Book 10
3
if, then, the question whether is always concerned with opposites, and we can ask whether it is greater or smaller, or equal, what is the nature of the antithesis between equal and greater or smaller? It is contrary neither to one only, nor to both: for (a) it is no more contrary to the greater than to the smaller; (b) equal is contrary to unequal, and thus it will be contrary to more than one thing;
4
(c) if unequal means the same as both greater and smaller at the same time, equal must still be opposed to them both: This difficulty supports the theoryHeld by the Platonists. Cf. Aristot. Met. 14.1.4, 5. that the unequal is a duality. But the result is that one thing is contrary to two; which is impossible.
5
Further, it is apparent that equal is intermediate between great and small, but it is not apparent that any contrariety is intermediate, nor can it be, by definition; for it could not be complete if it were the intermediate of something, but rather it always has something intermediate between itself and the other extreme.
5
It remains, then, that it is opposed either as negation or as privation. Now it cannot be so opposed to one of the two, for it is no more opposed to the great than to the small.
