, are constantly being killed by the cavalry. And now that we have been reduced to equal terms with the enemy, our servants are deserting. Of the mercenaries also, some, who embarked on our ships under compulsion, go home to their cities on the first opportunity; others, who were in the first place stirred by the prospects of high pay and thought they were going to make money rather than to fight, now that, contrary to their expectation, they see on the enemy's side the fleet and everything else offering resistance, either go over as professedie. as they would profess after they had got within the enemy's lines. Or, “on any occasion for deserting,” ie. whenever the deserters thought themselves unobserved by the Athenians or found themselves in the neighbourhood of the Syracusan troops, πρόφασις being used not of a pretended, but Of a real occasion, as in 1.23.6, 1.118.1, 1.126.1, . deserters, or get away as best they can—for Sicily is large—and there are also some who, being themselves engaged in traffic, have persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, and thus have robbed our navy of its perfection of discipline.
"You to whom I write understand that a crew only keeps at its prime for a short space,Or, “the really efficient part of a crew is always small.” and that it is only a few of the sailors who can both set a ship in motion and keep the oar-strokes in time.
But of all these difficulties, that which causes me most distress is that I, the general, cannot prevent these abuses—for the temper of you Athenians is hard to control—and that we have no source from which to get recruits for manning our ships, while the enemy has many sources of supply; on the contrary, the resources that we brought with us must suffice for our present needs as well as make up for our constant losses;Or, “the men we brought with us must serve for our present force as well as make up for our ever-recurring losses.” for the only cities that are now in alliance with us, Naxos and Catana, cannot help us in this.
And if but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will be all over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender. "I could have written you things more pleasant than these, but certainly not more useful, if you are to have full knowledge of the situation here before deciding upon your course;
and, besides, knowing as I do your tempers—that you do indeed prefer to hear what is most pleasant, but afterwards find fault if the results are in any respect disappointing—I have thought it safer to reveal the truth.
“And now I beg you to believe that neither your soldiers nor your generals have been blameworthy so far as concerns the original objects of our expedition; but since all Sicily is united and the enemy expects another army from the Peloponnesus, decide at once upon a course of action, knowing that the troops which are now here are not a match even for the enemy which at present confronts us, but that you must either recall these or send to reinforce it another armament equally large, both army and fleet, and no small amount of money; and you must send a general to relieve me, since I am unable to remain because of a disease of the kidneys.
And I submit that I have a claim upon your indulgence, for when I was strong I served you well in many a position of command. But whatever you intend to do, do it promptly at the opening of spring and without postponements, knowing that the enemy will procure fresh resources, some near at hand in Sicily, and others from the Peloponnesus, and that these last, though they will arrive less promptly, nevertheless, if you do not take care, will either elude you as they did before, or else outstrip you.”
Such were the disclosures made by the letter of Nicias. But when the Athenians heard it read, they did not relieve Nicias of his command, but in order that he might not to have to face his difficulties alone while in ill-health, they chose two men who were on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus,Already mentioned as one of those who signed the treaty of Nicias, 422 B.C.; cf. 5.19.2; 5.24.1. to assist him until the arrival of the other two who should be chosen as his colleagues. And they voted to send another armament, both land-force and fleet, to be recruited from the Athenians on the muster-roll and from the allies.
And as colleagues for Nicias they elected DemosthenesLast mentioned in active service in iv. 66-69. son of Alcisthenes, and EurymedonHe had been fined after the unsuccessful expedition to Sicily in 424 B. C.; cf. 4.65.3. son of Thucles. Eurymedon was despatched to Sicily immediately, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships; and he took with him one hundred and twenty talents of silver,£24,000; $116,640. and at the same time bore a message to the army in Sicily that reinforcements would come and that care would be taken of them.
But Demosthenes remained behind and busied himself with preparations for his departure, which he planned to make at the opening of spring, sending to the allies requisitions for troops and getting ready at home money and ships and hoplites.
And the Athenians also sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus, to see that no one should cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnesus to Sicily.
For the Corinthians, when the Syracusan envoys arrived and reported that the situation in Sicily was more favourable, felt much greater confidence than before, thinking that their former despatch of the fleet had been well timed, and accordingly not only were they themselves preparing to send hoplites to Sicily in merchant-ships, but also the Lacedaemonians were intending in the same manner to despatch troops from the rest of the Peloponnesus.
The Corinthians were also manning twenty-five ships, in order that they might try an engagement with the squadron on watch at NaupactusThe Athenian squadron, generally twenty triremes, stationed on guard here during the whole war; cf. 2.69.1.; lxxx. 4 and that the Athenians at Naupactus might not find it so easy to prevent their merchant-vessels from putting to sea, since they would be busy keeping watch upon the triremes arrayed against them.
The Lacedaemonians were also making ready for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their previous resolution and because the Syracusans and Corinthians urged it, when they heard of the reinforcements to be sent from the Athenians to Sicily, so that, as they said, these might be wholly prevented by the invasion. And Alcibiades was likewise insistently telling them that they should fortify Deceleia and not relax their efforts in the war.
But most important of all was the fact that a degree of confidence had come to the Lacedaemonians, because they believed that the Athenians, once they had on their hands a twofold war—with themselves and with the Siceliots—would be more easily overthrown, and because they regarded the Athenians as having been the first to break the treaty. In the former warThe Archidamian War, or the first decade of the Peloponnesian War. they felt that the transgression had been rather on their own part; for the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of truce,cf. 2.2.1. and, although it had been stipulated in the former agreementsReferring to Thirty Years' Truce; cf. 1.115.1. that neither party was to resort to arms if the other were willing to submit the question to arbitration, yet they themselves refused to respond to the summons when the Athenians invited them to arbitrate. On this account they considered that they deserved their misfortune, having in mind both the disaster at Pylosiv. 26-41. and any other that had befallen them.
