Book 7
14
But the body and its parts are posterior to this substance, and it is not the substance, but the concrete whole, which is resolved into these parts as into matter. Therefore in one sense these parts are prior to the concrete whole, and in another not; for they cannot exist in separation. A finger cannot in every state be a part of a living animal; for the dead finger has only the name in common with the living one.
15
Some parts are contemporary with the whole: such as are indispensable and in which the formula and the essence are primarily present; e.g. the heart or perhaps the brain,Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.1.1. for it does not matter which of them is of this nature. But man and horse and terms which are applied in this way to individuals, but universally, are not substance, but a kind of concrete whole composed of this particular formula and this particular matter regarded as universal. But individually Socrates is already composed of ultimate matter; and similarly in all other cases.
16
A part, then, may be part of the form (by form I mean essence), or of the concrete whole composed of form and matter, or of the matter itself. But only the parts of the form are parts of the formula, and the formula refers to the universal; for circle is the same as essence of circle, and soul the same as essence of soul.
