Kitap 4
For there is no disgrace in connexions giving way to connexions, whether a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those of the same race; in a word. all of us who are neighbours, and live together in one country, and that an island, and are called by the one name of Sicilians.
For we shall go to war again, I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again amongst ourselves by means of general conferences: but to foreign invaders we shall always, if we are wise, offer united resistance, inasmuch as by our separate losses we are collectively endangered;
and we shall never in future call in any allies or mediators. For by acting thus we shall at the present time avoid depriving Sicily of two blessings—riddance both of the Athenians and of civil war—and shall in future enjoy it by ourselves in freedom, and less exposed to the machinations of others.
Hermocrates having spoken to this effect, the Sicilians agreed amongst themselves in a determination to have done with the war, retaining their several possessions, but that Morgantina should be ceded to the Camarinaeans on their paying a stipulated sum of money to the Syracusans.
So the allies of the Athenians called those of them who were in command, and said that they should conclude peace, and that the treaty would extend to them also. When the generals had expressed their assent, they concluded peace, and the Athenian ships afterwards sailed away from Sicily.
But on the arrival of the generals, the Athenians at home banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined Eurymedon, on the belief of their having been bribed to return, when they might have brought Sicily under their dominion.
Thus in their present success they presumed that they could meet with no impediment, but equally achieve what was possible and impossible, with ample or deficient resources alike. The reason of which was their general success beyond their calculations, which suggested to them an idea of i.e. not arising from reality or from resources now in existence, but from the hope of gaming such. —Arnold. strength resting only on hope.
The same summer, the Megareans in the city, pressed at once by the hostilities of the Athenians, who always invaded their country in full force twice a year, and by their own exiles in Pegae, who had been expelled during the strife of factions by the popular party, and harassed them by their forays, began to discuss amongst themselves the propriety of receiving back their exiles, and not ruining the city in both ways.
The friends of the banished, when aware of such discussion, themselves begged them more openly than before to adopt this proposal.
But the leaders of the commons, knowing that the populace would not be able under the pressure of their sufferings to hold out with them, in their fear entered into communication with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, wishing to betray the city to them, and thinking that the danger to themselves would be less than from the return of those who had been banished by them. It was agreed then that in the first place the Athenians should take the long walls, (they were about eight stades in length, from the city to Nisaea their port,) that the Peloponnesians might not come to the rescue from Nisaea, where they alone formed the garrison to secure the good faith of Megara; and then that they should endeavour to put the upper town into their hands: and they thought the inhabitants would the more readily surrender when that had been done.
The Athenians therefore, when preparations had been made on each side, both by deeds and words, sailed in the night to Minoa, an island off Megara, with six hundred heavyarmed under the command of Hippocrates, and posted themselves in an excavated piece of ground, from which they used to make their bricks, and which was not far off;
while the troops, with Demosthenes, the other commander, consisting of lightarmed Plataeans, and a second corps composed of The peripoli were employed as a movable force, and confined exclusively within the walls of fortified places, but disposable for the defence of any point that might. be particularly threatened. See Arnold's note. peripoli, placed themselves in ambuscade in the ground consecrated to Mars, which was at a less distance. Now no one was aware of this but those who took care to know [what was doing] that night.
When day was about to dawn, the traitors amongst the Megareans did as follows. They had for a long time past used means to secure the opening of the gates, and with the consent of the officer in command, in the guise of privateers, to carry on a cart, during the night, a boat worked by sculls along the trench down to the sea, and so sail out; and before it was day, they brought it again on the cart, and took it within the wall through the gates; that the Athenians, as they pretended, might not know what precautions to take, no boat being visible in the harbour.
And on that occasion the cart was already at the gates, and on their being opened in the usual manner for the skiff, as they thought, the Athenians, (for this had been done by agreement with them,) on seeing it, ran full speed from their ambush, wishing to reach the spot before the gates were shut again, and while the cart was still in the entrance, and prevented their being closed; the Megareans who were in concert with them at the same time dispatching the guard at the gate.
