Kitap 5
The next summer the one-year's truce con-422 B.C. tinued till, and ended with, the Pythian games.The truce had really expired, according to 4.118.12, the 14th of the Attic month Elaphebolion (about the end of March), but hostilities were not renewed till after the Pythian games, which were celebrated in the Attic month Metageitnion (latter half of August and first of September). This seems the most natural interpretation of Thucydides' language, but many editors render “The next summer the one-year's truce was ended and war was renewed till the Pythian games.” During the suspension of arms the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos, thinking that they had been consecratedReferring to their purification and consecration to Apollo four years before (iii. 107). while in a state of pollution from some ancient crime, and besides, that they themselves had been responsible for this defect in the purification, in which, as I have before related, they believed they had acted rightly in removing the coffins of the dead. And the Delians settled, according as each man chose,Or, “was inclined” (etc. οἰκῆσαι). in Atramytteum in Asia, which had been given them by Pharnaces.
After the armistice had expired Cleon persuaded the Athenians to let him sail to the cities in Thrace, with twelve hundred Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry, and a larger force of the allies, and thirty ships.
And touching first at Scione, which was still under siege, and taking on from there some hoplites of the garrison, he then sailed down to the port of Cophus, which is not far distant from the city of Torone.
From there, on learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone and that the inhabitants were not a match for him in battle, he advanced with his land-force against the city, but sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour.
And first he arrived at the new wall which Brasidas had built round the city for the purpose of taking in the suburb, having pulled down a part of the old wall and made one city of Torone.
But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, and the garrison that was present came to the defence of this wall and tried to ward off the Athenian assault. But they were hard pressed and the ships that had been sent round were now sailing into the harbour; so Pasitelidas, in fear that the ships might take the town, undefended as it was, before he could get there, and that if the new fortifications were carried he might be captured in them, left them and hurried back into the town.
But the Athenians from the ships forestalled him and took Torone, and their land-force, following close upon him, at the first assault dashed in with him at the breach in the old wall. And they slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans on the spot in hand to hand fighting, but others they took alive, including Pasitelidas the commander.
Brasidas meanwhile was coming to the relief of Torone, but learning on the road that it had fallen he retreated, having missed getting there in time by just about forty stadia.
Cleon and the Athenians set up two trophies, one at the harbour, the other at the new wall, and made slaves of the women and children of the Toronaeans, but the men of Torone along with the Peloponnesians, and any that were Chalcidians, all together to the number of seven hundred, they sent to Athens. There, however, the Peloponnesians were afterwards set free in the treaty that was made, but the rest were brought back by the Olynthians, being ransomed man for man.ie. in exchange for Athenian prisoners.
About the same time Panactum, a fortress on the frontier of Attica, was betrayed to the Boeotians.
As for Cleon, after setting a guard over Torone, he weighed anchor and sailed round Athos with a view to attacking Amphipolis.
About the same time Phaeax son of Erasistratus and two others were sent by the Athenians with two ships on a mission to Italy and Sicily.
For the Leontines, on the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the general peace,cf. 4.65. init. had enrolled many new citizens,This was to strengthen the democratic party, and for their benefit a new division of state lands was to be made. and the people were minded to make a redistribution of the land.
But the oligarchs, perceiving their intention, brought over the Syracusans and expelled the people. And the latter were scattered in every direction; but the oligarchs, coming to an agreement with the Syracusans and leaving their own city desolated, settled at Syracuse on condition of having the rights of citizenship.
But later some of them, owing to discontent, left Syracuse and occupied Phoceae, a quarter so named of the city of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a stronghold in Leontine territory. These being joined by most of the members of the popular party who had been expelled, they established themselves and carried on war from their strongholds.
Hearing of this, the Athenians sent Phaeax to see if perchance they might persuade their own allies there, and the rest of the Siceliots if possible, to make a common expedition against the Syracusans on the ground of their continual aggression, and thus save the people of Leontini.
Phaeax, on his arrival, persuaded the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines; but since his undertaking did not prosper at Gela he did not go on to the other states, perceiving that he could not persuade them, but withdrew through the country of the Sicels to Catana, having visited Bricinniae on the way and encouraged its inhabitants. He then sailed back home.
On his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily and in Italy he negotiated with certain cities about friendship with the Athenians. He fell in also with the Locrian settlers who had been expelled from Messene; for these, after the general agreement among the Siceliots, when the Messenians had fallen into discord and one faction had called in the Locrians, had been sent out as colonists, Messene thus coming for a time into the hands of the Locrians.
Falling in, then, with these when they were on their way home, he did them no injury, as an agreement had been made with himOn his way to Sicily. by the Locrians for a treaty with the Athenians.
