Kitap 4
but finding, on a calculation of the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date of the convention, he said that they would not be included in it. But Brasidas earnestly contended, on the other hand, that they had revolted before the truce was made, and refused to give the town up.
So when Aristonymus reported their case at Athens, the people were immediately prepared to send an expedition against Scione. But the Lacedaemonians sent envoys and told them that they would be violating the truce; and laid claim to the town, in reliance on the statement of Brasidas; offering, at the same time, to let the question be decided by arbitration.
The Athenians, however, did not wish to run the risk of arbitration, but to send the expedition as quickly as possible; being enraged to think that even the inhabitants of the islands now presumed to revolt from them, trusting in the power of the Lacedaemonians by land, which could not help them.
And indeed the truth of the question respecting the revolt was rather as the Athenians maintained; for the Scionaeans revolted two days after the truce was signed. Accordingly, at the instigation of Cleon, they at once passed a decree that they should reduce the Scionaeans, and put them to death; and so, while they remained quiet from other undertakings, they were engaged in preparing for this.
In the mean time, Mende revolted from them, a town in Pallene, and a colony of the Eretrians. Brasidas received them, not thinking that he was doing wrong, because they had clearly come over to him during the armistice: for in some points he himself also charged the Athenians with infringing the truce.
And for this reason the Mendaeans were the more emboldened, seeing the feelings of Brasidas warmly disposed towards them, and inferring as much from the case of Scione, since he would not give it up; and at the same time because those of them who contrived the revolt were a small party, and since thinking of it on that occasion, had never let it rest afterwards, but were afraid of conviction for themselves, and forced the majority to it against their inclination.
The Athenians, immediately hearing of it, were still far more enraged, and made their preparations against both the towns.
And Brasidas, expecting their attack, conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans, and sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy-armed and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, with Polydamidas in command of them all. And so they joined in making their preparations, believing that the Athenians would quickly be with them.
Brasidas and Perdiccas meanwhile made an expedition together the second time into Lyncus, against Arrhibaeus; taking with them, the latter, the forces of the Macedonians under his dominion, and some heavy-armed troops of the Greeks living amongst them; the former, in addition to those of the Peloponnesians whom he had still left, the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and of the rest according to their respective strength. In all, the heavy-armed Greeks amounted to about three thousand; all the cavalry of the Macedonians with the Chalcidians went with them, amounting to nearly a thousand, and a large multitude of the barbarians besides. Having:
invaded the country of Arrhibaeus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped in the field against them, they also took up a position opposite to them.
The infantry occupying a hill on each side, and the space between being a plain, the horse of both armies, in the first place, galloped down into it, and engaged in a cavalry action. Then the Lyncestian heavy-armed having advanced first from their hill with their cavalry, and being ready for action, Brasidas and Perdiccas also, in their turn, led their forces against them, and engaged in battle, and routed the Lyncestians, and killed many of them; but the rest took refuge on the heights, and there remained quiet.
After thin, having erected a trophy, they waited two or three days, in expectation of the Illyrians, who were to join Perdiccas as mercenaries. Then Perdiccas wished to advance against the villages of Arrhibaeus, and not to sit still; but Brasidas was anxious for Mende, lest if the Athenians should sail against it before his return, it should meet with some disaster; and; as the Illyrians, moreover, had not joined them, he was not eager to advance, but rather to retreat.
In the mean time, while they were thus at variance, news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas, and joined Arrhibaeus: so that now both parties thought it best to retreat through their fear of them, as they were men of a warlike character; but nothing being settled, in consequence of their quarrel, as to when they should march, and night coming on, the Macedonians and the multitude of the barbarians were immediately terrified, (as great armies are wont to be panic-stricken for no certain cause;) and thinking that many times more than had really come were advancing against them, and had all but reached them, they broke into sudden flight, and proceeded homeward. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of it, was compelled by them, on his learning it, to depart before seeing Brasidas (for they were encamped at a great distance from each other)
In the morning, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone before him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibaeus were on the point of attacking him, he, on his side, drew his heavy-armed together into a square, and taking the light-armed multitude into the centre, intended to retire. And he appointed his youngest men to dash out, on whatever point they might charge them;
while he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended during the retreat to face about, and resist the first of the enemy that should fall upon them.
