Book 4
3
The first class, then, may be readily convinced of this, because it is not hard to grasp. But those who look only for cogency in argument look for an impossibility, for they claim the right to contradict themselves, and lose no time in doing so.
4
Yet if not everything is relative, but some things are self-existent, not every appearance will be true; for an appearance is an appearance to someone. And so he who says that all appearances are true makes everything relative.
5
Hence those who demand something cogent in argument, and at the same time claim to make out a case, must guard themselves by saying that the appearance is true; not in itself, but for him to whom it appears, and at, the time when it appears, and in the way and manner in which it appears. And if they make out a case without this qualification, as a result they will soon contradict themselves;
6
for it is possible in the case of the same man for a thing to appear honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and for things to appear different to the sight of each of his two eyes, if their sight is unequal. For to those who assert (for the reasons previously stated Aristot. Met. 4.5.7-17. ) that appearances are true, and that all things are therefore equally false and true, because they do not appear the same to all, nor always the same to the same person, but often have contrary appearances at the same time