For they alone of the allies, when the Siceliots became reconciled, made no treaty with the Athenians, nor would they have done so then if they had not been pressed by the war with the Iponieans and Medmaeans, who lived on their borders and were colonists of theirs. And Phaeax some time after this returned to Athens.
Now when Cleon had sailed round from Torone to Amphipolis, as mentioned above, taking Eion as his base he made an unsuccessful attack upon Stagirus,cf. 4.88.2. an Andrian colony, but did take by storm Galepsus,cf. 4.107.3. a colony of the Thasians.
Then sending envoys to Perdiccas, with a request to join him with an army in accordance with the terms of alliance,cf. 4.132.1. and other envoys to Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible, he himself kept quiet at Eion.
But Brasidas, on hearing of these things, took post over against him at Cerdylium. This place is in the territory of the Argilians, on high ground across the river not far from Amphipolis, and commands a view in all directions, so that Cleon could not move his army without being observed; for Brasidas expected that Cleon in contempt of the small numbers of the Lacedaemonians would go up against Amphipolis, with his present army.ie. without waiting for reinforcements.
At the same time he made further preparations, calling to his aid fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and all the Edonians, both targeteers and cavalry. And he had also of the Myrcinians and the Chalcidians one thousand targeteers, in addition to the troops in Amphipolis.
The whole body of hoplites collected by him was about two thousand in number, and he had three hundred Hellenic horsemen. Of these forces Brasidas took about fifteen hundred and stationed himself at Cerdylium; the rest were posted at Amphipolis under the command of Clearidas.
Cleon kept quiet for a while, then was forced to do just what Brasidas had expected.
For when the soldiers began to be annoyed at sitting still and to discuss the quality of his leadership—what experience and daring there was on the other side and what incompetence and cowardice would be pitted against it, and how unwillingly they had come with him from home—he became aware of their grumbling, and unwilling that they should be exasperated by remaining inactive in the same place, marched out with them.
He adopted the same course in which he had been successful at Pylos and so had acquired confidence in his own wisdom; for he had no expectation that anybody would come against him for battle, but he was going up, he said, rather to reconnoitre the place; and in fact he was waiting for the larger force,cf. 5.6.2. not with a view to gaining the victory without risk should he be forced to fight, but to surrounding the town and taking it by force of arms.
Accordingly he went and posted his force on a strong hill before Amphipolis, and was himself surveying the marshy part of the Strymon and the situation of the city in respect to the surrounding Thracian country, and he thought that he could withdraw whenever he pleased without a battle;
for no one was visible on the wall or was seen coming out by the gates, which were all closed. He therefore thought that he had made a mistake in coming up without storming-machines; for he might have taken the town, since it was undefended.
But Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians stirring, went down himself from Cerdylium and entered Amphipolis.
But he did not march out and draw up against the Athenians, because he mistrusted his own force, believing them to be inferior, not in numbers—as they were about equal—but in quality; for the force that was in the field were Athenians of pure blood and the pick of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he was preparing to attack by means of a stratagem;
for he thought that if he showed the enemy the number and the barely sufficient equipment of the troops with him he should be less likely to gain a victory than if they had no previous sight of his forces and did not look upon them with contempt from seeing their real character.
Accordingly, picking out for himself one hundred and fifty hoplites and assigning the rest to Clearidas, he determined to make a sudden attack before the Athenians withdrew, thinking that he could not again cut them off thus isolated if once reinforcements should reach them. So calling together all the soldiers, wishing to encourage them and explain his plan, he spoke to them as follows:
“Men of the Peloponnesus, let it suffice to remind you briefly from what manner of country we have come, that it has ever been free because of its courage, and that you are going to fight, Dorians against Ionians, whom you have been accustomed to vanquish.
I will, however, explain to you in what way I intend to make the attack, in order that my plan of fighting in detachments and not in a body may not seem to anyone poor tactics and thus cause discouragement.
For I imagine that the enemy ascended the hill in contempt of us and because they could not have expected that anybody would come out for battle against them, and now, with broken ranks and intent upon reconnoitring, are taking small account of us.
Now when an assailant having most clearly observed such errors in the enemy also makes his attack in accordance with the force at his own disposal, not openly and in array of battle, but as may be advantageous under present circumstances, then he would be most likely to succeed.
And those. stratagems have won the highest credit by which a man most completely deceives the enemy and helps his friends.
While, then, the Athenians, still unprepared, are full of confidence and are thinking, so far as I can see, more of withdrawing than of staying where they are, while their tension of mind is relaxed and before they have got their thoughts together, I will take my own troops and if possible surprise them by a dash upon the centre of their army.