Book 7
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For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have saidCf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1223a 36-b 17. Self-restraint (or the lack of it) indicates that a man’s personality has in a sense two parts, one of which may control the other; and similarly self-love implies that one part of the personality can have a certain feeling in regard to another part. how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one’s spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing,whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly.For all these relations involve two separate factors;
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in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not.
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From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses.Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1244a 20. Perhaps a reference to Aristotle’s lectures (Stock). For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other’s sake;
