Kitap 1
Some space of time after this, the outlaws of Boeotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and certain other places of Boeotia, the Athenians made war upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand men of arms of their own and as many of their confederates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas the son of Tolmaeus.
And when they had taken Chaeroneia, they carried away the inhabitants captives and, leaving a garrison in the city, departed. In their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Locrians of Opus and the Euboean outlaws and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coroneia;
and overcoming the Athenians in battle, some they slew and some they took alive.
Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Boeotia and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released. So the outlaws and the rest returned, and lived again under their own laws.
Not long after revolted Euboea from the Athenians; and when Pericles had already passed over into it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that Megara was likewise revolted and that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisaea. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Euboea;
and the Lacedaemonians afterward brake into Attica and wasted the country about Eleusine and Thriasium under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and came no farther on, but so went away.
After which the Athenians passed again into Euboea and totally subdued it: the Hestiaeans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands, but ordered the rest of Euboea according to composition made.
Being returned from Euboea, within awhile after they made a peace with the Lacedaemonians and their confederates for thirty years and rendered Nisaea, Achaia, Pegae, and Troezene (for these places the Athenians held of theirs) to the Peloponnesians.
In the sixth year of this peace fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians concerning Priene; and the Milesians, being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians. Wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians out of desire to alter the form of government.
Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys and set up the democracy there and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages, which, when they had put into Lemnos and set a guard upon them, they came home.
But certain of the Samians (for some of them not enduring the popular government were fled into the continent) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, who then was governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over into Samos in the evening and first set upon the popular faction and brought most of them into their power;
and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines.
The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use (for some of them went into Caria to observe the fleet of the Phoenicians and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos), but with the forty-four that remained, under the command of Pericles and nine others, fought with seventy galleys of the Samians (whereof twenty were such as served for the transport of soldiers) as they were coming altogether from Miletus; and the Athenians had the victory.
After this came a supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty-five. With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle and besieged the city, which they inclosed with a triple wall, and shut it up by sea with their galleys.
But Pericles, taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phoenician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys was already gone out of Samos and others out of other places to meet the Phoenicians.
In the meantime, the Samians, coming suddenly forth with their fleet and falling upon the harbour of the Athenians which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it and overcame the rest in fight, insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased.
But Pericles returning shut them up again with his galleys. And after this there came to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormio; and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos thirty more.
And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege they rendered the city upon composition: namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war at days appointed. And the Byzantines also yielded with condition to remain subject to them in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.
Now not many years after this happened the matters before related, of the Corcyraeans and the Potidaeans and whatsoever other intervenient pretext of this war.
These things done by the Grecians one against another or against the barbarians came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of 118erxes to the beginning of this present war. In which time the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedaemonians saw and opposed not, save now and then a little, but, as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity and also for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them; till now at last, when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly indeed and that they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer, but thought it necessary to go in hand with the war with all diligence and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose it was by the Lacedaemonians themselves decreed that the peace was broken and that the Athenians had done unjustly;
and also having sent to Delphi and enquired of Apollo whether they should have the better in the war or not, they received, as it is reported, this answer: That if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory and that himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled.
Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to put it to the question amongst them, whether they should make war or not. And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in and the council set, as well the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury and desiring the war, as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities everyone severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea should be lost before help came, being then present spake last of all to this effect:
"Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians, they having both decreed the war themselves and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs equally with others) to consider before the rest of the common business.
And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the Athenians need not be taught to beware of them, yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we in places of traffic on the sea side, to know that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not, but to make account that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach to themselves;
and that this consultation concerneth them no less than us, and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet unless they have wrong, yet it is the part of valiant men, when they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after success, from war to come again to composition, and neither to swell with the good success of war nor to suffer injury through pleasure taken in the ease of peace.
For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success observeth not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence.
For though many things ill advised come to good effect against enemies worse advised, yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly out against well advised enemies. For no man comes to execute a thing with the same confidence he premeditates it. For we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear.
"As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down.
And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory: first, because we exceed them in number;
and next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion. And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it both out of everyone's particular wealth and with the money at Delphi and Olympia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners by offer of greater wages. For the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than domestic; whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money.
And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto by teaching; but the experience which they exceed us in, that must we attain unto by industry.
And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, it must be all our parts to contribute. For else it were a hard case that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude, and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us and even with that do us mischief.
"We have also many other ways of war, as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue; the building of forts in their territory; and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contriveth most things upon the occasion. Wherein he that complies with it with most temper standeth the firmest, and he that is most passionate oftenest miscarries.
Imagine we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory with an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings with it no less than manifest servitude, which but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus.
For it must then be thought that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear and so appear degenerate from our ancestors. For by them the liberty of all Greece hath been restored, whereas we for our part assure not so much as our own but, claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us.
Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not by imputing it to that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it hath made too many men miscarry, hath gotten the name of foolishness.
"But to what end should we object matters past more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present labour for the future, for it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour. And though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom; for there is no reason that what was gotten in want should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war as for many other causes so also for this, that both the God hath by his oracle advised us thereto and promised to be with us himself, and also for that the rest of Greece, some for fear and some for profit, are ready to take our parts.
Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the God, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to the war, judgeth violated by them; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaketh the peace that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader.
So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same, and seeing also that both to the cities and to private men it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by lonians, nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admitteth not delay when they are some of them already oppressed, and others (after it shall be known we met and durst not right ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like.
But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity and that this is the best advice; and therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. For though by war growth the confirmation of peace, yet for love of ease to refuse the war doth not likewise avoid the danger.