Book 2
5
And the same considerations also prove that the virtues and vices are not capacities; since we are not pronounced good or bad, praised or blamed, merely by reason of our capacity for emotion. Again, we possess certain capacities by nature, but we are not born good or bad by nature: of this however we spoke before.
6
If then the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, it remains that they are dispositions.
6
Thus we have stated what virtue is generically.
1
But it is not enough merely to define virtue generically as a disposition; we must also say what species of disposition it is.
2
It must then be premised that all excellence has a twofold effect on the thing to which it belongs: it not only renders the thing itself good, but it also causes it to perform its function well. For example, the effect of excellence in the eye is that the eye is good and functions well; since having good eyes means having good sight. Similarly excellence in a horse makes it a good horse, and also good at galloping, at carrying its rider, and at facing the enemy.
3
If therefore this is true of all things, excellence or virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also which will cause him to perform his function well.
4
We have already indicated2.8 f. what this means; but it will throw more light on the subject if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue.
