Kitap 6
"So then, if only we be united, we have reason not to be disheartened, but rather to enter into the proposed alliance more heartily, especially as aid is sure to come from the Peloponnesians, who are altogether superior to these people in matters of war. And no one should regard as fair to us, while safe for you, that prudent course of yours—to aid neither, forsooth, as being allies of both. Indeed it is not as fair in fact, as when urged to justify you.Or, “as the plea of right represents it.”
For if through your failure to take sides as allies the sufferer shall be defeated and the conqueror shall prevail, what else have you done by this selfsame standing aloof but refused to aid the one to secure his salvation and to prevent the other from incurring guilt? And yet it were more honourable for you, by siding with those who are being wrongedThe Syracusans. and are at the same time your kinsmen, at once to guard the common interest of Sicily and not suffer the Athenians, seeing that they are your 'good friends', to make a serious mistake. “Summing up, then, we Syracusans say that it is no hard matter to demonstrate, either to you or to others, what you yourselves know as well as we;
but we do entreat you, and at the same time we protest, if we fail to persuade you, that while we are plotted against by Ionians,The Athenians. our inveterate enemies, we are betrayed by you, Dorians by Dorians.
And if the Athenians shall subdue us, it is by your decisions that they will prevail, but it is in their own name that they will be honoured, and the prize of victory they will take will be none other than those who procured them the victory; if, on the other hand, we shall conquer, you also will have to pay the penalty of being the cause of our perils.
Reflect, therefore, and choose here and now, either immediate slavery with no danger or, if you join us and prevail, the chance of not having to take, with disgrace, these men as masters, and also, as regards us, of escaping an enmity that would not be transitory.”
Such was the speech of Hermocrates; after him Euphemus, the envoy of the Athenians, spoke as follows:-
"We had come here for the renewal of the allianceCf. Thuc. 6.75.3. which formerly existed, but as the Syracusan has attacked us it is necessary to speak also about our empire, showing how rightly we hold it.
Now the strongest proof of this the speaker himself stated--that Ionians have always been enemies to the Dorians. It is even so. Accordingly, we, being Ionians, considered in what we way we should be least subject to the Peloponnesians who are Dorians and not only more numerous than we but our near neighbors.Or, retaining αὐτῶν, "For we, being Ionians in the eyes of Peloponnesians who are Dorians, not only more numerous than we but also our near neighbbors, considered in what way we should be least subject to them."
And after the Persian wars we acquired a fleet and rid ourselves of the rule and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, it being not in any way more fitting that they give orders to us than we to them, except in so far as they at the time were stronger. Having, then, ourselves become leaders of those who were before subject to the King, we so continue, thinking that we should in this way be least subject to the Peloponnesians, because we have power with which to defend ourselves. And to say the exact truth, not unjustly, either, did we subdue both the Ionians and the islands, whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved though they are our kinsmen.
For they came against us, their mother-city, along with the Persians, and had not the courage to revolt and sacrifice their homes, as we did when we abandoned our city, but chose slavery for themselves and wished to impose the same condition on us.
"We have dominion, therefore, both because we are worthy of it—seeing that we furnished the largest fleet and unhesitating zeal toward the Hellenes, and that they, readily taking the course they did in the interest of the Persians, were doing us harm—and at the same time because we aimed at strength with which to resist the Peloponnesians.
And we do not say in fine phrases that we deserve to rule either because we alone overthrew the Barbarian or because we incurred danger for the liberty of these men more than for that of all the Hellenes, including our own. But no one can be reproached because he makes provision for his proper safety. And now when for the sake of our own security we have come here also, we see that your interests also are the same as ours.
And this we prove to you both from these men's calumnies and from those suspicions of yours which most tend to undue alarm, because we know that those who are suspicious through excessive fear may indeed take delight for the moment in seductive speech, but afterwards when it comes to action consult their own interests.
For just as we have said that we hold our dominion over there because of fear, so we say that for the same reason we have come here with the help of our friends to place your affairs on a footing of safety for us, and not to enslave you, but rather to prevent your being enslaved.
"And let no one object that we are solicitous for you when it does not concern us; let him reflect that, if you are preserved and by not being weak are able to offer resistance to the Syracusans, we should be less liable to injury through their sending a force to aid the Peloponnesians.
