Kitap 1
For the moment then the ephors were distanced in their pursuit, but afterwards they took the roof off the building and, watching until he was inside and shutting off his retreat, walled up the doors; then they invested the place and starved him to death.
And when he was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the building,The temple would have been polluted if he had been allowed to die there. they perceived his condition and brought him out of the temple still breathing; but when he was brought out he died immediately.
It was their first intention to cast him into the Caeadas,A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probably near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners, in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown; cf. Strabo, 7.5.7; Paus. 4.18.3. where they throw malefactors; but afterwards they decided to bury him somewhere near the city. But the god at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by oracle to transfer him to the place where he died (and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as an inscription on some columns testifies), and that they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House with two bodies in place of one, since their act had brought a curse upon them. So they had two bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena to be a substitute for Pausanias.
Thus it was that the Athenians,cf. 1.128.1 in response to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus, seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse.
But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treasonable dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with discoveries they had made in connection with their investigation about Pausanias;
and they demanded that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him.
But Themistocles, forewarned, fled from the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, since he was a benefactorεὐεργέτης, benefactor, a title of honour bestowed upon him, either because he took the part of the Corcyreans in a dispute with Corinth (Plut. Them. 24), or because he had excused their absence (Schol.) in the Persian war (Hdt. 8.115). Themistocles relied upon the right of asylum, which had doubtless been decreed him as εὐεργέτης. of the Corcyraeans. As they, however, alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus incur the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the mainland opposite.
And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the task, according as they could learn the course he was taking, he was forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him.
Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themistocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was instructed by her to take their child and seat himself on the hearth.
And when Admetus returned after a short time, Themistocles declared who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed any request Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to take vengeance on him when a fugitive; for in his present plight he might come to harm at the hands of a far weaker man than Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides, he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the matter of a petition and not of his personal safety; whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers (telling who these were and what the charge against him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life.
Admetus, hearing this, raised him up, together with his own son, even as he still sat holding him, this being the most potent form of supplication. And when, not long afterwards, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave him an escort overland to Pydna on the otherThe Aegean. sea, the capital of Alexander.King of Macedonia.
There he found a merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on board was driven by a storm to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themistocles became afraid and told the captain who he was (for he was unknown to those on board) and why he was in flight, adding that if he did not save him he would tell the Athenians that he had been bribed to give him passage; their only chance for safety, he explained, was that no one be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage could be resumed, and he promised that if he complied with his request he would make a fitting return for the favour. The captain did as he was bidden, and after riding out the gale for a day and a night just outside the Athenian station, duly arrived at Ephesus.
And Themistocles rewarded him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon received from his friends in Athens and from Argos the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping); then proceeding into the interior with one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately come to the throne.
And the letter ran as follows: " I, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hellenes did your house most harm so long as your father assailed me and I was constrained to defend myself, but still greater good by far when, his retreat being in progress, I was in security and he in dire peril. And there is a kindness due to me (here he related the timely warning to retreat given at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to destroy the bridges at that time,For Themistocles' advice given to Xerxes to retreat before it was too late and his claim about the non-destruction of the bridges, cf. Hdt. 8.108-110. which he falsely claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and now I am here, having it in my power to do you great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on account of my friendship to you; and my desire is to wait a year and then in person explain to you that for which I am come."
The King, it is said, marvelled at his purposeOr, as some take it, character. cf. τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ Plut. Them. 28, the boldness of his spirit. and bade him do as he desired. And Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the Persian language and with the customs of the country;
but when the year was ended he came to the King and becme more influential with him than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both because of the reputation he already enjoyed and of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that he would make all Hellas subject to him, but most of all in consequence of the insight he minifested, of which he gave repeated proofs.
I[cr indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect. For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or later study,i.e. without knowledge acquired either before or after the occasion for action had arisen. he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future. Moreover, he had the ability to expound to others the enterprises he had in hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed he could yet without fail pass competent judgment; and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better or worse that lay in the still dim future. To sum up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and because of the brief preparation he required, he proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to hit upon the right expedient.
He died a natural death, an illness taking him off, though some say that he put an end to his own life by poisonFor the various accounts, see Cic. Brut. 11. 43; Plut. Them. 31; Diod. 11.58; Ar. Eq. 83. when he realised it to be impossible to fulfil his promises to the King.