But now the Athenians, setting out from Argos with thirty ships,cf. 1. had ravaged a part of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places, and at the same time were making predatory excursions from Pylos; and as often as differences arose about any of the points of dispute in the treaty and the Lacedaemonians proposed arbitration, they were unwilling to resort to it; at this time, therefore, the Lacedaemonians, considering that the unlawful conduct, of which they had themselves formerly been guilty, had shifted round and now rested upon the Athenians, were zealous for the war.
And during this winter they sent out requisitions for iron to their allies, and in general were making ready the tools needed in the fortification of Deceleia. And at the same time they were not only devising on their own part ways and means for sending reinforcements in merchant-ships to the army in Sicily, but were also compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do likewise. So the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.
At the very beginning of the next spring,March, 413 B.C. earlier than ever before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And at first they ravaged the plain of Attica and then proceeded to fortify Deceleia,Situated almost due north of Athens, at the highest point of the pass where the road to Boeotia cuts through the eastern Parnes, the site of the present village of Tatoï. apportioning the work to the several allied states.
Deceleia is distant from the city of Athens about one hundred and twenty stadia, and about the same distance, or not much more, from Boeotia. The purpose of the fort they were building was to dominate the plain and the most fertile parts of the country, with a view to devastating them, and it was visible as far as the city of Athens.
And while the Peloponnesians in Attica and their allies were building this fort, those in the Peloponnesus were at the same time despatching the hoplites in merchant-ships to Sicily, the Lacedaemonians having picked out the best of the Helots and Neodamodes,cf. v. xxxiv. 1. These were clans of new citizens made up of Helots emancipated for service in war. of both together about six hundred hoplites, with Eccritus the Spartan as commander, and the Boeotians having selected three hundred hoplites, in command of whom were Xenon and Nicon, both Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian.
Now these set out in the first contingent from Taenarus in Laconia and made for the open sea; and following them, but not long afterwards, the Corinthians sent out five hundred hoplites, some from Corinth itself, others being Arcadians whom they had taken on for hire, appointing in command of them Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also despatched at the same time as the Corinthians two hundred hoplites under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian.
Meanwhile the twenty-five Corinthian ships, which had been manned during the winter, lay opposite the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus, until their hoplites in the merchant-ships had got well on their voyage from the Peloponnesus; it was for this purpose, indeed, that they had been manned in the first place—that the Athenians might not give their attention so much to the merchant-ships as to the triremes.
Meanwhile the Athenians, simultaneously with the fortification of Deceleia and at the very beginning of spring, sent thirty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Charicles son of Apollodorus, whose orders were on reaching Argos to summon to the ships Argive hoplites, in accordance with the terms of their alliance.
And they also were setting Demosthenes on his way to Sicily, as they had planned to do, with fifty Athenian ships and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites from the muster-roll, and as many islanders as it was possible to get into their service from each place; and from their other allies who were subjects they collected whatever these had anywhere that was serviceable for the war. But Demosthenes had received instructions first of all, as he was sailing round, to co-operate with Charicles in his operations on the coast of Laconia.
So he sailed to Aegina and waited there for any part of the armament that had been left behind, and also until Charicles should take on board the Argive hoplites.
In Sicily, during the same spring and at about the same time, Gylippus returned to Syracuse, bringing from each of the cities which he had prevailed upon as large a body of troops as he could secure.
And calling together the Syracusans, he told them that they should man as many ships as possible and try their luck in fighting at sea; for he hoped thereby to accomplish something for the furtherance of the war that would be worth the risk.
And Hermocrates most of all joined in urging them not to be faint-hearted about attacking the Athenians with their ships, saying that with the Athenians also their maritime skill was not a legacy from their fathers or a possession for all time, but that on the contrary they were originally more landsmen than the Syracusans, and had only taken to the sea when forced to do so by the Persians. He added that those who with daring confront daring men like the Athenians appear most formidable to them; for that quality which enables the Athenians to terrorize their neighbours, to whom they are sometimes not superior in power, though they always attack them with confidence—this very quality the Syracusans would likewise exhibit to their opponents.
And lie said that he was well aware that the Syracusans, by daring unexpectedly to make a stand against the Athenian fleet, would have an advantage over them, dismayed as they would be on that account, which would more than outweigh the damage which the Athenians might inflict by their skill on the inexperience of the Syracusans.
He urged them, therefore, to proceed to the trial of their fleet and not to shrink from it. So the Syracusans, under the persuasions of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and perhaps others, were eager for the sea-fight and began to man the slips.
When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out his whole land-force under cover of night, intending in person to make an assault by land upon the forts of Plemmyrium, and at the same time, on a preconcerted signal, thirty-five Syracusan triremes sailed to the attack from the Great Harbour, while forty-five sailed round from the lesser harbour, where their ship-yard was, purposing to form a junction with those inside the harbour and simultaneously attack Plemmyrium, so that the Athenians, thus assailed from both directions, might be thrown into confusion.
But the Athenians, hastily manning sixty ships to oppose them, with twenty-five engaged the thirty-five Syracusan ships that were in the Great Harbour, and with the rest went to meet the squadron that was sailing round from the ship-yard. And so they at once engaged in battle in front of the mouth of the Great Harbour, and for a long time held out against one another, one side wishing to force the entrance, the other to prevent this.