Kitap 4
After this they came with their forces to Antander and took that city also by treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called Actaeae, which were in the occupation formerly of the Mytilenaeans, but subject to the Athenians; but above all the rest Antander, which when they had once gotten (for there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of timber, and Mount Ida was above their heads), they might issue from thence with other their preparation and infest Lesbos, which was near, and bring into their power the Aeolic towns in the continent. And this were those men preparing.
The Athenians the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking with them also the Milesians and some other of their confederates, made war upon Cythera, under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles, the son of Tolmaeus.
This Cythera is an island upon the coast of Laconia, over against Malea. The inhabitants be Lacedaemonians, of the same that dwell about them. And every year there goeth over unto them from Sparta a magistrate called Cyther- odikes. They likewise sent over men of arms from time to time to lie in the garrison there, and took much care of the place.
For it was the place where their ships used to put in from Egypt and Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by thieves from the sea, being that way only subject to that mischief. For the island lieth wholly out into the Sicilian and Cretic seas.
The Athenians, arriving with their army, with ten of their galleys and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians, took a town lying to the sea, called Scandeia; and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the Cythereans, lying likewise to the sea.
The Cythereans they found standing all in arms prepared for them. And after the battle began, the Cythereans for a little while made resistance, but soon after turned their backs and fled into the higher part of the city, and afterwards compounded with Nicias and his fellow-commanders that the Athenians should determine of them whatsoever they thought good but death.
Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cythereans before, which was also a cause that those things which concerned the accord both now and afterwards were both the sooner and with the more favour dispatched. For the Athenians did but remove the Cythereans, and that also because they were Lacedaemonians, and because the island lay in that manner upon the coast of Laconia.
After this composition, having as they went by received Scandeia, a town lying upon the haven, and put a guard upon the Cythereans, they sailed to Asine and most of the towns upon the sea-side. And going sometimes aland, and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about seven days together.
The Lacedaemonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera and expected withal that they would come to land in the same manner in their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them; but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory to guard it wheresoever there was need; and were otherwise also exceedingly watchful, fearing lest some innovation should happen in the state, as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island, and the Athenians having gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy and unavoidable war.
In so much that contrary to their custom they ordained four hundred horsemen, and some archers. And if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now, because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians, who thought they lost whatsoever they not attempted.
Withal, their so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary to their own expectation, exceedingly affrighted them.
And fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island, they durst the less to hazard battle, and thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them nothing.
As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country and disbarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most part stirred not, both as knowing themselves singly to be too small a number, and as being in that manner dejected. Yet one garrison fought about Cortyta and Aphrodisia and frighted in the straggling rabble of light-armed soldiers; but when the men of arms had received them, it retired again with the loss of a few, whom they also rifled of their arms; and the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again and went to Cythera.
From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera, and having wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea, which is of the territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the middle border between Argeia and Laconia. The Lacedaemonians, possessing this city, gave the same for an habitation to the Aeginetae, after they were driven out of Aegina, both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of the earthquake and of the insurrection of the Helotes, and also for that, being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone ever the same way with the Lacedaemonians.
When the Athenians were coming towards them, the Aeginetae left the wall which they happened to be then building toward the sea-side and retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which was not above ten furlongs from the sea.
There was also with them one of those garrisons which the Lacedaemonians had distributed into the several parts of the country; and these, though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would not now enter with them into the town, though the Aeginetae entreated them, apprehending danger in being cooped up within the walls; and therefore retiring into the highest ground, lay still there, as finding themselves too weak to give them battle.
In the meantime the Athenians came in, and marching up presently with their whole army, won Thyrea, and burnt it, and destroyed whatsoever was in it. The Aeginetae, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens, amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of Patroclus, captain of such Lacedaemonians as were amongst them, was wounded and taken alive.
They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom for safety's sake they thought good to remove into some other place. These therefore, the Athenians decreed, should be placed in the islands; and that the rest of the Cythereans at the tribute of four talents should inhabit their own territory; that the Aeginetae, as many as they had taken (out of former inveterate hatred), should be put to death; and that Tantalus should be put in bonds amongst those Lacedaemonians that were taken in the island.
In Sicily the same summer was concluded a cessation of arms, first between the Camarinaeans and the Geloans; but afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling by their ambassadors out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst themselves for making of a peace. Wherein, after many opinions delivered by men disagreeing and requiring satisfaction, every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusian, who also prevailed with them the most, spake unto the assembly to this effect:
"Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city nor of the most afflicted with war that am now to speak and to deliver the opinion which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily.
Touching war, how calamitous a thing it is, to what end should a man, particularising the evils thereof, make a long speech before men that already know it? For neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to enter into war, nor the fear of them divert any man from it, when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it so falls out that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger; and the other prefers danger before present loss.
But lest they should both the one and the other do it unseasonably, exhortations unto peace are profitable, and will be very much worth to us if we will follow them at this present.
For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure their own, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which if it succeed not so well that we may depart satisfied every man with reason, we will be at wars again.
"Nevertheless you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought not to be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but how to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at least in my opinion) by the Athenians. And you ought to think, that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders of the peace than any words of mine; who, having of all the Grecians the greatest power, lie here with a few galleys to observe our errors, and by a lawful title of alliance, handsomely to accommodate their natural hostility to their best advantage.
For if we enter into a war and call in these men, who are apt enough to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at our own charges and withal cut out for them the dominion here, it is likely, when they shall see us spent, they will sometime hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet and attempt to bring all these states into their subjection.
"Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates and undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours than for the impairing of what we already have; and to believe that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition, and that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the Athenians as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition within itself.
In contemplation whereof, we ought, man with man and city with city, to return again into amity; and with one consent to endeavour the safety of all Sicily: and not to have this conceit, that though the Dorians be the Athenians' enemies, yet the Chalcideans are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians.
For they invade not these divided races upon hatred of a side, but upon a covetous desire of those necessaries which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved themselves in their coming hither to aid the Chalcideans.
For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more forward to help them than by the league they were bound unto.
Indeed, the Athenians, that covet and meditate these things, are to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most willing to be subject; for it is the nature of man everywhere to command such as give way and to be shy of such as assail.
We are to blame that know this and do not provide accordingly and make it our first care of all to take good order against the common fear.
Of which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst ourselves (for the Athenians come not amongst us out of their own country, but from theirs here that have called them in); and so, not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace without trouble; and those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, so shall they with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.
"And thus much for the profit that will be found by advising wisely concerning the Athenians.
But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think, perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter or preserve the former, to both; or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety.
Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his hope, knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others trusting, by some strength they have had, to take away another's right, have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own.
For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune that is most predominant in things to come, which, though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence.
"Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and taking these for hindrances sufficient to have made us come short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us send away our enemies that hover over us and make an eternal peace amongst overselves, or if not that, then a truce at least for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us know this:
that following my counsel, we shall every of us have our cities free; whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate according to their merit such as do us good or harm; whereas rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, [if it be], we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies and enemies to such as we ought not.
For my part, as I said in the beginning, I bring to this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed; and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish spite will I look to be followed as absolute in my will and master of fortune, which I cannot command; but I will also give way where it is reason.
And so I look the rest should do as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy.