Book 11
8
Nor (b) can the infinite be any simple body; neither, as someAnaximander. It seems, however, that by ἄπειρον he meant indeterminate or undifferentiated, although he no doubt regarded this principle as infinite as well. Cf. notes on Aristot. Met. 1.7.3, Aristot. Met. 12.2.3. hold, something which is apart from the elements and from which they suppose the elements to be generated (for there is no such body apart from the elements; everything can be resolved into that of which it consists, but we do not see things resolved into anything apart from the simple bodies), nor fire nor any other element.
9
Apart from the question of how any of them could be infinite, the All, even if it is finite, cannot be or become any one of the elements, as Heraclitus saysCf. Hereclitus Fr. 20-22 (Bywater). all things at certain times become fire. The same argument applies as to the One which the physicists posit besides the elements; for all change proceeds from the contrary, e.g. from hot to cold.The argument seems to be: Since all change is from contrary to contrary, and it is impossible that either (a) one of the elements should be contrary to the rest, or (b) one material principle should be contrary to all four elements, it follows that no one element, and similarly that no one material principle apart from the elements, can be the ultimate material principle of the universe.
