Book 1
9
But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among these that the winners are found,—so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life.
10
And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul,Not an experience of the body (cf. 10.3.6), even the case of bodily pleasures. This brings pleasure within the definition of happiness as “an activity of the soul.” and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as fond of so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theater, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and acts conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue.
