Kitap 6
treaty; for he was afraid of them, owing to the part he had taken in the Mantinean business. And the result was. that in the Lacedaemonian assembly the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, by urging the same request, prevailed on the people there. But when the ephors and the authorities, though they purposed sending ambassadors to Syracuse, to urge them to make no terms with the Athenians, were not disposed to assist them, Alcibiades came forward, and exasperated and instigated the Lacedaemonians by addressing them as follows:
"It is necessary that I should first address you on the subject of the prejudice felt against me, that you may not, through your suspicions, attend to me the less on matters of public interest.
When, then, ἡμῶν.] Arnold accounts for the use of the plural here and in other parts of the chapter by supposing the speaker to join with himself some relations, as well as personal friends, who had been banished with him. our ancestors had, on the ground of some quarrel or other, renounced their connexion with you as your proxeni, I myself, from a wish to resume it, paid attentions to you, both in other respects, and in the case of your misfortune at Pylus. And when I continued thus zealous, you, at the time you were concluding peace with the Athenians, conferred influence on my enemies, by negotiating through them, but brought dishonour on me.
For these reasons it was with justice that you received harm at my hands, both when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and on whatever other occasions I opposed you. And now, if there be any one who at that time, while he was suffering, was unfairly angry with me, let him look at the question in the true light, and be led to a different conviction. Or if there be any one who formed a worse opinion of me, because I rather attached myself to the popular party, let him not on this ground, either, suppose that he was with good reason offended at me.
For we have always been foes to tyrants; and all that are opposed to the dominant faction are called by the name of 'people.' It was from this, then, that our taking the lead of the populace continued; and besides, as the state was under a democratical government, it was necessary on most occasions to follow the existing order of things.
However, we endeavoured to be more moderate in politics than suited the intemperate spirit which had before prevailed. But there were others, both in times of old and now, who led on the banished me.
But in our case it was the whole body of the people that we headed; thinking it right to assist in preserving that form of government under which the country was most great and free, and which we had received. For with regard to democracy, all of us who had any sense knew what it was; and I myself, perhaps, better than any one, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι.] I have given what appears to be the meaning, of this passage; though it is doubtful whether it can be extracted from the Greek as it now stands. Arnold supposes that some words have been lose before λοιδορήσαιμι so that the words οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον properly belong to that verb, and after ὅσῳ καὶ there should be supplied μᾶλλον ἐπ᾽ αὐτής ἠδίκημαι. But this is perhaps a more ingenious than safe correction. I had myself conjectured before I found that Bloomfield had done the same that καί might be a corruption of κἄν a contraction which occurs ch. 92. 4; and this very slight change is perhaps sufficient to remedy the evil.—Though γιγνώσκοιμι is probably understood with ἄν in the preceding clause, I cannot think that it could ever have been expressed, as Bloomfield proposes to do; at least not in the position which he would give to it, immediately after λοιδορήσαιμι, thus giving by the concurrence of the two optatives a most unmusical termination to the paragraph.—With regard to the word ὅσῳ, it seems doubtful whether it is to be considered as qualifying a comparative understood, as the commentators suppose, or as used absolutely, as in some other passages of our author, signifying inasmuch as; e. g. chap. 92. 4, κἂν φίλος ὢν ἱκανῶς ὠφελοίην, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ ὑμέτεραἤκαζον. If the former be the real construction, it is possible that the whole expression, οὐδενος ἂν χεῖρον, was intended to be supplied from the preceding clause; and so there would be no necessity for even the slight alteration of καί into κἄν in proportion as I could also abuse it more. But of an acknowledged absurdity nothing new could be said; and yet to put it aside did not appear to us safe, while you, as our enemies, were so closely besetting us.
"With regard then to your prejudices against me, such were the facts: but with regard to what you must deliberate upon, and I, on whatever point I am better informed, muss advise, now learn from me.
We sailed to Sicily, in the first place, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could; after them, again, the Italiots; and then also to make an attempt on the dominion of the Carthaginians, and on their own city.
If either all or most of these schemes proved successful, then we intended to attack the Peloponnese, after bringing here the united force of the Greeks that had joined us in those parts, taking many barbarians into our pay—both Iberians and others of those nations, confessedly μαχιμωτάτους] Poppo reads μαχιμωτάτων, of the barbarians confessedly the most warlike, etc., which, says Arnold. undoubtedly affords an easier sense. the most warlike barbarians at the present day—and building many triremes in addition to what we have, (since Italy contains timber in abundance). Blockading the Peloponnese with these round its coasts, and at the same time attacking it with our soldiers on the land side, after taking some of the cities by storm, and walling in others, we hoped with ease to reduce it, and after that to enjoy the sovereignty of the whole Grecian race.