Before the enemy came near, he addressed his men, as well as the short time allowed him, with the following exhortation:
Men of the Peloponnese, if I did not suspect that in consequence of your being left alone, and because your assailants are barbarians, and there are many of them, you were thrown into consternation, I should not have given you, as I do, information at the same time as encouragement. But as it is, with respect to the desertion of our friends, and the superior numbers of our adversaries, I will endeavour, by a brief admonition and advice, to convince you of what is most important for you.
For it is your proper characterr to be brave in warlike operations, not from the presence of allies in each case, but from your own native valour; and to fear no number of your enemies whatever: I venture to differ from all the editors whose opinion I generally follow, in thinking that there is no need to consider οὐ as carelessly introduced here, either by Thuoydides himself, or by his copyists. The perfect agreement of all the MSS. in retaining it renders the latter supposition exceedingly improbable: and though our author is doubtless sometimes careless, there is no reason for assuming that he was so in this passage, if his words can be explained on any other view of them. And such I think is the case, if the relative clause be taken as more particularly referring to πολιτειῶν, instead of being regarded as explanatory of τοιούτων. The meaning of the latter word will then be of such a character as to warrant your entertaining any such fear of superior numbers. When the passage is read with the stress on πολιτειῶν, which its prominent position seems to require, I cannot but think that this interpretation will appear most natural since neither are the governments from which you come of such a character—governments in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the smaller number the greater, having acquired their power by no other means than by being victorious in battle.
But with regard to barbarians, of whom you are now afraid through inexperience, you ought to know, both from the contest you have already had with those of them who are Macedonians, and from what I myself conjecture, and indeed have ascertained from hearsay, that they will not prove formidable.
For with regard to such points in an enemy as have an appearance of strength, while they are in reality weak, when correct information is gained respecting them, it rather gives confidence to those who resist them: whereas in the case of those who have any solid advantage, men would meet them the more boldly from having no previous acquaintance with them.
Now these men present indeed a demonstration fearful to such as are unacquainted with them: for they are formidable in their numbers which meet the eye, and intolerable from the loudness of their shouting; and the brandishing of their weapons in the air has a look of threatening. But to those who stand their ground against them, they are not what they seemed; for they have no definite order, so as to be ashamed of leaving any particular position, when hard pressed; and their retreat and attack being considered equally honourable puts their courage also beyond the reach of proof; while their independent mode of fighting would most frequently afford a man a pretext for saving himself with a fair show. And so they consider the probability of their frightening you without any danger to themselves a surer game than meeting you hand to hand; else they would have adopted that method instead of their present one.
And in this way you clearly see, that all that was previously terrible in them, is but little in reality, though to the eye and to the ear very urgent. If, therefore, you stand firm against its approach, and when you have an opportunity, again retire in good order, and in your ranks, you will the sooner reach a place of safety; and will know in future, that to those who sustain their first attack, such rabbles only make a vaunting demonstration, by threatening at a distance; but in the case of those who yield to them, they are quick in displaying their courage in pursuit, when they can do it with security.
In this way did Brasidas exhort them, and began to lead off his forces. When the barbarians saw it, they pressed on him with much shouting and uproar, thinking that he was flying, νομίσαντες seems to be used here in a different sense with reference to the two infinitives which follow it. For its meaning with the latter, compare chap. 86.2, οὐδ᾽ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν. and being determined to overtake and cut him off.
Then, when the reserve companies met them, at whatever point they charged; and Brasidas himself with his picked men withstood the pressure, and they had, contrary to their expectation, resisted their first rush, and, after that, received and repelled them when they came on, but retired themselves, when the enemy withdrew: then indeed the main body of the barbarians ceased attacking the Greeks with Brasidas in the the open country; and having left a portion of their forces to follow and harass them, the rest advanced at a run against the flying Macedonians, cutting down such as they fell in with; and got in time to preoccupy the narrow pass which runs between two hills, into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing that there was no other way of retreat for Brasidas. And when he was coming to just where the road now became impassable, they proceeded to surround him, with a view to cutting him off.
