Kitap 1
After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, delivered it to the Delphians; and afterwards, when they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedition, got possession of it, and delivered it again to the Phocians.
Some time after this447 B.C. the Athenians under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one thousand hoplites of their own and the respective quotas of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeotian exiles and therefore hostile. And after taking Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, they placed a garrison in it and departed.
But while they were on the march they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from (rchomenus, together with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and others who held the same political views, and were defeated, some of the Athenians being slain and others taken alive.
Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipulation that they should receive back their prisoners.
And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became autonomous.
Not long after this445 B. C. Euboea revolted from Athens; and Pericles had just crossed over to the island with an Athenian army when word was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that all the Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians except such as had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corinthians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid. So Pericles in haste brought his army back again from Euboea.
After this the Peloponnesians, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, ravaging the country; but without going further they returned home.
Thereupon the Athenians again crossed over into Euboea under the command of Pericles and subdued the whole of it; the rest of the island they settledSetting up democracies, etc. cf. C.I.A. iv. 27 a. by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and themselves occupied their territory.
Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies which was to last for thirty years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea; for these were the places belonging to the Peloponnesians which the Athenians then held.
Six years later a war arose between the Samians and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians. They were seconded in their complaint by some private citizens from Samos itself who wished to revolutionize the government.
So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos;
then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance with the most influential men who remained in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then satrap of Sardis; and collecting mercenary troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos.
First they attacked the popular party and got most of them into their power; then they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the island, and at once set about preparing an expedition against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in their revolt.
But when the Athenians heard of this they sailed for Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen of these, however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios and Lesbos to summon aid; but with forty-four ships, under the command of Pericles and nine others,Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of the year. they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were transport—ships, the whole fleet being on the way back from Miletus; and the Athenians were victorious.
Later, having received a reinforcement from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded to invest the city with three walls, at the same time blockading it by sea as well.
But Pericles took sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and departed in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing against his forces; for Stesagoras and others had gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the Phoenician ships.
Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which was unprotected by a stockade, destroying the guardships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that put out against them. And for about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing in and carrying out whatever they wished;
but when Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea. And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens of forty ships under the command of Thucydides,Possibly the historian, as some have thought; others explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles; still others as the poet from the deme of Acherdus. Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos.
Now the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in the ninth month439 B.C. were reduced by siege and agreed to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting to pay back by instalments the money spent upon the siege. The Byzantines too came to terms, agreeing to be subjects as before.
It was not many yearsHardly four years, since the naval battle between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 B.C. after this that the events already narrated occurred, namely the Corcyraean affair,1.24-1.40. the Potidaean,1.54-1.66. and all the other incidentsThe transactions in the Spartan assembly, 1.67-1.88. lxxxviii. that furnished an occasion for this war.
And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one another and against the Barbarian, took place in the interval of about fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war.479-432 B.C. It was in this period that the Athenians established their rule more firmly and themselves advanced to great power. And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their growing power, made no attempt to check it, except to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater part of the time, since they had never been quick to go to war except under compulsion, and in this case were in some degree precluded from interference by wars of their own.The Helot rebellion, 1.101. But at last the power of the Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedaemonians could bear it no longer, but determined that they must attack the Athenian power with all zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking this war. The Lacedaemonians themselves, then,Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of Thuc. 1.88. had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war.
The god answered them, as it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked.
But they wished to summon their allies again and put432 B.C. to them the question whether they should go to war. And when the envoys from the allies had come and an assembly was held, the others said what they wished, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should be entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They had already, before the meeting, privately begged the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and now, being also present at this meeting, they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:
" Men of the allies, we can no longer complain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both themselves voted for the war and also brought us together for this object. And that is right; for it is the duty of leaders, while equitably considering their particular interests, to have special regard for the general weal, just as in other matters they are honoured above all.
Now those of us who have had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not need to be taught to be on our guard against them. But those who dwell more in the interior and away from any trade-route should be warned that, if they do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will find it more difficult to bring the products of the land down to the sea and to get in return what the sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not be careless judges of what is said here, as though it were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger may possibly some day reach them, and that they are deliberating upon their own interests no less than upon ours.
They ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. For though it is the part of men of discretion to remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to submit to wrong.
For he who for the sake of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink; and he who presumes upon his success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is the confidence which elates him.
For many enterprises which were ill-planned have succeeded because the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, and yet more, which to all appearances were well advised, have turned out the opposite way and brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a plan with the same confidence with which he conceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of success.
" And so now in our own case, it is because we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the Athenians we will bring the war to an end when occasion offers.
And for many reasons we are likely to prevail: first, because we are superior in point of numbers and in military experience ;
secondly, because we all with one accord obey the word of command; and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the means which we severally possess, but also with the funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia.cf. Thuc. 2.13.4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource. The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according to 1.118.3. For by contracting a loan we can use the inducement of higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary sailors; for the forces of the Athenians are made up of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, whereas ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of the men than in the pay they get, would be less subject to such defection.
And so, if we win a single victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated.Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Peloponnesian side for higher pay. If, however, they should still hold out, we on our part shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and asp soon as we have brought our skill to a parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be superior. For the excellence that nature has given us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us through practice.
And as to the money we need to accomplish all this,we shall provide it by contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very wealth and withal have it used to our destruction.
" But we have other ways also of waging war—inducing their allies to revolt, which is the best means of depriving them of the revenues in which their strength consists, the planting of forts in their territory, and all the other measures which one cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources allow; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be safe, while he who loses his temper over itOr, reading αὐτόν with the MSS., “makes blunders through his own fault as much as anything,” ie. “the man who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters.” makes more blunders. "
And let us reflect also that, if we individually were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines with an enemy who was no more than our equal, that might be borne; but as the case stands, the Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, unless all of us together, every nation and town, with one accord resist them, they will easily overpower us because we shall be divided. And as to defeat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it be well understood that it brings nothing else than downright slavery.
That such an outcome should even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single states.
We know not how such a course can be acquitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose that, escaping those errors, you have reached that most fatal spirit of proud disdainκαταφρόνησις is that proud and haughty spirit which precedes and invites a fall. It seems impossible to reproduce in English the assonance of the words καταφρόνησις ἀφροσύνη Thucydides was fond of paronomasia; cf. Thuc. 1.33.4. which has ruined so many men that it has taken on a new name, that of despicable folly.
"With regard, however, to what is past and done, what need is there to find fault at length, except in so far as that is profitable for what is present? But with a view to what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task in hand—for to win virtueOr, the rewards of virtue--honour, renown. by toils is our heritage—and make no change of custom because you now have a slight superiority in wealth and power; for it is not right that attributes which have been won through poverty should be lost through prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with confidence, and for many reasons: the god has spoken through his oracle and promised that he himself will help you; all the rest of Hellas will join you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly through self-interest;
and, finally, you will not be the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in bidding you go to war, considers it to have been transgressed already, but you will be going to the defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it is not those who fight in self-defence that break a treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked.
"So then, since from every quarter a favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to war, and since we recommend this course in the common interest—if it be true that identity of interest' is the surest policy for states and individuals to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the rest; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when some are already being injured, and others, if it shall become known that we have had a meeting and dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same fate.