And herein you become at once our chief concern For this very cause, too, it is reasonable that we should restore the Leontines, so that they shall not be subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but shall be as powerful as possible, in order that, bordering as they do on the Syracusans, they may from their own territory be troublesome to these in our behalf.
For as to matters in Hellas, we by ourselves are a match for our enemies, and in regard to the Chalcidians, whom he says we are inconsistent in freeing here after enslaving them at home, it is to our interest that they should possess no armament and should contribute money only; but as to matters here, it is to our interest that both the Leontines and our other friends should enjoy the fullest measure of independence.
"To an autocrat or an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is to its interest, nor is anyone a kinsman who cannot be trusted; in every case one must be enemy or friend according to circumstances. And in Sicily it is to our advantage, not that we should weaken our friends, but that our enemies should be powerless because of the strength of our friends. And you must not mistrust us;
for we lead our allies in Hellas as they are each useful to us: the Chians and Methymnaeans as independent, on the condition of furnishing ships; the majority on more compulsory terms, with payment of tribute in money; others, though islanders and easy to be reduced, on terms of absolute freedom as our allies, because they occupy strategic positions along the coast of the Peloponnese.
So that it is natural that matters here also should be ordered with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they aim at dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you with themselves on the ground of your suspicion of us, then by force, or because of your isolation when we shall have gone away unsuccessful, themselves to rule Sicily. And that is sure to happen if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, if once combined, be any longer easy for us to handle, nor would the Syracusans lack strength to deal with you if we should not be present.
"And if there be anyone who does not accept this view, that which has taken place will itself prove his error. For you brought us over before,In 427 B.C., when Camarina stood with the Leontines and other Chalcidians against Syracuse; cf. 3.86.2. flaunting in our faces no other terror but this, that we ourselves should be in danger if we should permit you to come under the power of the Syracusans.
And it is not right for you now to distrust the very argument by which you thought it right to persuade us then, nor to be suspicious because we are present with a force out of all proportion to the strength of the Syracusans; far more should you distrust them.
We certainly are not able to maintain ourselves in Sicily without you; and even if we should prove false and subdue Sicily, we should be unable to hold it on account of the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding cities that are as large and well equipped as continental citiesie. with infantry and cavalry, our forces being purely naval.; whereas these Syracusans, in hostile proximity to you, not with a mere army in the field, but a city greater than our present force, are always plotting against you, and whenever they get an opportunity against you singly, do not let it slip, as they have shown several times already and especially in their dealings with the Leontines;
and now they make bold to urge you to oppose those who seek to prevent these things and who up to this time have kept Sicily from being under their dominion, as though you were without sense.
But it is to a safety far more real that we in our turn invite you, begging you not to throw away that safety which we both derive from one another; and to consider that for them, even without allies, the way is always open against you because of their numbers, whereas for you the opportunity will not often present itself to defend yourselves with the help of so great an auxiliary force. But if through your suspicions you suffer this force to depart with its object unaccomplished, or, worse still, defeated, you will hereafter wish that you could see even the merest fraction of it when its presence will no longer avail you aught.
“Nay, be not moved, men of Camarina, either you or the other peoples of Sicily, by the calumnies of these men. We have told you the whole truth concerning the matters of which we are suspected, and now again briefly recalling to your minds the chief points of our argument, we fully expect to convince you.
We say, namely, that we hold sway over the cities in Hellas in order that we may not have to obey some other power, but that we are trying to free those here, in order that we may not be injured by them. We are obliged to be active in many matters,πολλὰ πράσσειν, as well as πολυπραγμοσύνη below, is used in a good sense, characterizing the policy of the Athenians at their acme, as described by Pericles in the funeral oration, ii. 40, 41. because we have many dangers to guard against; and we come as allies, now as before, to those of you here who are wronged, not uninvited, but by your express invitation.
And do not you, by constituting yourselves either judges of our conduct or by tutoring us in moderationσωφρονισταί as in 3.65.3; 8.48.6; cf. Plato, Rep. 471 a εὐμενῶς σωφρονιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ κολάζοντες, οὐδ’ ἐπ’ ὀλέθρῳ, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες, οὐ πολέμιοι.—a hard task at this late day!—make any attempt to divert us, but in so far as anything in our busy activity and our character is at the same time to your interest, take this and make use of it; and think, not that these qualities of ours are hurtful alike to all, but that they are even profitable to far the greater part of the Hellenes.
