Kitap 2
The Peloponnesians with the remainder of their fleet went presently along the coast of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleians; and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from Leucas and with him those galleys that were there and with which this other fleet should have been joined.
After this the Lacedaemonians sent unto Cnemus to the fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to be of his council with command to prepare for another better fight and not to suffer a few galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea.
For they thought this accident (especially being their first proof by sea) very much against reason, and that it was not so much a defect of the fleet as of their courage, never comparing the long practice of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in passion.
Who, being arrived with Cnemus, intimated to the cities about to provide their galleys and caused those they had before to be repaired.
Phormio likewise sent to Athens to make known both the enemy's preparation and his own former victory and withal to will them to send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys but commanded him that had the charge of them to go first into Crete.
For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyna, the public host of the Athenians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia, telling them they might take it in, being now their enemy, which he did to gratify the Polichnitae that bordered upon the Cydonians.
Therefore with these galleys he sailed into Crete and together with the Polichnitae wasted the territory of the Cydonians, where also, by reason of the winds and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.
In the meantime, whilst these Athenians were wind-bound in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene in order of battle sailed along the coast of Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land forces come to aid them.
Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium Molycricum and anchored without it with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former battle.
Now this Rhium was of the Athenians' side, and the other Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea; and these two make the mouth of the Crisaean gulf.
The Peloponnesians therefore came to an anchor at Rhium of Achaia with seventy-seven galleys, not far from Panormus where they left their land forces.
After they saw the Athenians and had lain six or seven days one against the other meditating and providing for the battle, the Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide sea for fear of what they had suffered by it before, nor the other to enter the strait because to fight within they thought to be the enemy's advantage.
At last Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily before a new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together and, seeing the most of them to be fearful through their former defeat and not forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this effect:
Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle at hand for the success of the battle past, his fear is without ground.
For you know we were inferior to them then in preparation and set not forth as to a fight at sea but rather to an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in many things, and somewhat we miscarried by unskilfulness.
So as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice, nor is it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force but have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be dejected for the calamity of the event; but we must think that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of a valiant man can never fail, and not that we may justify cowardice in anything by pretending want of skill, and yet be truly valiant.
And yet you are not so much short of their skill as you exceed them in valour. And though this knowledge of theirs, which you so much fear, joined with courage will not be without a memory also to put what they know in execution; yet without courage no art in the world is of any force in the time of danger. For fear confoundeth the memory, and skill without courage availeth nothing.
To their odds therefore of skill oppose your odds of valour, and to the fear caused by your overthrow oppose your being then unprovided.
You have further now a greater fleet and to fight on your own shore with your aids at hand of men of arms; and, for the most part, the greatest number and best provided get the victory.
So that we can neither see any one cause in particular why we should miscarry; and whatsoever were our wants in the former battle, supplied in this will now turn to our instruction.
With courage therefore, both masters and mariners, follow every man in his order, not forsaking the place assigned him.
And for us, we shall order the battle as well as the former commanders and leave no excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign punishment; and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit.
Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. And Phormio, he likewise doubting that his soldiers were but fainthearted and observing they had consultations apart and were afraid of the multitude of the enemy's galleys, thought good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the present occasion.
For though he had always before told them and predisposed their minds to an opinion that there was no number of galleys so great which setting upon them they ought not to undertake, and [also] most of the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves that being Athenians they ought not to decline any number of galleys whatsoever of the Peloponnesians, yet when he saw that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive their courage and, having assembled the Athenians, said thus:
Soldiers, having observed your fear of the enemy's number, I have called you together, not enduring to see you terrified with things that are not terrible.
For first, they have prepared this great number and odds of galleys for that they were overcome before and because they are even in their own opinions too weak for us. And next, their present boldness proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof (as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them) they are now come up, wherein having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea.
But in reason the odds must be ours in this as well as it is theirs in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not; and as touching the advantage of either side, we may better be bold now than they.
And the Lacedaemonians, who are the leaders of the confederates, bring them to fight for the greatest part (in respect of the opinion they have of us) against their wills. For else they would never have undertaken a new battle after they were once so clearly overthrown.
Fear not therefore any great boldness on their part. But the fear which they have of you is far both greater and more certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but also for this, that they would never believe you would go about to resist unless you had some notable thing to put in practice upon them.
For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they invade chiefly upon confidence of their strength; but they that are much the fewer must have some great and sure design when they dare fight unconstrained.
Wherewith these men now amazed fear us more for our unlikely preparation than they would if it were more proportionable. Besides, many great armies have been overcome by the lesser through unskilfulness and some also by timorousness, both which we ourselves are free from.
As for the battle, I will not willingly fight it in the gulf nor go in thither, seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness and art against many without art, straitness of room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit unless he have sight of the enemy afar off, or if he be himself over-pressed, again get clear. Nor is there any getting through them or turning to and fro at one's pleasure, which are all the works of such galleys as have their advantage in agility; but the sea fight would of necessity be the same with a battle by land wherein the greater number must have the better.
But of this I shall myself take the best care I am able. In the meantime, keep you your order well in the galleys, and every man receive his charge readily; and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us. In the fight have in great estimation order and silence as things of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight by sea; and charge these your enemies according to the worth of your former acts.
You are to fight for a great wager, either to destroy the hope of the Peloponnesian navies or to bring the fear of the sea nearer home to the Athenians.
Again, let me tell you, you have beaten them once already; and men once overcome will not come again to the danger so well resolved as before.
Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor and betime in the morning, having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along their own coast within the gulf, leading the way in the same order as they had lain at anchor, with their right wing.
In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along his own coast likewise within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs and avoid the impression but be inclosed by their galleys on both sides.
Phormio, fearing (as they expected) what might become of the town now without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will and in extreme haste went aboard and sailed along the shore with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him.
The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore (which they most desired), upon one sign given turned suddenly everyone as fast as he could upon the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley.
But of those the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea. The rest they intercepted and, driving them to the shore, sunk them. The men, as many as swam not out, they slew;