Demosthenes with his Plataeans and peripoli were the first to run in, (at the point where the trophy now stands,) and as soon as they were within the wall, (for now the nearest Peloponnesians were aware of it,) the Plataeans engaged with and defeated those who came to the rescue, and secured the gates for the advancing heavy-armed of the Athenians.
Then each of the Athenians, as he successively entered, proceeded against the wall.
And of the Peloponnesian garrison a few at first resisted, and defended themselves, and some of them were killed; but the greater part took to flight, being terrified in consequence of the enemy having attacked them by night, and the Megarean traitors fighting against them; and thinking that all the Megareans had betrayed them.
For it happened that the Athenian herald had of his own accord proclaimed, that whoever of the Megareans wished, should go and pile his arms with the Athenians. So when they heard that, they stayed no longer; but thinking that they were certainly the objects of a common attack, fled for refuge to Nisaea.
In the morning, when the walls were now taken, and the Megareans in the city were in confusion, those who had negotiated with the Athenians, and others with them, viz. the popular party who were privy to the measure, said that they ought to throw open the gates, and march out to battle. It had been arranged by them, that when the gates were opened, the Athenians should rush in;
and they themselves would be distinguished from the rest, for they said they would anoint themselves with oil, that they might not be hurt. And they felt the greater security in opening the gates, since, according to agreement, the four thousand Athenian heavy-armed from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, and were now there.
But when they were anointed, and were now standing about the gates, one of their associates gave information of the plot to the other party, who consequently united, and came in a body, and urged that they ought neither to march out, (for not even before, when they were stronger, had they ever ventured on this,) nor to bring the city into evident danger; and if any one did not obey them, there, [in Megara itself,] should the battle be fought. But they gave no intimation of their being acquainted with their practices, but positively maintained that they were giving the best advice; and at the same time they kept their post about the gates, so that it was not possible for the conspirators to accomplish what they intended.
The Athenian generals, finding that some obstacle had arisen, and that they would not be able to take the city by force, immediately proceeded to invest Nisaea; thinking that if they could take it before it was relieved, Megara also would the more quickly surrender.
Now iron, stone-masons. and all other requisites were quickly brought from Athens. So they began from the wall which they occupied, and built a cross-wall on the side of Megara, from the point mentioned down to the sea on each side of Nisaea; the whole army having divided amongst themselves the trench and walls; and they used the stones and bricks from the suburb, and cutting down the fruit trees and timber, strengthened with a palisade whatever point might require it. The houses, too, in the suburb, when provided with battlements, were in themselves a fortification. That whole day they continued working;
and about afternoon of the next day the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, in despair of provisions, (for they used to receive daily rations from the upper city,) not thinking that the Peloponnesians would soon relieve them, and supposing the Megareans to be their enemies, capitulated to the Athenians, on condition that after surrendering their arms they should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; but that the Lacedaemonians, both the commander and all others in the place, should be treated by the Athenians according to their pleasure. On these conditions they surrendered and went out;
and the Athenians, having broken down the long walls at their abutment on Megara, and having taken possession of Nisaea, proceeded with their other preparations.
Now Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedaemonian, happened at this time to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an army for Thrace. And when he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing both for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and lest Megara should be taken, he sent to the Boeotians with orders to meet him with a body of troops as quickly as possible at Tripodiscus, (it is a village in the Megarean territory that has this name, under Mount Gerania,) and went himself with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy-armed, four hundred Phliasian, six hundred Sicyonian, and all his own forces that had been already raised, thinking that he should still find Nisaea untaken.
But when he heard of its capture, (for he happened to have gone out to Tripodiscus by night,) picking out three hundred men from his army, before he was heard of, he advanced to Megara unobserved by the Athenians, who were about the shore; wishing nominally, and really too, if he could, to make an attempt on Nisaea; but, above all, to effect an entrance into Megara, and secure it. Accordingly he begged them to receive his forces, telling them that he was in hope of recovering Nisaea.