And as for money and provisions, to render each of these measures more practicable, the newly acquired places in those quarters would by themselves supply sufficient, independently of our revenues from these parts.
"Thus, then, concerning the expedition which has now sailed, you have heard its objects from the man who knows with the greatest accuracy what we purposed by it: and the generals who still remain there will, if they are able, carry them out in the same way. But that the people there will not escape their attack, unless you succour them, you must now learn.
The Siceliots indeed, although untrained, might still even now gain the victory, if united in one body. But the Syracusans alone, defeated as they have already been in battle with all their forces, and hemmed in by sea at the same time, will be unable to hold out against the Athenian armament now there.
And if that city is taken, the whole of Sicily also is in their possession, and Italy, too, straightway; and the danger which I just now mentioned as impending from that quarter, would in no long time fall upon you. Let no one then think that he is deliberating about Sicily alone, but about the Peloponnese also, unless you quickly adopt these measures;
unless, I mean, you send thither on board ship such a body of troops, as, after working their own passage, shall immediately act as heavy infantry; and also, what I consider to be still more serviceable than troops, a Spartan as commander, both to discipline their present forces, and to compel those who are unwilling to serve. For so the friends you already have will feel the greater confidence, and those who are doubting between the two sides will more fearlessly join yours. You must also carry on hostilities here in a more decisive manner; that the Syracusans, convinced that you take an interest in them, may offer the greater resistance;
and that the Athenians may the less easily send reinforcements to their troops. And for that purpose you must fortify Decelea, in Attica; a blow of which the Athenians have always been most afraid, and the only one which they think they have not experienced in the present war.
And in that way would one most surely hurt his enemies, if, acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them those things which he knows them to fear most: for it is but reasonable that every people should know most accurately its own dangers, and fear them accordingly. But with regard to the difficulties which, while you benefit yourselves, you will create for your opponents by thus fortifying the place, though I pass over many, I will briefly mention the chief.
Whatever then the country is stocked with, the greater part will come to you, either through being captured, or τὰ δ᾽ αὐτόματα,] i. e. the slaves, which I believe to be chiefly alluded to by the expression οἷς ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύασται, (see note on ch. 17. 3,) though it may also include, as Arnold supposes, cattle, sheep, farm-houses, trees, and other articles of dead as well as live stock. of their own accord. They will also at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, with the advantages they now derive from their land and their δικαστηρίων,] i. e. in various fees and fines; on which see Boeckh Publ. Oecon. 1. p. 250. courts of justice; but, especially, of the revenue from the allies, which will be less regularly paid by them, when they consider that the war on your part is now vigorously prosecuted, and so think lightly of them. To have each of these things done with greater speed and spirit rests with you, Lacedaemonians; for that they are possible I am very confident, and I do not think that I shall be proved to have been mistaken.
And now, I beg that I may not be the worse thought of by any among you, because I am now strenuously attacking my country with its bitterest enemies, though I formerly had a reputation for patriotism;
and that my words may not be suspected on the score of an exile's forwardness. For though I am an exile, as regards the villany of those who banished me, I am not one, as regards assistance to you, if you will be persuaded by me:
and the party hostile to me was, not you, who only hurt your foes, but rather they who compelled their friends to become their foes. My patriotism, too, I keep not ἐν ᾧ] Or, as Arnold renders it, in a state where, etc.; but the expression is much more commonly significant of time than of condition. Compare I. 39, οὓς χρῆν ὅτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσίεναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἠδικήμεθα, οὗτοι δὲ κινδονεύουσι, μηδ᾽ ἐν ᾧ υμεῖς ... αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἕξετε, πάλαι δὲ κ. τ. λ. There is, however, so close a connexion between the ideas of a particular period and of the circumstances by which it is characterized, that it is sometimes of comparatively little importance which of the two is supposed to be expressed. at a time when I am being wronged, but only while I enjoyed my civil rights in security.
Nor do I consider myself to be going against what is still my country, but much rather to be recovering that country which is mine no more. And the patriot, in the true sense, is not that man who, when he has unjustly lost his country, abstains from aggression upon it, but he who, because of his longing for it, endeavours by all means to regain it.
Thus, as far as I am concerned, I beg you, Lacedaemonians, fearlessly to command my services, both for danger and trouble of every kind; knowing that argument Which is advanced by all, namely, that if as your enemy I did you very great harm, I might also as your friend do you great service; inasmuch as I know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed yours. I beg too, that on your own part also, being convinced that you are consulting about your greatest interests, you will not shrink from the expedition both against Sicily and Attica; that by joining them with a small part of your forces, you may at once preserve the great states in Sicily, and overthrow the present and future power of the Athenians; and may afterwards live in security yourselves, and enjoy a voluntary supremacy over the whole of Greece, resting not on force but on affection.
