Book 3
5.79
From these writers I differ even more widely: for it is not the nature of the legal action itself which is involved in the question of competence, but the cause of the act; and this is the case in almost every defence. Finally he who adopts this line of defence, does not thereby abandon the qualitative basis; for he states that he himself is free from blame, so that we really should differentiate between two kinds of quality ( A ) Absolute, when the deed is shown to be right. ( B ) Relative, when the act is not defended, but the agent is cleared of the guilt of the act. one of which comes into play when both the accused person and his act are defended, and the other when the accused person alone is defended.
5.80
We must therefore accept the view of the authorities followed by Cicero, See § 44. to the effect that there are three things on which enquiry is made in every case: we ask whether a thing is, that it is, and of that kind it is. Nature herself imposes this upon us. For first of all there must be some subject for the question, since we cannot possibly determine what a thing is, or of what kind it is, until we have first ascertained whether it is, and therefore the first question raised is whether it is. But even when it is clear that a thing is,
