Book 3
8
Then is it many and diverse? This too is illogical. And besides, how does the matter become each individual one of these things, and how is the concrete whole both matter and form?For answers to these questions see Aristot. Met. 7.8, 13-14; Aristot. Met. 12.6-10; Aristot. Met. 13.10.
8
(8.) Further, the following difficulty might be raised about the first principles. If they are one in kind, none of them will be one in number, not even the Idea of Unity or of Being. And how can there be knowledge unless there is some universal term?If the principles are one in kind only, particular things cannot be referred to the same principle but only to like principles; i.e., there will be no universal terms, without which there can be no knowledge.
9
On the other hand if they are numerically one, and each of the principles is one, and not, as in the case of sensible things, different in different instances (e.g. since a given syllable is always the same in kind, its first principles are always the same in kind, but only in kind, since they are essentially different in number)—if the first principles are one, not in this sense, but numerically, there will be nothing else apart from the elements; for numerically one and individual are identical in meaning. This is what we mean by individual: the numerically one; but by universal we mean what is predicable of individuals.