There is a monument to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the marketplace; for he was governor of this country, the King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine, Lampsacus, reputed to be the best wine country of all places at that time;
and Myus for meat. But his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by his own command and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury him there, as he had been banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished of the Hellenes of their time.
The LacedaemoniansTaking up the narrative from Thuc. 1.126. then had on the occasion of their first embassy directed the Athenians, and received a counter demand from them, to take such measures about the expulsion of the accursed. Later, however, they frequently repaired to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, and give Aegina its independence, and above all they declared in the plainest terms that they could avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the Megarians,See Thuc. 1.67.4, and the references in Aristoph. Arch. 520-3 and Aristoph. Arch. 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the outbreak of the war (432). in which they were forbidden to use any of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the Athenian market.
But the Athenians would pay no heed to their other demands and declined to rescind the decree, charging the Megarians with encroachment upon the sacred land and the border-land not marked by boundaries,The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to the Eleusinian goddesses; second, to land still in dispute between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked. and also with harbouring runaway slaves.
But at last a final embassy came from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the demands they had hitherto been wont to make, but only this: "The Lacedaemonians desire peace, and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes their independence." Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and gave their citizens an opportunity to express their opinions; and it was resolved to consider the whole question and then give their answer once for all.
And many others came forward and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, some urging that war was necessary, others that the decree should not stand in the way of peace, but should be rescinded; and finally Pericles son of Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech and in action, came forward and advised them as follows:
" I hold, men of Athens, to the same judgment as always, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are not as a rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually engaged in war as when they are being persuaded to undertake it, but change their judgments in accordance with events. And now also I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same advice as in the past, and I demand that those of you who are persuaded by what I shall say shall support the common decisions, even if we should in any way fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share in the good judgment shown. For it is just as possible for the course of events to move perversely as for the plans of men; and it is for that very reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.
"As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly clear before that they were plotting against us, and it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was expressly stipulated that we should submit our differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now when we make the offer. What they want is to redress their grievances by war rather than by discussion, and they are here dictating already and no longer expostulating.
For they order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree; and these men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must give all the Hellenes also their independence.
But let no one of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they especially insist upon, saying that there will be no war if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain in your minds any self-reproach that it was a small matter for which you went to war.
For this trifling thing involves nothing less than the vindication and proof of your political conviction. If you yield this point to them you will immediately be ordered to yield another and greater one, as having conceded this first point through fear; whereas by a downright refusal you will give them clearly to understand that they must be more disposed to deal with you on terms of equality.
So make up your minds, here and now, either to take their orders before any damage is done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me at least seems best--do so with the determination not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not to hold our possessions in fear. For it means enslavement just the same when either the greatest or the least claim is imposed by equals upon their neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by dictation. "
But as regards the war and the resources of each side, make up your minds, as you hear the particulars fiom me, that our position will be fully as powerful as theirs.
For the Peloponnesians till their lands with their own hands; they have no wealth, either private or public; besides, they have had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief campaigns separately against one another.
Now people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently sending out expeditions by land, since they would thus have to be away fiom their properties and at the same time would be drawing upon their own resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred from the sea as well.i.e., by the superior navy of the Athenians.
Again, it is accumulated wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own lands are more ready to risk their lives in war than their property; for they have confident hope of surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will not use up their funds before the war ends, especially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted beyond expectation.
Indeed, although in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are not strong enough to maintain a war against a military organisation which is so different from theirs, seeing that they have no single general assembly, and therefore cannot promptly put into effect any emergency measure; and as they all have an equal vote and are of different races they each strive to advance their own interests. In such circumstances it usually happens that nothing is accomplished.
And indeed it could scarcely be otherwise, for what some of them want is the greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, others the least possible damage to their own property. And when after many delays they do meet, they give but a scant portion of their time to the consideration of any matter of common concern, but the larger portion to their own individual interests. And each one thinks no harm will come from his own negligence, but that it is the business of somebody else to be provident on his behalf; and so, through all separately cherishing the same fancy, universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole body.
And what is most important, they will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that providing it slowly they are subject to delays;
but the opportunities of war wait for no man. "Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our territoryThuc. 1.122.1 need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their navy.
For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter even in time of peace to construct here a city that will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing this in a hostile country and at a time when we have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them.
But suppose they do establish a fort; although they might injure a part of our territory by making raids and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and building forts there, or making reprisals with our fleet, wherein our strength lies.