Kitap 3
Alcidas was persuaded, and set free all the Chians whom he still held and some of the others. It should be explained that the people of the coast,ie. the Greeks of whom Alcidas had taken so many prisoners. when they saw the Peloponnesian ships, made no attempt to flee, but came near, supposing that they were Athenian ships; and they had not the slightest expectation that while the Athenians dominated the sea the Peloponnesian fleet would ever venture over to Ionia.
From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste and took to flight; for while still at anchor near Clarusie. while on his way from Embatum to Ephesus. he had been sighted by the Salaminia and Paralus,The two swift Athenian state triremes kept always manned ready for extraordinary service. Alcidas knew that these two boats would notify the main Athenian fleet under Paches of his whereabouts, and that Paches would make pursuit. which happened to be on a voyage from Athens, and in fear of pursuit he sailed through the open sea, determined that he would not, unless obliged to do so, put into land anywhere except in the Peloponnesus.
Reports of him had been brought from Erythraea to Paches and the Athenians, and now kept coming from all quarters. For since Ionia was unfortified, a great alarm arose everywhere lest the Peloponnesians, while following the coast—even if, under the circumstances,ie. since they only crusing. they had no intention of remaining—might in passing fall upon their cities and plunder them. And finally the Paralus and the Salaminia brought the news that they had themselves seen him at Clarus. So Paches eagerly undertook the pursuit;
and he followed him as far as the island of Patmos, but when it was clear that Alcidas could no longer be overtaken he turned back again. And since he had not come up with the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, he considered it a piece of good fortune that they had not been overtaken in some port and compelled to set up a camp there, thus giving the Athenian fleet the trouble of watching and blockading them.Such a blockade would not only have been costly, but would also have kept the fleet from carrying on its work at Lesbos.
On the way back as he sailed along the coast he put in at Notium, the port of the Colophonians, where the Colophonians had settled when the upper town had been taken by Itamenes and the barbarians,ie. the Persians. Itamenes is otherwise unknown. who had been called in on account of party discord by one of the factions. And this place had been taken about the time when the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica was made.In the spring of 43 B.C.
Now those who had fled for refuge to Notium and settled there again fell into sedition. One party called in mercenaries, both Arcadian and barbarian, whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, and kept them in a space walled off from the rest of the city, and the Colophonians from the upper town who were in sympathy with the Persians joined them there and were admitted to citizenship;
the other party had secretly made their escape, and, being now in exile, called in Paches. And he summoned Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a conference, on condition that if his proposals were unsatisfactory he would restore him safe and sound to the fortress. But when Hippias came out to him, he kept him under guard but unfettered while he himself made a sudden and unexpected attack upon the fortress, captured it, and put to death all the Arcadians and barbarians that were in it. As for Hippias, he afterward took him into the fortress just as he had agreed to do, and as soon as he was inside seized him and shot him down.
He then delivered Notium to the Colophonians, excepting, however, the Persian sympathizers. The Athenians afterwards sent a commission and recolonized Notium, giving it their own institutions, after they had first brought together all the Colophonians from cities where any of them were to be found.
After returning to Mytilene Paches re-427 B.C. duced Pyrrha and Eresus, and having caught Salaethus the Lacedaemonian in hiding in the town sent him off to Athens, as also the Mytilenaean men whom he had placed for safe-keeping in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to him to blame for the revolt. He also sent back most of
his army; with the rest he remained, and proceeded to settle the affairs of Mytilene and of Lesbos in general as seemed best to him.
When Salaethus and the others arrived at Athens, the Athenians at once put Salaethus to death, although he offered among other things to induce the Peloponnesians to abandon Plataea, which was still under siege;
as to the others they held a debate, and under the impulse of anger finally determined to put to death, not only the Mytilenaeans who were there in Athens, but also all who were of adult age, and to enslave their women and children. The general charge which they brought against them was that they had made this revolt in spite of the fact that they were not held in subjection like the other allies; and what contributed not least to their fury was that the Peloponnesian fleet had dared to venture over to Ionia to their support; for from this they thought the revolt had been made after long deliberation.