He, on perceiving it, gave orders to his band of three hundred to advance at a run to that one of the hills which he thought they might take more easily, as quickly as each man could, without observing any order; and to endeavour to dislodge from it the barbarians who were already upon it, before their main force that was surrounding him should join them there.
Accordingly, they charged, and overpowered the party on the hill, and the main force of the Greeks now advanced more easily up to it; for the barbarians were frightened on finding their men on that side dislodged from the height, and no longer followed the main body, considering that they were now on the borders, and had escaped them.
When Brasidas had thus reached the heights, he proceeded with greater safety, and arrived the same day at Arnissa, the first town in the dominions of Perdiccas.
And as the soldiers were enraged at the Macedonians' having retreated before them, whatever yokes of oxen belonging to them they fell in with on the road, or whatever baggage that had dropped off, (as was likely to happen in case of a retreat by night, and under an alarm,) on their own authority they unyoked and cut down the cattle, and appropriated the baggage.
From this time Perdiccas first regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and cherished in future a hatred of the Lacedaemonians, which was not, indeed congenial with his feelings, because of his aversion for the Athenians; but he departed from his natural interests, and was contriving in what way he might soonest come to terms with the Athenians, and be rid of the Peloponnesians.
On his return from Macedonia, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende; and remaining quiet there, though he considered himself unable to cross over into Pallene, and assist it, he kept watch over Torone.
For about the same time as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians sent the expedition against Mende and Scione, as they were preparing to do, with fifty ships, ten of which were Chians, and one thousand heavy-armed of their own, six hundred bowmen, one thousand Thracian mercenaries, and others of their allies from that country serving as targeteers, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus son of
Diitrephes. After advancing from Potidaea with their ships, they came to land opposite the temple of Neptune, and proceeded against the Mendaeans. They, both themselves and three hundred Scionaeans who had come to their aid, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy-armed in all, with Polydamidas their commander, were encamped outside the city on a strong
hill. Nicias, with one hundred and twenty Methonaean light-armed, sixty picked men of the Athenian heavy-armed, and all the bowmen, attempted to come at them by a path running up the hill; but being wounded by them, was unable to force their position: while Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army, advancing by a different approach, and from a more distant point, against the hill, which was difficult of access, was beaten back in utter confusion, and the whole force of the Athenians was within a little of being
conquered. For that day, then, as the Mendaeans and their allies did not give way, the Athenians retreated and pitched their camp; and the Mendaeans, when night came on, returned into the town.
The day following, the Athenians sailed round to the side towards Scione, and took the suburb, and ravaged the land the whole day, no one coming out against them. For indeed there was some opposition of parties in the town; and the three hundred of the Scionaeans, on the approach of night, returned home.
The next day Nicias advanced with half the forces to the borders of the Scionaeans, and laid waste the land, while Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before the town, near the upper gates, by the way they go to Potidaea.
There Polydamidas (as the arms of the Mendaeans and their auxiliaries happened to be piled in that quarter) began to draw them up for battle, and exhorted the Mendaeans to march out against the enemy.
One of the popular faction replying to him, in the spirit of party, that they would not go out, and did not want a war, and, when he had thus relied, being dragged to him by the hand, and roughly treated, the commons immediately took up their arms, and advanced in a great rage against the Peloponnesians, and those who had joined them in opposition to themselves. Having thus fallen upon them, they routed them, in consequence both of the suddenness of the charge, and of their alarm at the gates being opened to the Athenians;
for they imagined that the attack had been made in consequence of some agreement with them.
They then, as many as were not immediately killed, took refuge in the citadel, which was before held by themselves; while the Athenians (for by this time Nicias also had returned and was close to the town) rushed with all their forces into Mende, inasmuch as it had not thrown open its gates to them on the ground of any convention, and sacked it as though they had taken it by storm; the generals with difficulty restraining them from even butchering the inhabitants.