Book 3
7
We deliberate about things that are in our control and are attainable by action (which are in fact the only things that still remain to be considered; for Nature, Necessity, and Chance, with the addition of Intelligence and human agency generally, exhaust the generally accepted list of causes). But we do not deliberate about all human affairs without exception either: for example, no Lacedaemonian deliberates about the best form of governmentOr, the best line of policy. for Scythia; but any particular set of men deliberates about the things attainable by their own actions.
8
Also there is no room for deliberation about matters fully ascertained and completely formulated as sciences; such for instance as orthography, for we have no uncertainty as to how a word ought to be spelt. We deliberate about things in which our agency operates, but does not always produce uniform results; for instance about questions of medicine and of business; and we deliberate about navigation more than about athletic training, because it has been less completely reduced to a science; and similarly with other pursuits also.
9
And we deliberate more about the artsA less well attested reading gives more about our opinions, and Aristotle does not usually distinguish sharply between the arts and crafts and the practical sciences (the theoretic sciences cannot here be meant, see 3.3,4). than about the sciences, because we are more uncertain about them.
