Book 2
22.8
It makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful; defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust; advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful.
22.9
And similarly in regard to any subject whatever. For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in justice or the good.
22.10
Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly or loosely—since they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove anything in any other wayOr, by means of the speech it is impossible to prove anything otherwise (Cope).—it is evidently necessary, as has been stated in the Topics,Aristot. Top. 1.14. πρῶτον: i.e. the speaker's chief care should be . . . to have first on each subject a selection of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable.
