Book 7
7
thus in one sense there will be no definition of anything, and nothing will have an essence, except substances; and in another those other things will have a definition and essence. It is obvious, then, that the definition is the formula of the essence, and that the essence belongs either only to substances, or especially and primarily and simply.
1
We must inquire whether the essence is the same as the particular thing, or different. This is useful for our inquiry about substance; because a particular thing is considered to be nothing other than its own substance, and the essence is called the substance of the thing.
2
In accidental predications, indeed, the thing itself would seem to be different from its essence; e.g., white man is different from essence of white man. If it were the same, essence of man and essence of white man would be the same. For man and white man are the same, they say, and therefore essence of white man is the same as essence of man.
