Book 8
15
The former persons then may possibly owe their good fortune to nature, for their impulse and appetition, being for the right object, succeeded, but their reasoning was foolish; and in their case, when it happens that their reasoning seems to be incorrect but that impulse is the cause of it, this impulse being right has saved them; although sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they have reasoned in this way and come to misfortune.
16
But in the case of the others,Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1247b 30τὰ δ’ οὔ( Solomon). then, how will good fortune be due to natural goodness of appetition and desire? The fact is that the good fortune here and that in the other case are the same. Or is good fortune of more than one kind, and is fortune twofold?
17
But since we see some people being fortunate contrary to all the teachings of science and correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of good fortune must be something different. But is it or is it not good fortune whereby a man formed a desire for the right thing and at the right time when in his case human reasoning could not make this calculation? For a thing the desire for which is natural is not altogether uncalculated, but the reasoning is perverted by something.
18
So no doubt he seems fortunate, because fortune is the cause of things contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason, for it is contrary to knowledge and to general principle.