Such was the address of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who of themselves were previously intending to make an expedition against Athens, but were still acting with delay and circumspection, were far more determined, when he had informed them of these several particulars, and when they considered that they had heard them from the man who had most certain knowledge of them.
So that they now turned their thoughts to the fortification of Decelea, and to immediately sending some assistance to the Sicilians. Having appointed therefore Clearidas to the command of the Syracusans, they instructed him to deliberate with that people and the Corinthians, and to provide for succours reaching them on as large a scale, and with as much speed, as present circumstances permitted.
Accordingly he desired the Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine, and to let the rest, as many as they purposed sending, be equipped and in readiness to sail, when the proper time came.
Having arranged these points, they returned from Lacedaemon.
Now, too, arrived the Athenian trireme from Sicily, which the generals had sent for money and cavalry. And when the Athenians had heard their request, they resolved to send both the supplies for their armament and the cavalry. And so the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.
At the very commencement of the spring of the next summer, the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and coasted along towards the Sicilian Megara, from which the Syracusans, in the time of their tyrant Gelo, (as I have before mentioned,) drove out the inhabitants, and themselves continue to occupy the territory.
Having landed therefore, they ravaged the country; and after going against a fort of the Syracusans without taking it, they again proceeded both with their land force and ships to the river Terias, and advancing inland, both laid waste the plain, and fired the corn. After falling in with a small body of the Syracusans, killing some of them, and erecting a trophy, they returned to their ships.
When they had sailed back to Catana, and supplied themselves with provisions there, they went with their whole force against Centotripa, a town of the Sicels, and returned after getting possession of it by capitulation, burning at the same time the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans.
On their arrival at Catana, they found the horsemen come from Athens, two hundred and fifty in number, without their horses, but with their equipments, in expectation of horses being provided there, with thirty mounted archers, and three hundred talents of silver.
The same summer the Lacedaemonians also marched against Argos, and went as far as Cleonae, but, on the occurrence of an earthquake, returned. The Argives, after this, made an incursion into the Thyrean country, which lies on, their borders, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less than five and twenty talents.
The commons of the Thespians also, this same summer, and not long after what has been mentioned, having attacked those in office amongst them, did not get the better; but Theban succours having arrived, some of them were made prisoners, and others fled the country and went to Athens.
The Syracusans, the same summer, hearing that the cavalry had joined the Athenians, and that they were about to march against them, and thinking that unless the Athenians were masters of Epipolae, a precipitous tract, and lying right above their city, they could not, even if defeated in battle, be easily circumvallated, they determined to guard τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν,] i. e. the openings in the cliff at different points by which the ridge might be ascended, and particularly the ascent by Euryclus. —Arnold. On the topography of Syracuse, and the military operations before it, see his excellent Memoir in his third volume; as well as the other authorities quoted by Poppo in his note on ch. 98. 2. the approaches to it, that the enemy might not gain the heights without their observation; for in no other way could they, as they thought, effect it.
For the rest of the position rises high, sloping down to the city, and being all visible within it:
and so it is called by the Syracusans, from lying above the rest, Epipolae, [or Overton. ] They, then, went out at day-break with all their forces into the meadow along the course of the river Anapus, (Hermocrates and his colleagues having just come into office as their generals,) and held a review of their heavy-armed, having first selected from those troops a chosen body of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to be a guard for Epipole, and quickly to muster and present themselves for whatever other service they might be required.
ἐξητάζοντο, καὶ ἔλαθον, κ. τ. λ.] They had landed their men during the night, and had then stationed their ships at Thapsus; while the soldiers, as soon as it was light, after a brief muster of their force, hastened to ascend to the Hog's Back behind Epipolae. —Arnold. The Athenians, on the other hand, held a review the day following this night, having already, unobserved by them, made the coast with all their armament from Catana, opposite a place called Leon, about six or seven stades from Epipolae, and having landed their soldiers, and brought their ships to anchor at Thapsus; where there is a peninsula running out into the sea, with a narrow isthmus, being not far from the city of Syracuse, either by land or by water.
The naval armament of the Athenians lay quiet at Thapsus, having thrown a stockade across the peninsula; but the land forces proceeded at full speed to Epipolae, and had time to ascend it, on the side of Euryelus, before the Syracusans, on perceiving it, could come to them from the meadow and the review.
They came, however, against them, both the rest, as quickly as each could, and Diomilus, with his six hundred: but they had a distance of not less than five and twenty stades to go, before they came up to them from the meadow.