Book 10
6
(hence AnaxagorasCf. Aristot. Met. 1.3.9. was not right in leaving the subject by saying all things were together, infinite both in multitude and in smallness; instead of in smallness he should have said in fewness,sc. and then the absurdity of his view would have been apparent, for, etc. Aristotle assumes the Anaxagoras meant smallness (μικρότης) to be the opposite of multitude (πλῆθος); but he meant just what he said—that the particles of which things consist are infinitely many and infinitely small. See Bowman in Classical Review 30, 42-44. for things cannot be infinite in fewness), since fewness is constituted not by one, as some hold, but by two.
7
In the sphere of numbers one is opposed to many as the measure to the measurable, i.e., as relative terms are opposed which are not of their own nature relative. We have distinguished elsewhereAristot. Met. 5.15.8, 9. that things are called relative in two senses—either as being contraries, or as knowledge is related to the knowable, A being related to B because B is described in relation to A.
8
There is no reason why one should not be fewer than something, e.g. two; for if it is fewer it is not therefore few. Plurality is, as it were, a genus of number, since number is a plurality measurable by one. And in a sense one and number are opposed; not, however, as being contrary, but as we have said some relative terms to be; for it is qua measure and measurable that they are opposed.
