Book 3
15
But the term involuntary does not really apply to an action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choicei.e., choice of Ends: see 3.2.1 note. (that sort of ignorance constitutes vice)—that is to say, they result not from general ignorance (because that is held to be blameworthy), but from particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the thingsThings seems to include persons, see example (3) below. affected by it; for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent.
16
Perhaps then it will be as well to specify the nature and number of these circumstances. They are (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thingThings seems to include persons, see example (3) below. that is affected by or is the sphere ofἐν τίνι seems to bear a more limited sense than ἐν οἷς ll. 1, 16, 19, 24, which covers the circumstances of all sorts. the act; and sometimes also (4) the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done, (5) the effect, for instance, saving a man’s life, and (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.