But the Megarean factions were afraid, on the one side, that he might introduce the exiles, and expel them; on the other, that the popular party, through fear of this very thing, might attack them, and so the city be ruined by their fighting with each other, while the Athenians were close at hand in ambush against them; and therefore they did not receive him, but both parties determined to remain quiet, and wait to see the result.
For each side expected that a battle would be fought between the Athenians and those who had come to relieve the place, and that so it would be safer for themselves to go over to the side they favoured, if it were victorious. When therefore Brasidas did not prevail on them, he returned again to the rest of the army.
In the morning the Boeotians joined them, having indeed purposed, even before Brasidas sent to them, to march to the relief of Megara, considering the danger to affect themselves, and being already in full force at Plataea; but when the messenger reached them, they felt much more confidence, and after despatching two thousand two hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred cavalry, they returned again with the main force.
When the whole army was now come, amounting to no less than six thousand heavy-armed, and when the Athenian heavy-armed were formed in line about Nisaea at the shore, but their light-armed were dispersed over the plain; the Boeotian horse fell upon the light-armed, and drove them to the sea, while they were not expecting it; for before this no succours had yet come to the Megareans from any quarter.
But the Athenian horse charged in return, and came to close quarters with them; and there was a cavalry action which lasted for a long time, in which both parties claim to have had the better.
For the Athenians, close under the walls of Nisaea, charged, killed, and stripped the Boeotian commander of the horse, and some few others; and having got possession of these bodies, restored them under truce, and elected a trophy: yet, regarding the action as a whole, neither party retired with a decided result, but the Boeotians drew off to their forces, and the Athenians to Nisaea.
After this, Brasidas and the army moved nearer to the sea and to Megara; and having chosen a convenient spot, drew up in order of battle, and remained still, thinking that the Athenians would advance against them, and knowing that the Megareans were waiting to see on which side would be the victory.
And they considered that both results were favourable for them, their not being the first to make the attack, and voluntarily to begin an engagement with all its hazard, (since, at any rate, they had clearly shown that they were ready to defend themselves,) and the victory's being fairly assigned to them, without any struggle, so to speak; and that at the same time it was favourable to their interest at Megara.
For if they had not shown themselves there, they would not have had a chance, but would certainly have lost the city, being considered as good as beaten. But as it was, the Athenians might happen to be not disposed for a contest; so that without fighting they would succeed in the objects of their coming. And this was indeed the case.
For the Athenians came out, and drew up by the long walls, but remained quiet on their side also, as the enemy did not attack them: since their commanders too considered it no equal hazard, on the one hand for them, after succeeding in most of their designs, to commence an engagement against superior numbers, and either, if victorious, only to take Megara, or, if beaten, to sacrifice the flower of their heavy-soldiery; and, on the other hand, for merely a part of their enemies' whole force, nay even of that which was present in each case, to be willing, as they reasonably might, with boldness to risk a battle. So when, after waiting some time and no attack being made on either side, the Athenians first returned to Nisaea, and then the Peloponnesians to the point they had set out from; under these circumstances the friends of the Megarean exiles with greater confidence threw open the gates to Brasidas and the commanders from the different states, (considering that he had proved his superior strength, and that the Athenians had no longer been willing to fight,) and having received them, proceeded to confer with them, while those who had negotiated with the Athenians were now confounded.
Afterwards, when Brasidas had dismissed the allies to their several cities, he himself went back to Corinth, and prepared for his expedition to Thrace, which was his original destination.
When the Athenians also had returned home, such of the Megareans in the city as had been most implicated in the negotiations with them, knowing that they had been marked, immediately stole away; while the rest, having conferred with the friends of the exiles, restored the party at Pegae, after binding them by solemn oaths to forget the past, and to advise what was best for the city.
When, however, they had been put in office, and held a review of the heavy-armed troops, having separated the battalions, they selected a hundred of their enemies, and of those who appeared to have joined most decidedly in the negotiations with the Athenians; and having compelled the commons to pass an open sentence upon them, on their being condemned, they put them to death, and established a thorough oligarchy in the city.