Kitap 4
The spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys of Syracuse and as many of Locris went to Messana in Sicily, called in by the citizens themselves, and took it; and Messana revolted from the Athenians.
This was done by the practice chiefly of the Syracusans, that saw the place to be commodious for invasion of Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians, some time or other hereafter making it the seat of their war, might come with greater forces into Sicily and invade them from thence; but partly also of the Locrians, as being in hostility with the Rhegians and desirous to make war upon them on both sides.
The Locrians had now also entered the lands of the Rhegians with their whole power, both because they would hinder them from assisting the Messanians and because they were solicited thereunto by the banished men of Rhegium that were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition and were unable for the present to give them battle, for which cause they the rather also now invaded them.
And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their land-forces; but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messana, and more were setting forth, to lie in the same harbour, to make the war on that side.
About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, invaded Attica, and there lay and wasted the country about.
And the Athenians sent forty galleys into Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose, and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in Sicily before.
To these they gave commandment also to take order, as they went by, for the state of those Corcyraeans that were in the city and were pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain; and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in the mountain, who, because there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of that state.
To Demosthenes also, who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately, they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of the same galleys, if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.
As they sailed by the coast of Laconia and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hasted to Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a tempest that then arose by chance.
And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with them for no other purpose, and showing how there was great store of timber and stone and that the place itself was naturally strong and desert, both it and a great deal of the country about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs in the territory that, belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedaemonians Coryphasion.
But they answered him that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places, because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedaemonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence and be also faithful guardians of the place.
When he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains of companies, he gave it over, till at last, the weather not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own accord.
And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar, where it was needed, for want of vessels they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling, making all possible haste to prevent the Lacedaemonians and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour it.
For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature and needed no fortifying at all.
The Lacedaemonians were [that day] celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news did set lightly by it, conceiving that whensoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone or easily take the place by force.
Somewhat also they were retarded by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians, having in six days finished the wall to the land and in the places where was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it and with the rest hastened on in their course for Corcyra and Sicily.
The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were advertised of the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home; for the Lacedaemonians and Agis, their king, took this accident of Pylus to concern their own particular. And the invasion was withal so early, corn being yet green, that the most of them were scanted with victual. The army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder than for the season.
So as for many reasons it fell out that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done, and this invasion was the shortest, for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.
About the same time, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaeans, that was their enemy, by treason, but was presently again driven out by the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans that came to succour it, and lost many of his soldiers.
When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta and of other the neighboring towns went presently to the aid of Pylus; but [the rest of] the Lacedaemonians came slowlier on, as being newly come from the former expedition.
Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of the Peloponnesus to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus, and also to their threescore galleys that were at Corcyra, which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylus unseen of the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus. And by this time their army of foot was also there.
Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus, in all haste, to tell them that they must come presently to him for as much as the place was in danger to be lost.
And according as Demosthenes' message imported, so the fleet made haste. The Lacedaemonians in the meantime prepared themselves to assault the fort both by sea and land, hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste and not many men within it.
And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour.
For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe and the entries straight, one of them, nearest to Pylus and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood and untrodden, in bigness, about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their galleys thick set, and with the beak-heads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven.
And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians [putting men into it] should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same and placed others likewise along the shore of the continent.
For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylus itself without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows; and they in all probability might by siege, without battle by sea or other danger, win the place, seeing there was no provision of victual within it and that the enemy took it but on short preparation.
Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms out of every band by lot. Some also had been sent over before by turns; but they which went over now last and were left there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helotes that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.
Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedaemonians bent to assault him both from their galleys and with their army by land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, to the land, he placed them athwart the fort and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves of arms. Those they had they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars and a light-horseman of the Messenians, which came by chance. And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest.
The greatest part therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on the parts of the wall toward the land which were of most strength and commanded them to make good the place against the land-forces if they assaulted it. And he himself, with sixty men of arms chosen out of the whole number and a few archers, came forth from the fort to the sea-side in that part where he most expected their landing, which part was of troublesome access and stony and lay to the wide sea. But because their wall was there the weakest, he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place [to the seaward] the less strong;
and if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no other account but the place would be lost.
Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms and encouraged them with words to this effect:
You that participate with me in the present danger, let not any of you in this extremity go about to seem wise and reckon every peril that now besetteth us, but let him rather come up to the enemy with little circumspection and much hope and look for his safety by that. For things that are come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but a speedy hazard.
And [yet] if we stand it out, and betray not our advantages with fear of the number of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us.
For I make account, the difficulty of their landing makes for us, which, as long as we abide ourselves, will help us; but if we retire, though the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them they will land well enough. For whilst they are in their galleys, they are most easy to be fought withal; and in their disbarking, being but on equal terms, their number is not greatly to be feared;
for though they be many, yet they must fight but by few for want of room to fight in. And for an army to have odds by land is another matter than when they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that I think their great difficulties do but set them even with our small number.
And for you, that be Athenians and by experience of disbarking against others know that if a man stand it out and do not fear of the sowsing of a wave or the menacing approach of a galley give back of himself, he can never be put back by violence; I expect that you should keep your ground and by fighting it out upon the very edge of the water preserve both yourselves and the fort.
Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes the Athenians took better heart and went down and arranged themselves close by the sea.
And the Lacedaemonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land and with their fleet, consisting of three-and-forty galleys, in which was admiral Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan. And he made his approach where Demosthenes had before expected him.
So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians, dividing their galleys into small numbers because they could not come near with many at once and resting between, assailed them by turns, using all possible valour and mutual encouragement to put the Athenians back and gain the fort. Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas.