Book 11
12
Since nothing accidental is prior to that which is per se, neither are accidental causes prior. Therefore if chance or spontaneity is the cause of the universe, mind and nature are prior causes.The argument is stated more fully and clearly in Aristot. Physics 2.6ff.. Chance produces indirectly the effects produced directly by mind; and spontaneity is similarly related to nature. But the indirect cause presupposes the direct. The argument is directed against the Atomists. Cf. Aristot. Phys. 196a 24, Simplicius 327.24, Cicero De Nat. Deor. 1.66 (nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito).
1
A thing may exist only actually or potentially, or actually and potentially; it may be a substance or a quantity or one of the other categories. There is no motionThe discussion of motion in this chapter consists of extracts from Aristot. Physics 3.1-3. apart from things, for change is always in accordance with the categories of Beingi.e., change is substantial (generation and destruction); quantitative (increase and decrease); qualitative (alteration); spatial (locomotion). Cf. Aristot. Met. 11.12.1, 2.; and there is nothing which is common to these and in no one category. Each category belongs to all its members in two ways—e.g. substance, for this is sometimes the form of the thing and sometimes its privation;
