Book 10
6
Therefore it is a privative negation of both. For this reason we say whether with reference to both, and not to one of the two—e.g., whether it is greater or equal, or whether it is equal or smaller; there are always three alternatives. But it is not a necessary privation; for not everything is equal which is not greater or smaller, but only things which would naturally have these attributes.
7
The equal, then, is that which is neither great nor small, but would naturally be either great or small; and it is opposed to both as a privative negation, and therefore is intermediate between them. And that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but it has no name (for each of these terms has several meanings, and there is no one material which is receptive of both); that which is neither white nor black is better entitled to a name,
8
although even this has no single name, but the colors of which this negation is privatively predicated are to a certain extent limited; for it must be either grey or buff or something similar.
9
Therefore those persons are wrong in their criticism who imagine that all terms are used analogously, so that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand will be intermediate between shoe and hand, because that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between good and bad—as though there must be an intermediate in all cases; but this does not necessarily follow.