Accordingly they sent a trireme to Paches to announce what had been determined upon, and bidding him to despatch the Mytilenaeans with all haste;
but on the very next day a feeling of repentance came over them and they began to reflect that the design which they had formed was cruel and monstrous, to destroy a whole city instead of merely those who were guilty.
And when this became known to the Mytilenaeancf. 3.28.1. envoys who were present and their Athenian supporters, they induced those in authority to bring the question before the people again; and they found less difficulty in persuading them because it was evident to them also that the greater part of the citizens wished that another opportunity should be given them to consider the matter.
A meeting of the assembly was held immediately, at which various opinions were expressed by the several speakers. One of these was Cleon son of Cleaenetus, who had been successful in carrying the earlier motion to put the Mytilenaeans to death. He was not only the most violent of the citizens, but at that time had by far the greatest influence with the people. He now came forward a second time and spoke as follows:
"On many other occasions in the past I have realized that a democracy is incompetent to govern others, but more than ever to-day, when I observe your change of heart concerning the Mytilenaeans.
The fact is that, because your daily life is unaffected by fear and intrigue in your relations to each other,cf. 2.37.2. you have the same attitude towards your allies also, and you forget that whenever you are led into error by their representations or yield out of pity, your weakness involves you in danger and does not win the gratitude of your allies. For you do not reflect that the empire you hold is a despotismcf. 2.63.2. imposed upon subjects who, for their part, do intrigue against you and submit to your rule against their will, who render obedience, not because of any kindnesses you may do them to your own hurt, but because of such superiority as you may have established by reason of your strength rather than of their goodwill.
But quite the most alarming thing is, if nothing we have resolved upon shall be settled once for all, and if we shall refuse to recognize that a state which has inferior laws that are inviolable is stronger than one whose laws are good but without authority; that ignorance combined with selfrestraint is more serviceable than cleverness combined with recklessness;
and that simpler people for the most part make better citizens than the more shrewd. The latter always want to show that they are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public discussions, as if there could never be weightier questions on which to declare their opinions, and as a consequence of such conduct they generally bring their states to ruin; the former, on the contrary, mistrusting their own insight, are content to be less enlightened than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker, but being impartial judges rather than interested contestants they generally prosper.
Thus, then, we ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and combat of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own judgment.
"As for me, I have not changed my opinion, and I wonder at those who propose to debate again the question of the Mytilenaeans and thus interpose delay, which is in the interest of those who have done the wrong; for thus the edge of the victim's wrath is duller when he proceeds against the offender, whereas the vengeance that follows upon the very heels of the outrage exacts a punishment that most nearly matches the offence. And I wonder, too, who will answer me and undertake to prove that the wrong-doings of the Mytilenaeans are beneficial to us but that our misfortunes prove injurious to our allies.
Manifestly he must either have such confidence in his powers of speech as to undertake to show that what is universally accepted as true has not been established,Or, “your absolute resolve has really not been adopted.” or else, incited by gain, will by an elaborate display of specious oratory attempt to mislead you.
But in contests of that kind the city bestows the prizes upon others, while she herself undergoes all the risks. And you are yourselves to blame, for your management of these contests is wrong.
It is your wont to be spectators of words and hearers of deeds, forming your judgment of future enterprises according as able speakers represent them to be feasible, but as regards accomplished facts, not counting what has been done more credible, because you have seen it, than what you have heard, you are swayed in judgment by those who have made an eloquent invective.
You are adepts not only at being deceived by novel proposals but also at refusing to follow approved advice, slaves as you are of each new paradox and scorners of what is familiar.
Each of you wishes above all to be an orator himself, or, failing that, to vie with those dealers in paradox by seeming not to lag behind them in wit but to applaud a smart saying before it is out of the speaker's mouth; you are as quick to forestall what is said as you are slow to foresee what will come of it.
