Book 7
7
It follows, then, that there is one form of many things whose form is clearly different (a consequence which confronted the Pythagoreans tooCf. Aristot. Met. 1.5.17.), and that it is possible to make one supreme Form of everything, and not to regard the rest as forms. In this way, however, all things would be one.
8
Now we have stated that the question of definitions involves some difficulty, and have shown why this is so. Hence to reduce everything in this way and to dispose of the matter is going too far; for some things are presumably a particular form in particular matter, or particular things in a particular state.
9
And the analogy in the case of the living thing which the younger SocratesA disciple of the great Socrates; one of the speakers in the PoliticusPlat. Stat. and referred to in Plat. Theaet. 147c, Plat. Soph. 218b. used to state is not a good one; for it leads one away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it is possible for a man to exist without his parts, as a circle does without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for the animal is sensible and cannot be defined without motion, and hence not unless its parts are in some definite condition;
10
for it is not the hand in any condition that is a part of a man, but only when it can perform its function, and so has life in it. Without life in it it is not a part.
