Book 5
4
Thus it follows that substance has two senses: the ultimate subject, which cannot be further predicated of something else; and whatever has an individual and separate existence. The shape and form of each particular thing is of this nature.
1
The same means (a) accidentally the same. E.g., white and cultured are the same because they are accidents of the same subject; and man is the same as cultured, because one is an accident of the other; and cultured is the same as man because it is an accident of man; and cultured man is the same as each of the terms cultured and man, and vice versa; for both man and cultured are used in the same way as cultured man, and the latter in the same way as the former.
2
Hence none of these predications can be made universally. For it is not true to say that every man is the same as the cultured; because universal predications are essential to things, but accidental predications are not so, but are made of individuals and with a single application. Socrates and cultured Socrates seem to be the same; but Socrates is not a class-name, and hence we do not say every Socrates as we say every man.