You seek, one might say, a world quite unlike that in which we live, but give too little heed to that which is at hand. In a word, you are in thrall to the pleasures of the ear and are more like men who sit as spectators at exhibitions of sophists than men who take counsel for the welfare of the state.
"And it is from these ways that I seek to turn you when I attempt to prove that Mytilene has done you more injury than any single state.
I can make allowance for men who resorted to revolt because they were unable to bear your rule or because they were compelled by your enemies to do so; but men who inhabited a fortified island and had no fear of our enemies except by sea, and even there were not without the protection of a force of their own triremes, who moreover were independent and were treated by us with the highest consideration, when these men have acted thus, what else is it but conspiracy and rebellion rather than revolt—for revolt is the work of those who suffer oppression—and a deliberate attempt by taking their stand on the side of our bitterest enemies to bring about our destruction? And yet this is assuredly a more heinous thing than if they had gone to war against us by themselves for the acquisition of power.
The calamities of their neighbours who had already revolted from us and been subdued proved no warning to them; nor did the good fortune which they enjoyed make them hesitate to take the perilous step; on the contrary, becoming over-confident as to the future, and conceiving hopes which, though greater than their powers, were less than their ambition, they took up arms, presuming to put might before right; for the moment they thought they should prove superior they attacked us unprovoked.
And indeed it is the rule, that such states as come to unexpected prosperity most fully and most suddenly, do turn to insolence, whereas men generally find success less precarious when it comes in accordance with reasonable calculations than when it surpasses expectation, and more easily, as it seems, they repel adversity than maintain prosperity.
But the Mytilenaeans from the first ought never to have been treated by us with any more consideration than our other allies, and then they would not have broken out into such insolence;
for it is human nature in any case to be contemptuous of those who pay court but to admire those who will not yield. "Let them be punished, therefore, even now, in a manner befitting their crime, and do not put the blame upon the aristocrats and exonerate the common people. For they all alike attacked you, even the commons, who, if they had taken our side, might now have been reinstated in their city; but they thought there was less risk in sharing the dangers of the oligarchs, and so joined them in the revolt.
Consider, moreover, your allies: if you inflict upon those who wilfully revolt no greater punishment than upon those who revolt under compulsion from our foes, which of them, think you, will not revolt on a slight pretext, when the alternatives are liberty if he succeeds or a fate not irreparable if he fails?
We, on the other hand, shall have to risk our money and our lives against each separate state, and when we succeed we shall recover a ruined state and be deprived for the future of its revenue, the source of our strength, whereas if we fail we shall be adding fresh enemies to those we have already, and when we should be resisting our present foes we shall be fighting our own allies.
"We must not, therefore, hold out to them any hope, either to be secured by eloquence or purchased by money, that they will be excused on the plea that their error was human. For their act was no unintentional injury but a deliberate plot;
and it is that which is unintentional which is excusable. Therefore, I still protest, as I have from the first,Referring to what happened in the assembly of the day before, in which, however, he had urged the action that was taken; its reconsideration was not urged till the present meeting. that you should not reverse your former decision or be led into error by pity, delight in eloquence, or clemency, the three influences most prejudicial to a ruling state.
For compassion may rightly be bestowed upon those who are likewise compassionate and not upon those who will show no pity in return but of necessity are always enemies. As to the orators who charm by their eloquence, they will have other opportunities of display in matters of less importance, and not where the city for a brief pleasure will pay a heavy penalty while they themselves get a fine fee for their fine speaking. And clemency would better be reserved for those who will afterwards be faithful allies than be shown to those who remain just what they were before and no whit the less our enemies. "I can sum up what I have to say in a word.
If you take my advice, you will do not only what is just to the Mytilenaeans but also at the same time what is expedient for us; but if you decide otherwise, you will not win their gratitude but will rather bring a just condemnation upon yourselves; for if these people had a right to secede, it would follow that you are wrong in exercising dominion. But if, right or wrong, you are still resolved to maintain it, then you must punish these people in defiance of equity as your interests require; or else you must give up your empire and in discreet safety practise the fine virtues you preach.For the thought, cf. 2.63.2.