Book 7
5
And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same.
6
And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure.i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit they get from their friend is not equal (absolutely, not merely in proportion to a supposed difference of merit) to that which they give to him.
7
This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their affection. Hence AenicusA dramatist of the Old Comedy. has said: A loved one so would speak, but not a lover. But they think that the reason is the same.
1
There being then, as has been said,See Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1236a 7-1237b 15. three kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of superiority.
