Book 4
16
And the same argument holds also in the case of not being man; because being man and being not-man have different meanings if being white and being man have different meanings (for the opposition is much stronger in the former case so as to produce different meanings).
17
And if we are told that white too means one and the same thing,i.e. the same as man. we shall say again just what we said before,Aristot. Met. 4.4.12. that in that case all things, and not merely the opposites, will be one. But if this is impossible, what we have stated follows; that is, if our opponent answers our question; but if when asked the simple question he includes in his answer the negations, he is not answering our question.
18
There is nothing to prevent the same thing from being man and white and a multitude of other things; but nevertheless when asked whether it is true to say that X is man, or not, one should return an answer that means one thing, and not add that X is white and large. It is indeed impossible to enumerate all the infinity of accidents; and so let him enumerate either all or none.
19
Similarly therefore, even if the same thing is ten thousand times man and not-man, one should not include in one’s answer to the question whether it is man that it is at the same time also not-man, unless one is also bound to include in one’s answer all the other accidental things that the subject is or is not. And if one does this, he is not arguing properly.