For everyone in every place, even where we are not already present, both he that thinks he will suffer wrong, and he that plots to do wrong—on account of the certain prospect that is ever present in their minds, in the one case that he will obtain succour from us in return for his allegiance, in the other that, if we shall come, he will run the risk of not escaping unscathed for his wrongdoings—are both alike under constraint, the latter to be moderate however unwilling, the former to be saved without effort of his own.
This common safety, then, which is now offered to anyone who may ask for it as well as to you, reject not; but availing yourselves of it as others do, join forces with us and instead of having always to be on your guard against the Syracusans, change your course and at length plot against them even as they have plotted against you.”
Thus Euphemus spoke. But what the Camarinaeans had felt was this: They were well disposed to the Athenians, except in so far as they thought that these would enslave Sicily; but with the Syracusans, as is usual with next-door neighbours, they were always at variance. And it was because they were more afraid of the Syracusans, as being so near, that they had in the first instance sent them the few horsemen,6.67.2. lest they might prove superior to the Athenians even without their aid; and they now resolved for the future to keep on giving to them rather than to the Athenians assistance in fact, though as moderately as possible, and for the present, in order that they might not seem to show less favour to the Athenians, especially since these had proved the stronger in the battle, to give in word the same answer to both.
Having thus determined, they made answer, that, as they were allies of both parties that were at war, it seemed to them to be consistent with their oath to aid neither at present.
So the envoys of both sides went away. The Syracusans on their side were getting ready for the war, while the Athenians who were encamped at Naxos were negotiating with the Sicels, in the effort to bring over as many of them as possible.
Now, of the Sicels that lived more toward the flat country and were subjects of the Syracusans not manyOr, retaining οἱ πολλοί, “most had held aloof,” ie. from the alliance with the Athenians. had revolted; but the Sicel settlements in the interior, which even before had always been independent, with few exceptions straightway sided with the Athenians, bringing down grain for the army and in some cases money also.
Against those that did not come over the Athenians took the field, and compelled some to do so, but were kept from compelling others by the Syracusans, who sent garrisons to their relief. Removing also the anchorage of their fleet from Naxos to Catana, and restoring the camp which had been burned by the Syracusans, they passed the winter there.
They sent also a trireme to Carthage on a mission of friendship, in the hope that they might be able to get some aid; and they sent one also to Tyrrhenia, as some of the cities there offered of themselves to join them in the war. They also despatched messengers to the various Sicel tribes, and sending to Egesta urged them to send as many horses as possible;
and they were getting ready for the circumvallation bricks and iron and whatever else was needful, with a view to taking the war in hand as soon as spring opened. Meanwhile the Syracusan envoys, who had been sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as they sailed along the coast tried to persuade the ItaliotsGreek colonists settled in the part of Italy called Magna Graecia. not to tolerate the conduct of the Athenians, as the plot was aimed equally against them;
and when they reached Corinth they made an appeal to the Corinthians, urging them to send them aid on grounds of kinship. And the Corinthians at once took the lead in voting to aid them with all zeal themselves, and also sent envoys along with them to Lacedaemon, to help in persuading them not only to prosecute the war at home more openly against the Athenians, but also to send aid in some form to Sicily.
Accordingly there were present at Lacedaemon these envoys from Corinth, and also Alcibiades with his fellow-exiles. He had, at the time of which we have spoken,cf. 6.61.6. at once crossed over on a freight-boat from Thuria, going first to Cyllene in Elis, and had afterwards, on the summons of the Lacedaemonians themselves, come to Lacedaemon under safe-conduct;
for he feared them on account of his intrigues in the affair of the Mantineans. So it happened that in the Lacedaemonian assembly the Syracusans, the Corinthians, and Alcibiades, making the same appeal, were prevailing upon the Lacedaemonians. The ephors indeed and others in authority were already intending to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent their making terms with the Athenians, but were not disposed to send them aid; Alcibiades, however, coming forward, inflamed the Lacedaemonians and goaded them on, speaking as follows: