Book 7
3
Now that which is intelligible and primary to individuals is often but slightly intelligible, and contains but little reality; but nevertheless, starting from that which is imperfectly intelligible but intelligible to oneself, we must try to understand the absolutely intelligible; advancing, as we have said, by means of these very things which are intelligible to us.
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Since we distinguished at the beginningAristot. Met. 7.3.1. the number of ways in which substance is defined, and since one of these appeared to be essence, we must investigate this.
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First, let us make certain linguistic statements about it.
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The essence of each thing is that which it is said to be per se. To be you is not to be cultured, because you are not of your own nature cultured. Your essence, then, is that which you are said to be
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of your own nature. But not even all of this is the essence; for the essence is not that which is said to be per se in the sense that whiteness is said to belong to a surface,Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.18.3, 4. because being a surface is not being white.
